

THE  
RESTLESS PACIFIC

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NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT












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




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# THE RESTLESS PACIFIC



BY  
NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT  
AUTHOR OF "THE PHILIPPINES: A TREASURE AND A PROBLEM"



CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS  
NEW YORK · LONDON

1928



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
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




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TO THE MEMORY OF  
ADMIRAL A. T. MAHAN, U. S. N.  
TEACHER, STATESMAN  
REALIST





## PREFACE

In this book I have tried to piece together the disjointed fragments of the jig-saw puzzle of the Pacific so as to make a picture at once clear and unified.

In the hope of dispelling some of the illusions which so often obscure discussions of international affairs in America I have especially emphasized the geographical and economic fundamentals.

The outstanding fact of the twentieth century is that the theatre of world-events has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The United States of America, as one of the great Pacific powers, is now irretrievably involved in the politics of eastern Asia. Little understood by the American people to-day, this relation is destined in time to be of utmost importance to them.

If this volume gives the reader a sense of the unity of the Pacific area, and a realization of the interrelation between the politics of Europe and eastern Asia and their effect on America's interests, it will have served its purpose.

NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT.

NEW YORK, February, 1928.







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
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


# THE RESTLESS PACIFIC

## I

### THE PROBLEM





### THE SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE FAR EAST BETWEEN 1890 AND 1925.

Based on an arbitrary scale, this shows the relative decline of Russian and British and the rise of Japanese and American influence in eastern Asia and their relation to the principal historical events of the period.



## CHAPTER I

### IN PERSPECTIVE

Seventy-five years have passed since Senator William H. Seward, later Lincoln's Secretary of State, uttered his famous prophecy that "the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter." With rare clarity of vision he added that, "henceforth European commerce, European politics, European thought, and European connections, although actually becoming more intimate, will nevertheless relatively sink in importance."

Seward spoke in the days of the California gold-rush, when America's clipper ships were famous on the seven seas. For a half century after the Civil War his prophecy was without honor, as Americans had turned their eyes inland and were occupied in the titanic task of carving an empire out of a continent. But in time his vision was vindicated. He had correctly foreseen the inevitable result of American expansion to the shores of the Pacific and beyond.

To-day the Pacific is the scene of a stirring drama. What the Mediterranean was to the civilization of Rome, and the Atlantic was to Europe in the last three centuries, the Pacific is to the world of the twentieth century. On its shores lie two of the greatest nations of history—China and the United States—the older firmly established when the younger was unborn; the younger bursting with wealth and strength such as the older

never knew in its golden prime. A little apart from the mainland of Asia, as England is from Europe, lies the great island empire, Japan. At the western gateway of the Pacific, Great Britain stands guard over her possessions scattered from the Antipodes to the Arctic, and shelters, incidentally, Holland's treasure trove in the East Indies. On the extreme north, pressing, expanding, grasping, lies the land of the Muscovite—Russia, ever turning her back on her frozen steppes, seeking empire in Asia, and ports in warm waters. China, Japan, Russia, Holland, the British Empire, and the United States—these are the actors on the Far Eastern stage to-day.

China now, as four centuries ago, is the great enigma. The wealth of Cathay still lures the world, even though none knows whether it be fact or myth. Europe, America, and Japan want China's trade, hoping to find among the 444,000,000 inhabitants of that country more markets for their goods. In the meantime China, torn by what may prove to be the greatest of her periodic revolutions, is in contact with new forces. Industrialism has clashed with feudalism. Strange ideas have shaken the foundations of a social order crystallized for several thousand years. The Celestial Empire, over which the Son of Heaven presided with absolute power until 1911, has disintegrated, and in its place almost every form of government has been tried. China is changing. Whether she will move forward rapidly and become a great modern power like Japan, or, repeating her history, will pass through a century of turmoil, emerging later with a new dynasty, cannot be foretold.

Nor is unrest confined to China alone. Throughout the East racial consciousness is stirring. The seeds of

self-determination, skilfully broadcast among the Oriental peoples by Soviet Russia, are beginning to germinate. In India, in the Dutch East Indies, even in the Philippines, resentment against foreign governmental control is increasing. The new nationalist forces are primarily destructive, for behind them there does not seem to be sufficient unity to make possible the effective replacement by native control of that power now exercised by foreigners. But the forces are none the less vital and all the more dangerous.

Japan, with her extraordinary growth and rapid Westernization, has not escaped the disruptive effect of modern social theories. Liberalism is active in Japanese life and may modify the expansionist ambitions of the militarists and reactionaries. The peace of the Pacific will be largely determined by which tendency prevails.

Soviet Russia, like France after the Revolution, is stirred with hope of expansion. The chief difference between Czarist and Soviet imperialism is one of method, both being in aim aggressive, designing, unscrupulous. Russia, for the time at least, has turned her back on Europe. Is it mere coincidence that the removal of the capital from Petrograd to Moscow should be accompanied by a new Asiatic orientation, just as the transfer of the capital from Moscow to the shores of the Baltic two centuries ago marked the first active participation of Russia in European politics? To-day Russia is again pushing down upon China. It is not impossible that, as Admiral Mahan suggested thirty years ago, Manchuria will be the Belgium of the Far East, and that another war will be fought there soon.

Far to the south lies the great island empire of the Netherlands, the fabled Indies which lured the early

merchant adventurers in search of peppers and spice. To-day these islands would be unprotected were it not for the British guard at Singapore and—which is equally important—for the American occupation of the Philippines. Their wealth, both actual and potential, is so great that they may well tempt an unscrupulous aggressor. It is no secret that the Germans coveted them before the World War and would gladly have added them to the newly created German colonial empire. Is it to be wondered that the Dutch are among the staunchest supporters of world-peace and are determined to use their influence to see the status quo in the Pacific made doubly sure? To them the new forces of race-consciousness in Asia are alarming. The possibility of Philippine independence fills them with fearful forebodings.

Like Holland, Great Britain in the East plays the rôle of a conservator. She has no aggressive designs and has given up expansionist aims, seeking only to hold what she has. In particular, she is concentrating on the preservation of India, now as always the base of the empire. Her new tendencies are viewed with mixed feelings in the Dominions, which are less interested in India than in the Pacific.

As a result of the development of modern communications, the Pacific basin has become in effect a unit. Not only have conflicting commercial and political activities in one part a repercussion in another, but even the violent "acts of God" in the form of earthquakes and typhoons which from time to time visit the East are not without influence elsewhere. A repetition of the 1923 earthquake in Japan might so cripple that country as to reduce it to comparative impotence, thus changing the course of history in eastern Asia.



The problems of the Pacific are manifold. There are adjustments of race involving emigration and immigration. Two opposing questions must be answered: Have we who hold the unused good lands of the world the right to keep these exclusively for our own people? Have the overpopulated nations the right to force their excess children on other countries? Correlated with these are problems of industrialization and of birth-control, of the mooted "yellow peril" and of a possible "white peril," which some believe is undermining the civilizations of the East.

Intricate questions concerning the rights of white men in Asia likewise remain to be answered. Are Europeans and Americans entitled to propagate their religious, social, and political views when these become disruptive forces? Have they the right to insist on special protection in countries where justice is rarely to be found? What of the colonies and dependencies which Western enterprise has developed and which Western arms have kept peaceful? Have Eastern peoples, in the name of self-determination, the right to revert to mediævalism if in so doing they bring suffering on their own kind and on the world in general?

To Americans these questions of the Pacific have ceased to be purely academic, for the United States has been forced by geographic circumstances to play an important—perhaps a determining—part in this conflict of interests in the Pacific. Not content to make the Pacific coast her territorial limit, and to develop through the Golden Gate and other ports a flourishing trade across the Pacific, the United States has annexed Alaska and Hawaii, and established naval bases in Guam, the Philippines, and Samoa. The American people, to use a

phrase of H. H. Bancroft, the historian of the west coast, "have plunged into the sea." Henceforth their destinies will be affected by developments in the imperial ocean.

America's interests in the Pacific are determined by geographical, governmental, commercial, sentimental, diplomatic, and strategical factors. To divide them into separate categories is not easy, but a few generalizations may be suggested: that our Pacific coast line and our possession of Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines are the geographical bases of our power in the Pacific; that the administration of the Philippines raises internal questions of government of far-reaching external consequence; that our need for tropical raw materials and for more markets for our steadily increasing output of manufactured goods leads us to extend our commercial relations in eastern Asia; that our guardianship of the only large group of Christian orientals—the Filipinos—and our century-old support of religious, educational, and medical missionary work in China give us special concern about spiritual and idealistic matters in the Orient; that the furtherance of these various legitimate interests leads us into constant political relations with other nations having like or different interests; that the necessity of supporting our policies, in peace as well as in war, places on us the onus of maintaining naval forces and bases in the Pacific.

As will be made clear later, the cutting of the Panama Canal was probably the most important single event in the first fifteen years of America's history in the twentieth century. That act revolutionized world-politics—invisibly, at first, but none the less surely. Thanks to the Panama Canal, America has become an island,

which, as William Howard Gardiner has pointed out in his essay, "Insular America," is centrally placed in the oceanic world, 3,000 miles from Europe, 1,500 miles from South America, and 4,000 miles from Asia. When compared with the position of England off Europe and Japan off the Asiatic mainland, the position of insular America is seen to be even more fortunate. At the same time that it has given the United States the benefits of geographical—and hence political—detachment, it has given her the central position which in matters of peace and war is highly advantageous. The "Far East" is closer to the United States than is the "Near East." From Yokohama to Seattle is scarcely a hundred miles farther than from Naples to New York.

In addition to this strategically invaluable home base, America possesses in the Philippines an Asiatic outpost which has been aptly described by the late General Wood as a "spearhead of Christian civilization" in the Oriental world. On what we do with the islands will largely depend the success of our activities in the East, religious and social, as well as commercial and political. The Philippines are thus of vital importance in America's Pacific policy. Their ultimate disposition can only be decided with a due regard to the interests of the region as a whole.

In interpreting correctly the relative merits of the different problems of the Pacific it is well to keep in mind a few fundamental principles. A direct relationship exists between national policy and sea power. The navy is not only an implement of war but an arm of diplomacy which properly used insures the support of a nation's legitimate interests and aspirations in time of peace. In this age of metals in which we live naval and

national power are largely determined by available sources of essential raw materials. These properly utilized give a nation wealth and strength.

The United States in these respects has been peculiarly fortunate. Thanks to her enormous natural resources and to her skill in developing her industries, she has become the foremost industrial power of the world. Her annual production of steel equals that of all the other nations put together. The same is true of other important manufactures, like automobiles, farm implements, and sewing machines. Her foreign trade now equals the trade of the British Isles. Particularly significant is the fact that American trade with Asia has steadily increased while that with Europe has relatively declined. In 1925 we imported more from Asia than from Europe or the Americas.

Most important of all is that the United States, which fifty years ago was an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods, is now an exporter of finished products and an importer of raw materials. America has become dependent on the outside world for many essentials in her industries. She has also come to need the outside world as a market for her products. Even in the all-important matter of foodstuffs the time is not far distant when the United States will, like most of the countries of Europe, have to look abroad for new supplies. In 1926 our imports of foodstuffs exceeded our exports by \$266,000,000, and in the not very remote future we shall find ourselves in the same position as England, which yearly imports millions of tons of food from all parts of the world and pays for them with manufactured goods made at home.

The situation has not been simplified by the fact that America is thus coming into competition with Europe,



both in the fields of raw materials and in markets for manufactured goods. It is not extreme to assert, as does Mr. Gardiner, that "with this world-wide rivalry it follows that if either competitor can secure command over the means of conducting and controlling the traffic—*i. e.*, shipping and naval power—he will be able to divert and differentiate the business in his own interests and will thus have a great and even determinative advantage in assuring cheap supplies for his industries and adequate markets for his surplus products." Needless to say, it is to protect and assure such command of the sea that the British navy has been maintained as second to none in power and effectiveness.

In spite of the conflicting tendencies of the nations in the Pacific, one fact stands out supreme: that it is to the interest of the British Empire—or at least the Dominions—and of Holland and the United States to see the status quo preserved in this entire area.

In order to do this effectively the problems of the Pacific must be viewed realistically. Heretofore we Americans have been guided by sentimentality and ignorance, and have cherished illusions with surprising obtuseness and tenacity. We have complacently assumed that our fiat could remake the world, and that we had a mission to "reform the heathen." Our tasks remain and our ideals are unfulfilled. The problem which we face is how to make these ideals effective.

In the following chapters some of the more important factors have been broadly outlined in the hope that their interrelation will thus be more apparent. The selfish intrigues of European politics still have profound reactions in the Far East. As America is to-day an Asiatic power she can no longer remain indifferent to these currents.







## II

### THE GEOGRAPHY OF POSITION





## CHAPTER II

### THE GATES OF THE PACIFIC

Four centuries have passed since Vasco Nuñez de Balboa stood silent upon a peak in Darien, the first white man to gaze on the Pacific. Hewing his way through the thorny tropical jungle three hard days after this discovery, he waded into the waters which he called the South Sea, and, in the name of Castile and Aragon, took "real and actual possession of this sea and lands and coasts and ports and islands of the south, with all thereto annexed; and kingdoms and provinces which belong to them, in whatever manner and by whatever right and title acquired, now existing or which may exist, ancient and modern, in times past, present, and to come, without any contradiction." To make assurance doubly sure, he proclaimed the sovereigns of Castile and Aragon to be "lords paramount in these Indies, islands and firm lands, northern and southern, with their seas, as well in the arctic pole as in the antarctic, on either side of the equinoctial line, within or without the tropics of cancer and capricorn."

Six years later, Fernando de Magellan, after battling the terrible storms of the straits that bear his name, turned his hundred-ton galleon northward into a sea so sweetly placid by contrast that he forthwith named it the "Pacific." Coming into warmer waters off the coast of Chile, he set a westerly course and sailed across the longest stretch of open ocean in the world,

guided only by his faith that the morrow would find him at the Spiceries. "We were three months and twenty days without getting any kind of fresh food," his companion and chronicler, Pigafetta, tells us. "We ate biscuit which was no longer biscuit, but powder of biscuit swarming with worms." Rats sold for half a ducat apiece. Nineteen men died of scurvy before they finally reached Guam. It is interesting to note that this island is now one of the outposts of the United States in the Pacific, and that Magellan's next stop was at Cebu in the Philippines, over which to-day the American flag also flies. There he met his death, having earned lasting fame as the first man to find the passage to the East by sailing west.

Thus was the Pacific discovered, but for another two hundred and fifty years it remained largely unknown. The eastward course escaping the prevailing head winds was not found until 1565. Despite the going to and fro of buccaneers and occasional explorers, there are no records that the Hawaiian Islands were visited before the famous Captain Cook touched there in 1778. By another strange coincidence this man, who ranks with Magellan in the importance of his discoveries, met his death, like Magellan, on territory over which the American flag was later to fly. His explorations of Australia and the coast of western America, embracing Oregon, Columbia, and southern Alaska, first brought to the Western world extensive knowledge of this vast imperial ocean which Balboa had so grandly appropriated in Panama for the King and Queen of Spain.

Another century was to pass, however, before the Pacific was to assume importance in world events commensurable with its size. Between Balboa's proclamation




and the battle of Manila Bay it was the scene of minor reactions to the politics of Europe. In particular was it affected by the struggle between England and Spain—that struggle which reached its climax in 1588, when the Armada was destroyed off England, but dragged on for three centuries punctuated by bloody battles with buccaneers in the Spanish Main, while the English, and later the Americans, gradually dismembered the Spanish Empire. By 1830 Cuba and Porto Rico were all that remained of Spain in the Americas, and the Philippines and a few scattered isles in the Pacific. In 1899 these passed into American hands. The war waged by Elizabeth and the descendants of her people on both sides of the Atlantic was ended. The last vestige of the overseas Empire of the Catholic Kings had become the property of the American Republic. With that event a new world-power was born.

As if to hasten this shift of power, the Atlantic joined waters with the Pacific through the Panama Canal, the cutting of which has been described as the greatest geographical event since the discovery of America. Old as was the idea of slitting the Isthmus—King Philip of Spain is said to have envisaged the prospect—and great as is the credit due to the builder of the Suez Canal who failed in his efforts to sever Panama, it is owing to American political courage, to American engineering and technical skill, and to American initiative that this project was made effective. Suez had reduced the journey from Europe to the Far East by 3,500 miles. The Panama Canal reduced by 10,000 miles the sea voyage from New York to our northwest coast and brought Pacific ports within easy reach of the Atlantic. The Far East ceased to be far.

Thus by the stroke of a shovel the United States took its place in fact as well as in potentiality as one of the leading powers in the Pacific. A channel was opened through which the great industries of the East and of the Mississippi Valley, already seeking an overflow for their surplus, could easily send goods to the ends of the South Seas. Furthermore, the American navy, formerly confined to guard only one coast or risk being made vulnerable by division into two fleets, was given mobility that greatly increased its power. The ditch that split two continents united two oceans. Panama became the eastern gateway of the Pacific, vital alike to the trade and safety of the United States, and invaluable to the countries of the west coast of South America. Of utmost importance to Great Britain as well, it reduced the voyage from London to eastern Australia and New Zealand by 1,000 miles, and to western Canada by 5,500 miles. Within ten years of its opening its annual traffic exceeded that through Suez. To-day it is a vital artery of trade. Its closure would disrupt the economic life of the world.

Not merely chance alone delayed so long the opening of this great cut. The engineering task in itself was formidable, requiring technical methods which were unknown when Suez was dug, and scarcely perfected when the American engineers first took over the work from their unsuccessful French predecessors. The gigantic feats of construction which they performed would have been well-nigh impossible had not the service of the American sanitary engineers in Cuba following the occupation of that island taught the army how to control the yellow fever and malaria which had plagued the Isthmus for centuries. Modern science, modern profes-

sional skill, modern machinery, modern methods of efficiency alone made possible this easy passage through a mountainous neck of land. To-day only highly developed system and organization permit the uninterrupted use of this channel. The spotless cleanliness of the Canal Zone, the precision of the machinery, the efficiency of the administration, are the products of the



twentieth century, of an age of steel and concrete, of co-operation and organization. They epitomize the spirit of modern America, the might of intelligent materialism.

A clearer idea of the meaning to the world of this canal may be had when it is realized that the tonnage of cargo carried through it had risen from 4,800,000 in 1915, the year after its opening, to 26,000,000 in 1926. This is more than twice the amount that had been originally estimated for this period. By 1924 the traffic outstripped that through Suez. It is roughly equal to that

which passes through Singapore. Nearly 40 per cent of the trans-Panamanian cargoes in 1926 were part of the intercoastal trade of the United States. Another 10 per cent passed between the Atlantic and Gulf ports of the United States and the Far East and Australasia. This constituted about a quarter of our entire trans-Pacific trade. Half of the total traffic was under the American flag, a quarter under the British.

This traffic undoubtedly will continue to grow. M. Bunau Varilla, the celebrated French engineer who was alone in correctly forecasting the rate of increase in traffic before the canal was opened, has estimated that by 1934 the traffic will be at least 45,000,000 tons and by 1944, 135,000,000. This, be it noted, will tax the canal to capacity, as the projected water supplies for the locks are only expected, under normal conditions, to be able to carry between 50,000,000 and 100,000,000 tons of shipping a year.

The source of this future traffic cannot be precisely foretold, but there is every reason to expect that much of the exports, at least, will come from the great Mississippi Valley, which is rapidly taking its place as the seat of empire in America. As this region is more and more industrialized, it will seek markets abroad. The natural outlet for its products is by the Gulf ports. That portion destined for the west coast of South America, and for the entire region of the Pacific, will inevitably pass through Panama. The Canal, in fact, promises to assume ever greater importance for the Middle West.

It is interesting to note in this connection that twenty years before the Canal was built Admiral Mahan, in his studies on "The Influence of Sea Power on History," wrote that when Panama was opened the Mississippi

Valley would, in case of war involving the Canal, become the permanent base of operations, and that "the main effort of the country must pour down that valley." The Canal is, in fact, vital to the commerce and the defense of the United States. It is the centre of our coast line which runs from Maine to Seattle, with an interruption at the Rio Grande and the border of southern California not unlike the break in France's coast line made by the Pyrenees and the Iberian Peninsula. North America has become an island, with the United States lying athwart it from coast to coast, and protecting the passage that joins these coasts at Panama.

This deep cut which America has slashed through the Isthmus of Panama is of exceptional value in this century of the Pacific. Commerce follows the most advantageous routes, of which the Panama Canal is one. A strong Panama, well guarded, is therefore as necessary for America as is an open Suez for Great Britain. Both are primary requisites for the maintenance of world-trade.

As the great eastern gateway to the Pacific, Panama, machine made, and modern of the modern, the product of an age of steel and power, is in sharp contrast to Singapore, the western gateway to the imperial ocean. Lying on the other side of the globe almost directly opposite Panama, this island city of Singapore, which guards the tip end of the southern corner of Asia, is of the East oriental. To sail into its small harbor is to think of the ships of Tarshish that sailed thither in the days of King Solomon, bringing "gold and silver, ivory and apes and peacocks" back to Babylon. There people from the four corners of the earth meet; and ships from the seven seas. Liners from New York; trampers from the



Spice Islands; freighters with rubber from Sumatra or tin from Banka; tankers of the Standard Oil; packet-boats of the Royal Dutch Mail from Java; China coasters carrying coolies packed in like cattle; English steamers from Calcutta to Hongkong; French mail-boats going to Indo-China; Spanish freighters for Manila; Straits steamers bound for Borneo and the land of the Rajah Brooke—these and a thousand others, flying flags of all nations and bound for all ports of the world, may be seen any day swinging at anchor in the roads of Singapore. Chinese junks, their reddish-brown sails standing out against the pale-green waters of the tropics, ply their stately way among them, symbols of a civilization that is indifferent to steam and progress.

On shore the people of all races mingle—lanky Britishers in government or business, pride of possession in their attitude toward the rest of the world; American tourists pleasantly homesick from seeing American canned goods in the shops and American flivvers in the streets; Dutchmen from Java and Sumatra waiting for their ships to move on; Europeans from north and south, some dressed in white, others looking hot and out of place in woollen clothes under the equatorial sun. These white people, however, are but a surface of cream covering a vast population made up of the peoples of India, Malaysia, and China.

Ford cars, driven by Sundanese, vie with rickshaws pulled by Canton coolies, wearing "shorts" and straw hats, their naked backs and legs gleaming under the moist sun of the tropics. Tamils from India—blacker than Africans and incredibly evil-looking, narrow of head and thin of limb, their long black hair hanging

down their bare backs or tied up in bath towels used as turbans—the lowest of the low caste, languidly sweep the streets or mend the pavement.

Malays and Javanese, chocolate skinned and gentle of feature, amble about in leisurely unconcern. Deep-chested, long-bearded six-foot Sikhs, the pride of the Indian army, clad in khaki and turbans, act as traffic police and guard the godowns with haughty consciousness of their physical superiority over their little brown brethren.

But everywhere Chinamen—coolies, shopkeepers, drivers, millionaires—for out of Singapore's 400,000 inhabitants more than three-quarters are of Chinese origin. Their city runs from the two or three European business streets that line the waterfront back into the hills, where the white residential quarter begins. Within its confines all is Chinese, and, being Chinese, all is incessant activity day and night, despite the oppressive tropical heat.

To Sir Stamford Raffles goes the glory of having discovered the value of Singapore. This remarkable man, who in his brief life packed many great achievements, had the geographical mind and a statesman's grasp of world-problems. When first he was agent for the East India Company his thoughts were ever turning toward the East, curious about the Indies and the mystery of China. A keen student of native customs and languages, he saw clearly the need of providing friendly relations with the peoples of southeastern Asia and of studying thoroughly their countries if England was to push forward her trade and empire into the Pacific.

The reason that Raffles was so impressed with Singapore was that this island, which stands in relation to

the Malay Peninsula as an egg does to a cup, was so situated that ships plying between India and China had to pass within a mile of it. He saw that it was destined to become the outpost for Britain's commercial advance upon China, and, as he put it, that it would serve as the fulcrum of British trade in the Far East. But being in matters political a realist, Raffles also appreciated its political importance. "It gives us," he wrote a friend, shortly after he had raised the British flag on the site of the modern city in 1819, "the command of China and Japan, with Siam and Cambodia, to say nothing of the islands [*i. e.*, the Indies and the Philippines] themselves."

Raffles, whose clear vision led him into acts that his less alert company directors in London considered too impetuous, was ahead of his time. The British—fortunately for them—held Singapore, but Raffles died unsung, having earned the scorn of the timid "Little Englanders" of his day. A half century after his death the city which he had founded was one of the great ports of the world. Within a century its political significance, which he had so clearly seen, began to be understood by his fellow countrymen. Many of them, to be sure, are still opposed to the naval base being built there. They complain that it is too costly, and fear lest it give offense to other powers in the Pacific. They overlook two great facts—that the empire rests on sea-borne trade, which in turn rests on a strong navy, and that not in twenty-five years has the political situation in the East been so fraught as now with uncertainties and lurking dangers.

Under these circumstances a powerful Singapore is sure to be a steadying influence in the Pacific. The naval

base is not being built against any one, but solely to help maintain the status quo in the Far East. Three nations in particular are vitally concerned in seeing the balance of power and territory remain unchanged there. These are England, Holland, and the United States, whose colonial possessions lie within range of Singapore.

The nearest of the Dutch East Indies are only 10 miles away. Sumatra is only 60, Java scarcely 500, and Borneo little more than 300 miles from Singapore. Within a radius of about 1,500 miles lie Manila, Hong-kong, Calcutta, Rangoon, northwestern Australia, and all of the Dutch East Indies. A fortified Singapore, therefore, is in a sense the protector of the Philippines and Java, as well as of Australia and India.

It is no secret in the Far East that the Dutch, whose islands stretch all the way from Singapore to Australia, look upon the projected naval base as of supreme importance to the safety of their empire. Americans living in the Philippines, far from Hawaii and even farther from our fleet, also feel that a strong Singapore means added security for the Philippines.

The naval-political problems of Singapore are in the hands of far-seeing men who appreciate the wisdom of Sir Stamford Raffles 100 years ago in choosing the island as England's principal base in the Far East. What they have planned is being carried out with thoroughness. They realize that some day Singapore may be called upon to defend Australia or India, or that it may become involved if anything happens to the Philippines.

They also realize, as do the Dutch, that because the Dutch East Indies are at its gates, Britain's relations with Holland are a matter of prime importance in the politics of the Far East. Were Singapore ever to be the

object of attack, the enemy's first thought would be to take the Dutch-owned Rhio Islands, directly opposite Singapore. Hence Holland is as anxious as is Britain that nothing shall arise to disturb the balance of power in the Far East.

These are the reasons why Singapore is being fortified and why, so long as the United States is responsible, directly or indirectly, for the protection of the Philippine Islands, Americans are as concerned about the development of Singapore as are the Colonial Britishers.

Singapore, Panama—the west and east gates of the imperial ocean. Their guardians hold the keys to the trade and politics of the Pacific.



## CHAPTER III


### ACTS OF GOD

So little known was the Pacific prior to the voyages of Captain Cook, and so perilous the passage by the Horn, that when the *Empress of China* sailed out of New York Harbor in February, 1784, the first American ship bound for Canton, her course lay through the south Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, and thence past Java Head into the restless China Sea. The trans-Pacific route was not even contemplated. In those days America's west coast was more remote from New York and Boston than was India. Not only was the actual sailing distance to the Columbia River around the Horn greater by about 3,000 miles than to Calcutta by Good Hope, but the difficulties of navigation were more acute. The passage through the Straits of Magellan required days, and sometimes weeks, of beating against violent head winds and high seas. Ports of call and replenishment on the west coast of South America were few and jealously guarded by the Spaniards. Furthermore, Americans of the Revolutionary days knew practically nothing about the potential wealth of the northwest coast, despite the fact that an American, John Ledyard, had accompanied Captain Cook and had tried to persuade Robert Morris and other financiers to back a cruise from New York by the Columbia River to Canton and return. Ledyard knew both the furry riches of the Northwest and the peak prices that even the poorest pelts brought in China. The chronicler of Captain Cook's voyages tells how,

after the great captain had been killed in Hawaii, his ship stopped at Canton on the way home and the sailors nearly mutinied, with the intention of sailing back to the Columbia River for more furs, so great were the sums offered by the Chinese.

It was partly under Ledyard's inspiration that interest in the China trade was aroused in America. So encouraging was the voyage of the *Empress of China* that it was followed by others from Boston, Salem, and Newport, as well as New York, and by 1792 the merchants of these places were petitioning the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, for assistance from the government in encouraging this new trade in the Pacific. That a spirit of adventure was abroad in the land may be judged from the fact that the second ship that sailed for Canton from New York was a sloop of 84 tons burden, the *Experiment* by name, manned by only seven men and two boys. The round trip lasted a year and a half and netted a profit of 40 per cent to the shareholders.

The development of the fur trade in the Oregon Territory, following the successful voyage thither of the ship *Columbia*, of Boston, acted as a fillip to this commerce, and soon Salem ships were racing those from Newport and New York round the Horn to the northwest coast and thence across the Pacific to the gates of Canton. Following close upon the merchants came the whalers of New Bedford and Nantucket, scouring the waters of the imperial ocean for the leviathan. The companions of Captain Ahab, whose pursuit of the great white whale has been recorded by Hermann Melville in "Moby Dick," were to be found careening their vessels on the beaches of tropical islands, or taking on food and



water, or—such appears to have been the demoralizing effect of the sunny isles of the South Seas on the cold and restrained children of the Puritans—idling with nut-brown maids in the shade of the palm-trees. Small wonder that their tales of athletic daughters of Poseidon swimming out sans bathing suits to help the sailors work the ships to port convinced the dour denizens of rockbound New England that here were souls that must be saved.

During the century that followed these first ventures in the Pacific trade American vessels searched the ocean from Arctic to Antarctic. In the wake of the whalers came the missionaries, and after them the resident traders. Now and then an enterprising American citizen anointed himself king of a tropic isle and raised the American flag over it, showing that he was not too royal to admit allegiance to a republic. The list of islands occupied in the name of the United States is as striking for the variety of locations as for the shortness of tenure. It includes the Marquesas and the Galapagos, as well as the Sandwich Islands, destined to a term of abandonment before becoming the Territory of Hawaii. For a year the Stars and Stripes flew over Formosa, then Chinese territory and now the southern outposts of Japan. The permanent occupation of this island by America had the support not only of naval men like Commodore Perry, but even of Doctor Peter Parker, one of the earliest American medical missionaries in China.

Thus bit by bit the ocean was mapped and occupied, and the islanders given the doubtful benefit of contact with the Western world. This chapter of the white man's history, when written dispassionately, will re-

dound but little to his credit. Even the missionaries, though moved by the highest motives, were often so anxious to force mid-Victorian notions of propriety upon primitive peoples that they paid scant attention to the devastating moral effect of uprooting old traditions and replacing them by new and alien standards. As the net result of the effort of missionaries, traders, and beach-combers, races were first contaminated and then obliterated.

It is not surprising that these great migrations of marauders came from the Western world. As already pointed out, the prevailing winds in the Pacific between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn blow toward Asia. As the currents also are adverse it was almost impossible for the peoples of China or Japan to explore and settle the vast semipopulated regions of the Pacific—including Australia—which white men have since pre-empted. To be sure, Chinese junks visited the Philippines and Java, and even sailed up toward India, where they did a flourishing trade with the Arabs. But this was made possible by the fact that the waters adjacent to the Asiatic Coast from Japan to Singapore are out of the belt of the trade winds that blow steadily across the Pacific from America, being subject instead to seasonal monsoons. During the summer months the prevailing wind in the China Sea and off the China coast, as well as in the Indian Ocean, is from the southwest. In winter it is from the northeast. Although these monsoons blow steadily and strongly, the fact that they change makes it easier for ships unable to sail close to the wind to work a passage home.

When the monsoons shift, and, more particularly in the late summer months, the section of the Pacific in

which the Philippines, Formosa, and the southern Japanese islands lie is subject to violent storms known as typhoons. These have their origin in the neighborhood of the American-owned island of Guam, and move along tracks so clearly mapped that it is possible to forecast their direction and duration with reasonable accuracy two days or more in advance, and so to broadcast storm warnings to all ships in those seas. Their general course is from Guam to the Philippines, where they either pass across southern Luzon and then lose themselves in a northerly direction in the China Sea, or else blow over northern Luzon and move up toward Formosa and Japan. A few are dissipated in interior China.

Whoever has read Joseph Conrad's "Typhoon" understands how these fierce storms may affect commerce or even war. His dramatic tale of the tramper loaded with fear-crazed Chinese coolies, bounced about in the grip of a typhoon, has many parallels. Ocean liners have been stripped of funnels, masts, lifeboats, and every movable thing above deck by the force of the wind and water. Obviously, such violent tempests render airplanes completely useless. Even hangars in a typhoon belt have to be specially constructed so as to enable them to withstand these levelling winds. Were such a storm to overtake a fleet of warships preparing for battle it might well turn the tide of war by putting the navy temporarily hors de combat. As a matter of fact, it was a typhoon which broke up the large invading fleet of Kublai Khan when that mighty conqueror tried to subdue Japan in 1280. It would be a strange act of God if a typhoon should rise as the Philippine Islands were about to fall a prey to a hostile fleet.

But the influence of typhoons reaches beyond war and



commerce into agricultural production. It is because of typhoons that rubber is not planted north of the 8th to 10th degree of latitude. This tree is peculiarly sensitive, and not only dislikes violent gales but must have steady atmospheric conditions. When the typhoons sweep across the northern islands of the Philippines from the Pacific they bring a brief respite from the excessive heat of the rainy summer. Although this is welcome to man, it is not especially helpful to delicate plants. In contrast, the equatorial belt, embracing the southernmost of the Philippine Islands—Mindanao, Basilan, the Sulu Archipelago, etc.—as well as Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula—are regions of gentle, equable temperature. At Batavia, for example, the thermometer rarely moves more than a degree or two above or below 85 degrees, Fahrenheit, day in and out, winter or summer. In Manila the thermometer sometimes falls as low as 68 degrees, even though it usually remains in the 80s.

The China Sea, which lies between the Philippines and the Asiatic mainland, is an uneasy part of the earth's surface, troubled not only by typhoons but by submarine volcanic activity. Because its floor is apparently in a state of flux, mariners have long regarded the sea as dangerous. The charts show such items as "new island reported here" or "submarine volcano active here." Geologists say that there is a "fault" in the earth's surface in this neighborhood, and that the bottom of the sea is undergoing changes.

These submarine volcanoes form part of the great volcanic ring that surrounds the Pacific basin. On the Asiatic side it runs down through Kamtchatka to Japan and Formosa and thence by way of the Philippines to the Dutch East Indies. Java in particular is highly vol-

canic. Off Java Head occurred in 1883 the explosion of Krakatoa, which sent a tidal wave around the world. In Japan periodic eruptions cause much damage.

Closely linked with volcanic disturbances are earthquakes. California, Panama, Nicaragua, the Philippine Islands, Java, Japan are periodically shaken. In the old days these occurrences were of only local importance. To-morrow, however, we may read that the Panama Canal has been put out of commission for a year by a slide caused by an earthquake—an event that would have its repercussion throughout the world. Or there may be another violent quake in Japan, causing an acute economic crisis with grave consequences. Neither of these eventualities may be lightly dismissed as improbable. Incidentally, the danger from earthquakes is one of the arguments in favor of a sea-level canal at Panama, sufficiently wide to be practically indestructible by a quake or slides.

Japan is even more vulnerable, not only because that region is the most unstable on earth but because it is thickly populated and becoming highly industrialized. Since 1850 there have been more than a dozen major quakes, killing upwards of 150,000 people. Of these the worst was that in 1923, which caused more than 90,000 deaths and destroyed property to the value of \$2,000,000,000 including incidentally two years' reserves of oil for the Japanese navy. The story of this disaster is still fresh. Enormous concrete piers were upended, streets were cleft in twain, and fires and tidal waves took their relentless tolls. But it is easier to visualize the terrific forces at work when it is realized that the shores of the west coast of the Bozo Peninsula were raised in some places as much as 150 feet, and that the bottom of Sagami Bay fell as much as 1,400 feet. Had

New York City stood on the ledge that sank deepest, not even the top of the Woolworth tower would have remained above water.

What happened in 1923 may occur again next year, or to-morrow. The haunting consciousness of this possibility has made the Japanese earthquake-sensitive as never before. It is not impossible that this may be an element in the general unrest that has come over them since the war.

It is interesting to note, in connection with the shifts in the earth's crust in Japan, the Philippine Islands, and the China Sea, that no one has successfully controverted the evidence that most of the Dutch East Indies were connected either with Asia or Australia in comparatively recent times. Seventy-five years ago the English naturalist, Wallace, definitely established the line which bears his name separating these two continental systems. It runs between the islands of Bali and Lombok, just off the eastern end of Java, and thence northward and curving eastward around Celebes. The flora and fauna within the Australian side of this line belong in the main to Australia. West of it, *i. e.*, in the Philippines, Borneo, and Sumatra, they belong to the Asiatic mainland.

Probably most important of all geographical factors in relation to man and power in the Pacific is climate. The tropical region, which includes the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines as well as everything on the Asiatic mainland south of Hongkong, and the innumerable islands dotted throughout the Pacific, is, in the main, characterized by a warm climate with heavy rainfall. It is not necessary here to go into details of the local variations in temperature or precipitation. Suffice it to point out that most of the lands in the tropical belt



are highly fertile, and are lived in by people to whom effort is distasteful. Capable of producing agricultural crops of great value to the world such as rubber, coffee, sugar, spice, quinine, and gutta percha, they are yet inhabited by people whose capacity of production depends on direction by Northern races. As a result of the world's expansion during the last 150 years, many tropical products once luxuries are now essentials. To have them the people of the pines, whether English, Dutch or American, Japanese or Chinese, will live among the peoples of the palms only long enough to bring forth the earth's fruit. The necessity of alien supervision is one of the principal causes of economic imperialism.

Inasmuch as the climate in these tropical regions is too hot and moist to suit the northern peoples, colonization is not to be expected except, perhaps, by the southern Chinese, who themselves live under semitropical conditions. Having the virtues of industry and frugality common to the Chinese race as a whole, these people manage to survive and retain their power of domination over the tropical races even in such a hothouse climate as that of Sumatra and Borneo. In the Philippines and everywhere throughout the Dutch East Indies Chinese storekeepers are to be found. In the Malay Peninsula and parts of Java the Chinese are landowners and farmers besides. So great is the pressure of population in south China that if the barriers against immigration were once removed in the Philippines those islands would undoubtedly be overrun by Chinese in a few decades and the Filipino peoples be submerged in the process. The Chinese are indefatigable and persistent. The story is told that when in the remoter regions of Sumatra the natives have resented the coming of




a Chinese storekeeper and have killed him, he has promptly been replaced by two, and this multiplication repeated until the natives have learned the futility of exclusion by violence.

The northern Chinese resemble the Japanese and the white people in that they do not flourish in tropical heat. It has been the experience of the Dutch in the Indies that the Japanese who come to Java and other islands usually return home after two or three years, unable to stand the climate. In the Philippines is a growing colony of Japanese, but these also are reported to be transients, despite the fact that their numbers have been steadily increasing.

There seems little doubt that of all the races in the Pacific the Japanese are most particular about climate. Their own, speaking roughly, may be said to resemble that of Oregon and the Pacific Coast. The Japanese have not colonized their northern island of Hokkaido, largely because it is too cold. They have not been happy in Siberia and northern Manchuria, for the same reason. Outside of their damp, cool islands they are apparently most contented in Hawaii and California—two places where, to their misfortune, they are now no longer welcomed as colonists.

Most of China also enjoys a climate not unlike parts of the United States. There as here it differs according to longitude and proximity to the sea. The southern coastal provinces are much like Florida and the gulf coast of Texas, and the northern coast line like New England with a dry winter. In the interior, south as well as north, rainfall diminishes in proportion to the distance from the seacoast. Incidentally, the concentration of rainfall during the growing season is one of the





reasons why China is periodically overwhelmed by floods or famine. Sudden excessive rains may result in the overflow of the rivers, inundating thousands of square miles of thickly settled farms.

In Japan and on the Asiatic mainland, as in the tropics, the effect of climate on man is all-important. Ellsworth Huntington, whose books on the influence of weather on civilization are highly interesting, has shown clearly the relation between temperature and humidity and man's capacity for work. His studies, borne out by other investigators, indicate that northern Europe and the northern portion of the United States possess the highest degree of climatic energy. He ranks Japan high and most of China from medium to high. Other students are inclined to include portions of the Yangtse Valley and northern China among the regions possessing a degree of climatic energy at least as high as that of Japan.

The significance of this lies in the fact that the climate in which the Japanese and the northern and central Chinese live is, like that of America, conducive to health and industry. This is one of the reasons why these people are among the active, virile races of the world. So long as energy is a factor in social and political life, the Chinese and Japanese are likely to bulk large in the affairs of the world. Climate alone, of course, does not determine racial and national growth, else the American Indians would have created a great world power. But given good climate and a healthy heritage, half the battle of life is won.

Accurately to appraise the influence of climate and earthquakes, volcanoes and typhoons, and other acts of God is, of course, impossible. But there is little doubt

that they are factors of importance in shaping world events and that they form an essential part of the picture of the Pacific. The English historian, George Macaulay Trevelyan, in describing Sir Francis Drake's voyage round the world, gives an illustration of an incident of this sort and its effect on European history. The *Golden Hind*, after leaving the Spice Islands, grounded on a shoal in the uncharted Molucca Seas. For twenty hours she hung there, apparently doomed to certain destruction. If she were wrecked and Drake failed to return, the influence on court politics in England would be such that the pro-Spanish party would triumph and that victory in the world contest between England and Spain would go to the Spaniards. Such a course would have profoundly changed the history of Europe and America. "Vast destinies," as Trevelyan put it, "depended on the relation of a capful of wind and a tropical sandbank to a few planks of English oak." But English ingenuity and luck triumphed. The *Golden Hind* at last slipped off into deep water and successfully returned to Plymouth, where Drake's first inquiry was for Queen Elizabeth, who owed so much to his activities.

Although such fortuitous acts of Providence occur less frequently in the days of steam than of sail, yet they belong in the class with other phenomena of nature which from time to time knock awry man's best-laid plans. Now that distance has been annihilated in the Pacific, and East and West stand cheek by jowl in Asia, a violent earthquake in Japan, or a typhoon in the China Sea may change the course of history in America. Certainly those eventualities cannot be ignored in considering the problems of the Pacific.

## CHAPTER IV


### CONTINENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

During the Napoleonic wars American vessels carried almost the lion's share of the China trade. This was chiefly for European account, and meant that American shipping was levying tolls on foreign commerce just as British shipping now levies tolls on American commerce by transporting American goods in British bottoms. In 1827-8 America's Canton trade actually exceeded that of the British East India Company. In the clipper-ship era, which was at its height during the two decades before the Civil War, the exceptional speed of American vessels enabled American merchants once more to make serious inroads on Britain's China trade. Some remarkably swift journeys from Pacific ports were recorded. The *Sea Witch* sailed from Canton to New York in seventy-eight days. The *Witch of the Wave* made a run of ninety days from Whampoa (just outside Canton) to England.

This was in the heyday of America's maritime supremacy, when the Stars and Stripes were as common on the high seas as the Union Jack. In 1860, according to British statistics, the American shipping total actually exceeded that of the United Kingdom, although the Empire as a whole led the United States.

But the Civil War turned Americans' eyes inland. Coincidentally the use of iron and steel in shipbuilding gave England, with her ready supplies of coal and iron, the lead over other nations in developing a mercantile

marine. The construction of the Suez Canal, which was opened in 1869, stimulated Britain's trade with China, giving her a 2,000-mile handicap over the eastern ports of the United States—a handicap which she was destined to hold until the Panama Canal was cut. These various factors contributed to drive Americans off the



GROWTH OF AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE ENGAGED IN FOREIGN TRADE.

The black line shows the increase in tonnage from 1789 to 1926.

The dotted line shows the percentage of American trade carried in American vessels.

seas. So complete was their withdrawal that even the whaling industry, for so many years the special delight and profit of the New Englanders, was almost entirely abandoned, and America's whaling fleet, which had carried nearly 80 per cent of the world's whale oil and bones in its palmy days, dropped from 170,000 tons in 1847 to only a little more than 2,000 tons in 1926.

The bare figures of America's shipping engaged in foreign commerce also tell the story. The tonnage rose from 123,893 tons in 1789 to 2,496,895 in 1861. By 1910 it had dropped to 782,517. The World War set

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the pendulum swinging in the other direction again. By 1921 it had reached a peak of 11,977,398 but by 1926 had dropped back to 7,719,139. During the first half-century of the republic between 80 and 90 per cent of America's foreign trade was carried in American bottoms. After the Civil War, while the American merchant marine declined steadily, trade increased rapidly. In 1910 only 8.7 per cent was carried in American ships. By 1925 the figure had risen to 33 per cent.

Great Britain was undeterred by the fluctuations in America's merchant marine. She followed her traditional policy of developing a merchant fleet to carry her expanding trade. For a short period in the 1850s she feared that American competition might be injurious. Again in the '90s she saw her supremacy threatened by Germany, Holland, and Norway. But her tonnage was steadily increased. Whereas in 1830 it had been only 2,200,000, in 1925 it was 19,440,000. Nothing was permitted to check its growth, for Great Britain was determined to remain mistress of the seas.

This was in keeping with the traditions of 500 years. As early as 1436 an unknown political hack-writer indited what he termed "The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye" in which he warned his fellow countrymen:

"Kepe then the see abought in speciall,  
Whiche of England is the rounde wall."

He praised King Edward III for loving his merchants jealously and for wishing to control the sea so that they might prosper. Such portions of this poem as do not consist of admonitions on the relations of sea power and commerce, catalogue the various commodities coming into England. These included:



“All spicerie and other grocers ware,  
Wyth swete wyne, all manere of chaffare,  
Apes and Japes and marmusettes taylede,  
Nifles, trifles, that litell have availed.”

Again, in 1681, a British pamphleteer, moved, no doubt, by the recent successes of the Dutch admirals in the English Channel, wrote: “As concerning ships, it is that which every one knoweth and can say: they are our weapons, they are our ornaments, they are our strength, they are our pleasures, they are our defense, they are our profit. The subject by them is made rich; the kingdom through them strong; the Prince in them mighty. In a word, by them, in a manner we live, the Kingdom is, the King reigneth.”

The English people, by a slow, unconscious process, grew to accept the truth in these pronouncements as axiomatic. They developed their banks to finance their trade. They established their colonies to furnish more trade. They built their navy to protect their trade. They seized the earth's strategic spots—Gibraltar, Malta, Jamaica, the Cape of Good Hope, Suez, Singapore—to make the navy's task easier. They were the first to realize that the advantages of steady speed possessed by steamships was offset by a limited cruising range, and that merchantmen and warships alike must therefore have bases from which to operate. Accordingly, they established coaling-stations and drydocks throughout the world.

The Germans, coming after them and learning much from England, attempted late to establish commercial and naval bases for themselves. What they could not accomplish by direct government action they sought

through their big shipping companies like the Hamburg American.

Great Britain early understood the importance of cables in peace and war. By opening cable communication with the Far East she revolutionized the tea trade and other branches of commerce, brought the markets of the ends of the earth together, and secured the distinct advantage of priority of dispatch in matters commercial as well as governmental. Unfortunately, the cable-owning nations too often discarded their scruples about the sanctity of private messages, and used confidential information about foreign trade secrets obtained from sources publicly supposed to be inviolable. This reprehensible privilege was long an important prize in the struggles between various nations for the control of cables.

Failure to possess cable connections sometimes worked more impressive hardships even than were the benefits derived from owning them. Thus, when Germany lost her trans-Atlantic cable in 1914 she was deprived by the British censorship of an invaluable opportunity to exert pressure on American public opinion by propaganda.

Although the radio takes from the cable some of its exclusiveness, it has not yet completely supplanted that system for satisfactory and safe transmission. Cables and radio stations alike require land bases. In times of war these bases assume great strategic importance, and to prevent them from falling into enemy hands is essential.

The principal telegraphic connections between Europe and eastern Asia are the Great Northern Telegraph Company and the Eastern Telegraph Company. The former is Danish, the latter British. From America

a cable runs to Hawaii and Midway Island, and thence to Guam. There it branches in three, one going over the Bonin Islands to Japan, another to the Philippines, and the third to Yap, which in turn splits, one branch to Shanghai, the other to the Dutch East Indies. These, which are the former German cables, are now respectively in the hands of Holland and Japan. Although the Commercial Pacific Company is nominally American-owned, it is reported that a large part of the stock is in British control, and that many of the technical operators are British. In peace this is unimportant. In war it might result in serious complications. The United States might have to depend on the radio alone for sure communication with the Philippines and the rest of the Far East.

The Japanese for years have blocked all American efforts to build radio stations in China and have even prevented the Chinese from owning and operating such an American-built station. As a result, in matters aerial the United States has to rely on her naval vessels and on her few naval stations in the Philippines, Samoa, Guam, and Hawaii to relay messages across the Pacific.

Japan was quick to learn England's trade and shipping methods. In 1890 she had only 138,431 tons of shipping; by 1925 nearly 4,000,000 tons. Like Britain, she specialized in moderately fast ships, realizing that a merchant marine is even more indispensable in war than in peace, and that without such a merchant marine and the means of protecting it, an insular power is in danger of national strangulation by a blockade and by commerce raiding.

Having learned by the Russo-Japanese War how important it is to have her own shipyards and drydocks,

the Empire now possesses these as well. Just as England can blockade northeastern Europe, so Japan can blockade northeastern Asia. Like England, Japan is peopled by a race of seamen, skilled in commerce and war. In fact, she possesses all the advantages of Great Britain save one—the reserves of coal and iron which contributed so much to England's strength and wealth.

As Admiral Ballard has pointed out in "The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan," that country has always been potentially a great power. But her case is an interesting example of the truth that geographical factors of position affect a nation's growth only when men make the most of them. Japan's relation to the sea, he reminds us, passed through four phases; first, a period of compulsory isolation when owing to the inadequacy of shipping she was invulnerable by sea; second, a period of voluntary isolation when she deliberately shut herself in from the world; third, a period of probation when she first began to sense the importance of controlling the sea; and finally her period of power, which finds her to-day as the third nation in naval and maritime strength.

Probably the greatest penalty that she paid for her self-imposed isolation during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries was the lost opportunity to expand in the Pacific. She shut herself up just when the nations of Europe began to consolidate their possessions throughout the Pacific. It is interesting to follow Admiral Ballard's speculation as to what might have been her place in the world had she begun to develop in the seventeenth century as she did in the end of the nineteenth. She would, he indicates, probably have appropriated for herself the great chain of islands

from Sumatra to Australia and so have become one of the greatest colonial powers on earth. She might even have spread to our own west coast. But her leaders endeavored to halt history by barring out the world.

As in the case of England, Japan's geographical position has stood her in good stead in her conflicts with the mainland. She has triumphed even when her military and naval strength have been much less favorable than at present. In the thirteenth century she repulsed the invasion of Kublai Khan. Although defeated by the Chinese and Koreans in the sixteenth century when she tried to invade those countries—a defeat directly traceable to her inadequate naval power compared to that of Korea—she overcame the Chinese in 1894 and the Russians in 1905.

The fact that Japan potentially dominates the Asiatic mainland does not mean, of course, that she actually controls it, or that she inevitably will do so. But by the annexation of Korea she has advanced her frontier well into the mainland. As a result, she is safe from invasion by China until that country organizes a strong government and builds a great navy. As there is little likelihood of such an eventuality for a good many years, the probability that Japan's supremacy on the mainland will be menaced except by Russia is small. China's impotence is Japan's safeguard.

At the same time, China's very size and clumsiness protect that country from military conquest. Covering an area larger even than the United States, her enormous population is widely spread out, and access to the interior, save along the great rivers, is slow and unsatisfactory. The length of the navigable portions of the Yangste and other rivers is one of the geographical pe-







cularities in China. Ships of deep draught can go five hundred miles inland. The river boats go even farther. The enormously rich bottom lands of the Yangste Valley have made this from time immemorial the centre of China—the Middle Kingdom of history. To-day its trade streams down past Shanghai—which fact has given to that city its strategic importance as the gateway of central China.

In one respect China resembles the United States—she possesses a frontier region in which pioneer conditions prevail. Northern Manchuria and parts of Mongolia are not unlike the plains of Texas. The winter climate is much colder and the rains mostly concentrated in summer, but the soil is rich and its potential productivity great. Like Texas in the '80s the country is being settled, though large areas still remain almost uninhabited. The pressure of population northward is steady and, as in our own frontier country, has followed the railroads. In 1880 the population of the three Manchurian provinces was about 9,000,000, in 1926 about 26,000,000.

On China's southern border is Indo-China. Save that this country cements France's interest in the East, it does not figure largely in the problems of the Pacific. The same is true of Siam and the Federated Malay States. All are pawns of the European powers in the international play in the Far East.

Not so the island world, however. The Philippines, with the adjoining Dutch East Indies stretching from Singapore to Australia, promise to loom large in the politics of the Pacific. They are mines of actual and potential wealth and productivity. Lying, all of them, in the tropics, and containing large uninhabited areas, they promise in time to afford opportunities for producing

food enough to feed millions of people, and other tropical products to satisfy the growing needs of the world. They are the pioneer islands of the Pacific. Their control implies wealth and power for those to whom they belong.

Politically the Philippines present a complex problem. They are America's base in eastern Asia. By what we do there our prestige in the East will be judged. Our every political and economic step in the Philippines is closely watched alike by the foreign powers and by the native leaders throughout the East. If we give them independence in the near future we shall encourage vast destructive forces which may let loose the dogs of war.

The same is true of the Dutch in their East Indies, with the additional complication that Holland's position in the Indies is a matter of vital concern to Great Britain, and that, in consequence, events in the East Indies have their reaction in European politics and affect the relations of Holland and Great Britain. Here again, as in the case of France in Indo-China and of Russia in Manchuria, the threads ultimately lead back to the capitals of Europe. The East, instead of being a region apart, is closely bound up with the politics of the world, and is directly affected by events in Europe.

What is true of the relations of Europe and eastern Asia is even more true of America and the East. A glance at the diagram shows how the world has shrunk in the last two generations. Thanks to fast steamships, cables, and radios, the continents and islands on both sides of the Pacific have been brought close together. Interests have been interwoven like a great net with the result that a pull on one side is felt on the other. The Pacific has become a unit.



### III

## THE GEOGRAPHY OF PRODUCTION





## CHAPTER V

### THE SINEWS OF PEACE

It was always a theory of Brooks Adams, the brilliantly erratic grandson of America's most studious President, John Quincy Adams, that world-power is dependent on the supplies of metals and that it shifts to that country which possesses the greatest capacity for utilizing its metals efficiently. Thus, as early as 1900 he foretold the power that has come to the United States through the development of our almost unlimited resources of coal and iron. At the same time he predicted Japan's policy of penetration into north China and her war with Russia on the ground that the control of the rich iron and coal deposits of Shansi was desired by those two nations in their climb to world power.

Owing partly to his espousal of Bryan and free silver in the campaign of 1896, Adams was disregarded by thoughtful Americans. But in Europe his views were read with interest, as they fell in with the theories of *real-politik* which were then gaining popularity. Such was the condescending attitude of the Europeans of that generation toward the United States—Bismarck had recently characterized the Monroe Doctrine as a "piece of impertinence"—that they were reluctant to admit that Adams's theory might be applicable to America.

Although ideas of this sort must be qualified by contingent explanations, there can be little doubt that in this mechanical age large resources of fuels and metals are the sinews of great national power. Coal, oil, and

hydroelectricity are the principal sources of energy to-day. In the utilization of these more than in any other respect does our age differ from its predecessors.

Adams based his theory on the control of metals. It might be elaborated to read that world-power to-day is determined by the control of the sources of mechanical energy. Man first worked only with his body. In time he harnessed horses and oxen. Later he used wind and water. Not until the nineteenth century did he use steam or gas to any extent, nor electricity and oil till the twentieth. Until machines came into the world, man's reliance was on his own physical strength and on that of his family and slaves and other beasts of burden. Now his machines are his slaves. It has been estimated, for example, that a ton of coal, properly used, is equivalent to about 1,100 man-days of work. T. T. Read, formerly of the Bureau of Mines, has recently stated that every American has 35 of these "machine slaves" working for him. Their appetite is voracious, and their food raw energy—coal, water-power or oil and its products. Cut off the supply of coal and the factories of the world would grow cold and rust; the trains would stop; the ships would drift helpless before the storm. Dry up oil and twenty odd million automobiles in the United States alone would stop running; saw-mills would cease twanging; fields would go unplowed and unharvested; airplanes would fall to earth.

The bearing of these speculations on the present problems of the Pacific is direct. As industrial civilization spreads, the sources of energy increase in importance. The owners of energy units are the owners of potential or actual power, and power attracts supplies and creates business.

In peace as in war, victory goes to the machines. A soldier, no matter how well trained and how brave, cannot fight bombs and gas with his bare hands, and a laborer who has only his arms to serve him cannot compete with a machine that can turn out one thousand articles to the handworker's one. In America the tendency is toward more and more machines—a tendency which is made possible by our enormous supplies of raw power in all its forms.

Mr. O. E. Baker, of the Department of Agriculture, recently gave a homely illustration of the effect of machinery on man's labor on this earth. To plow a 40-acre field six inches deep means to turn 50,000 tons of soil. A mechanical tractor does this in about 40 hours. A man with a team, using a single plow, needs 165 hours. A man with a spade would require 18 months. If the average farm worker were dependent on his muscles alone he could develop only about 3 per cent of the power now on the farms. Nearly  $6\frac{1}{4}$  horse-power per man is available in agriculture in this country. Of this about three-fifths is furnished by machinery and nearly all the rest by animals.

Since power is in a sense evanescent, its importance is enhanced. The fuels, with the exception of the water supplies that generate electricity, are consumed in the process of yielding power. To make a ton of steel requires four tons of coal. When the process is finished there is little to show for the fuel. The metal remains and is used in one form or another for long years. The quantity of fuel consumed by locomotives and automobiles is enormous, whereas the machines wear out slowly.

Although oil and electric power are comparatively

easily transported, and coal is shipped all over the world, it nevertheless remains true that just as there is profit in having a factory located near good coal supplies, so there is an advantage to that nation which owns large stores of fuels. One of the reasons for England's great prosperity in the nineteenth century was the happy conjunction of her enormous accessible supplies of coal and iron. But while England has been sinking her mine shafts so deep that the price of production has steadily increased, other nations have developed their coal resources. First came Germany, followed by Belgium and France. Then the United States. To-day we are in the fortunate position of being almost supreme in the quantity of power which we use and in the amount of stored energy in the form of available supplies of coal, oil, and water-power which we possess.

It is not enough merely to own supplies of power. They must be wisely used. This implies good organization, highly trained engineers and scientists, and willing laborers. It means, on the one hand, that neither the state nor the laws shall unduly interfere with business development, and on the other that selfish capital shall be prevented from undue exploitation of natural resources and that labor shall refrain from destructive interference with the normal administration of business. In these respects, again, America has been fortunate and has so built up her industries by efficient operation that they have been able to bring wealth to the country at large.

In contrast to this, Mr. H. Foster Bain, author of "Ores and Industry in the Far East," stresses the habits of mind of the Chinese which handicap them in dealing with mechanical devices. "It is extremely difficult to get



Chinese workmen to care properly for machinery," he remarks. "An engine-driver will often fail to report repairs needed on a locomotive, under the impression, apparently, that in doing so he gives valuable information for nothing. Chinese are so accustomed to living and working under general conditions of disrepair that the importance of tightening bolts in time does not appeal to them. . . . Generally speaking, a man grand enough to run an engine of any kind is much too important to condescend to see that his engine is kept in good working condition." Although similar stories are no longer told of the Japanese, it is a common complaint among Americans and English who have dealt with Japanese mechanics that they seem to lack a "feel" for their machines.

As a result of the expansion of industrial civilization there are in the world to-day a number of indispensable key raw materials other than foodstuffs. Coal and iron head the list, followed closely by oil, copper, rubber, cotton, sulphur, nitrates, and tin. A number of other metals are vital in certain processes, as tungsten, chromium, vanadium, manganese, etc. Aluminum and nickel bid fair to assume increasing importance.

One hundred and fifty years ago most of these materials were used in negligible quantities or not at all. Coal and iron were rare; oil was practically unknown; sulphur was identified with magic; copper was common only in pots and pans; tin was a semiprecious metal; the nitrates, tungsten, etc., were unused. Ships were made of wood and run by sail. Land travel was by wooden coach or cart, drawn by horses, or else afoot or on horseback. Then came the industrial revolution. It had been estimated that during the century that fol-

lowed the Napoleonic wars the per capita consumption of the principal metals in the world increased 33 times, while world population increased only threefold. In America alone consumption has increased tenfold during the last forty years.

The contrast in the relative use of mechanical power on the two shores of the Pacific is marked. While the Americans stand first among the masters of machines, the Chinese are most industrious and skilled in relentless handicraft. The Japanese, who a half century ago were in a class with the Chinese, are rapidly becoming an industrial nation. It has been figured by Doctor T. T. Read that if the average producing power per person in China at present be postulated at 1, that in Japan is  $3\frac{1}{2}$ , and that in the United States 30. This is not because the Americans are better workers. The Chinese are notoriously industrious. But it is because China is still in a low stage of mechanical development. Professor Goodnow described China as possessing a "vegetable civilization." Ours is a civilization of metals and machines. China relies on agriculture and on manpower to cultivate the soil. We rely on machines for all purposes—in farming on mechanical tractors, threshers, reapers, binders, milkers, separators, etc.; in industry and transportation for uses so numerous as to be almost beyond enumeration.

A better idea of America's dependence on metals and mechanics may be had from a study of the following tables compiled by Mr. Howard L. Clark, associate editor of *The Manufacturers' Review*. The first shows America's share of the world's output of the principal minerals. The second shows America's share of the consumption of these minerals:

TABLE I

## PRODUCTION

Sulphur.....	87	per cent
Oil.....	71	"
Copper.....	56	"
Aluminum.....	54	"
Pig iron.....	53	"
Steel.....	51	"
Zinc.....	50	"
Coal.....	38	"

TABLE II

## CONSUMPTION

Sulphur.....	70	per cent
Oil.....	76	"
Copper.....	46	"
Aluminum.....	64	"
Pig iron.....	59	"
Steel.....	52	"
Zinc.....	40	"
Coal.....	37	"

It is clear from these figures that the United States is at the same time the world's greatest producer and consumer of minerals and of mechanical energy. Although comparable figures for Japan are not available, it is interesting to note that in 1925 Japan's consumption of iron and steel was estimated at 1,085,000 tons, or a little over 1 per cent of the world's output, of which 36 per cent was imported. Her production of oil meets less than one-third of her consumption. Although her coal supplies have so far been sufficient to make it unnecessary to import large amounts of fuel, the amount of coal of highest grade available is small in proportion to the long-time needs of the country. It is being supplemented by extensive hydroelectrical development. China's production and consumption of these articles is negligible.


Because Japan, though lacking in mineral resources, has successfully pushed her industrialization, it has been argued that the possession of energy and raw materials is unimportant, inasmuch as these can be easily transported. Plausible as is this contention, it neglects the factors of cost and of possible interruption of transportation, which are disadvantageous to the importing na-

tion. At the same time it disregards the main lines of Japanese policy during the last century. Finally, it ignores the possible effects of war.

Mr. H. Foster Bain has called attention to the strategic value of "tonnage" minerals—that is, of those metals and fuels which are used in enormous quantities, like iron, copper, coal, and oil, as compared with the metals of which only a few ounces or pounds are used in manufactures. "To import steadily materials required in thousands of tons," he writes, "not only makes heavy drafts on shipping and foreign credits, but may well be a critical weakness in time of war." The pound-and-ounce metals, on the other hand, can usually be obtained even from an enemy country in time of war. Mr. Bain reminds us that in 1917 enough platinum was smuggled out of Russia into the United States in the hands of one engineer to meet our war-time needs.

The nations—with the possible exception of the United States—have learned the lesson of the last "war of attrition." If ever another great war occurs the victory will go to that power which controls the greatest resources of the principal sinews of production—coal, oil, iron, copper, and their component alloys and by-products. Large resources are essential in modern warfare—large resources, efficiently mobilized and utilized. They make possible the indefinite prolongation of war and the consequent exhaustion of a less well-provided enemy. They facilitate supplying the army and navy. They furnish the material for replacing lost units. It is not enough merely to have a good fleet well armed if it cannot be repaired or, if necessary, replaced.

In seeking to understand the problems of the Pacific the possibility of war must not be neglected. To put it



EXPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES BY ECONOMIC CLASSES,  
1820-1926.



IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES BY ECONOMIC CLASSES,  
1820-1926.



out of mind means to risk wrongly estimating important trends and events in that region. The other governments of the world, however peace-loving they may be, are sufficiently realistic in their study of foreign affairs to know that the potential war-strength of a nation is an important factor in the conduct of its foreign relations. Nowhere is this truer than in the Pacific area, where prestige or "face" means much, and is so intimately connected with the possession and display of force.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE POLITICS OF POWER

In the old days trade was confined to animal and vegetable products and to luxuries. The earliest India and China merchants were primarily interested in spices, and the later ones in tea and silk. These articles could be dispensed with in emergencies—a fact which surprised George III in 1775, and the famous Chinese Emperor Ch'ien Lung at the end of the eighteenth century when the British traders refused to be nonplussed by his edicts forbidding them to penetrate beyond Canton.

“Hitherto, O King,” he explained, in a formal communication to George III in which he took note of that gentleman’s “respectful humility” and “humble desire to partake of the benefits” of China’s civilization—“hitherto, all European nations, including your own country’s barbarians merchants, have carried on their trade with Our Celestial Empire at Canton. Such has been the procedure for many years, although Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce. But as the tea, silk, and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves, we have permitted, as a signal mark of favor, that foreign hongs should be established at

Canton, so that your wants might be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence."

With true Chinese complacency, the Son of Heaven imagined that China's products were absolutely essential to the outside world. But events proved that such a trade could be interrupted even for several years without catastrophic effects on the economic life of other nations. To-day conditions have changed. Manufactures or their raw materials furnish the bulk of the trade in the Pacific, and any serious curtailment of supplies is likely to injure the exporting as well as the importing country. The nations that border the Pacific need certain staple articles with which to carry on their business. What they do not produce they must import. Thus the United States and Japan get their rubber from the Dutch East Indies and the Malay States. Japan buys much sugar in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. The United States, although obtaining most of her sugar from Cuba, also imports from Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. Japan's coking coal comes mostly from China and much of her steel from the United States. Three-quarters of her petroleum products are imported from the United States, Mexico, and the Dutch East Indies. We, in turn, depend on China and Japan for our raw silk, and on China for our supplies of tungsten, antimony, and a number of other metals important in various manufactures, as well as for wood-oils, and silks.

It has already been pointed out that the United States produces more than half the world's output of iron, copper, and oil. Collectively, the entire Far East produces only about 4 per cent of the world's coal, less than 3 per cent of the oil, and 2 per cent of the steel.

## THE POLITICS OF POWER



Japan produces as much as 5 per cent of the world's copper supply, but of all other important bulk metals no country in the East produces as much as even 1 per cent. Eastern Asia's mineral wealth is in the "pound-metals" such as tin, of which 60 per cent comes from Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies; and 6 per cent from China; and tungsten, of which 63 per cent comes from China.

Put in comparative terms, this means that in 1924 the United States produced 20 times more coal than Japan, 45 times more steel and iron, 10 times more copper, and 350 times more oil. The corresponding figures for China show that America's coal production was 30 times greater; the production of pig iron 120 times; steel 300 times, and oil and copper in overwhelming proportions.

Consumption of these bulk minerals is in somewhat relative proportions to production. The United States uses, on a per capita basis, about 10 times as much coal as Japan and nearly 1,000 times as much as China. Her consumption of iron is 30 times that of Japan, and 90 times China's. The same is true of other products. Whether figured on a per capita or on a bulk basis, the disproportion is so great as to be very striking.

That not even Japan among the Far Eastern nations has reached a stage of industrial development comparable to that of the United States is due both to retarded development and to actual lack of these minerals. Because the industrial revolution only began in Japan about forty years ago and has hardly been launched in China, the East has not yet had time to catch up to Western industrialization. But the studies of such experts as Doctor C. K. Leith and Mr. H. Foster Bain tend to show that the trouble is more deeply seated. In

an article in *Foreign Affairs* for April, 1925, Doctor Leith made the statement, sustained by statistics, that "the Pacific region of the Far East is deficient in essential minerals necessary for the development of a great industrial civilization, when considered in relation to their location, grade, and relative quantities. The more conspicuous deficiencies are in iron ore, coking coal, copper, lead, and zinc." From a comparison of the various reports by geologists and engineers of different nationality, checked by experience in the field, Mr. Bain accepted in 1927 the following tables (with one important qualification) as the most reliable:

#### RESERVES OF COAL AND IRON IN THE PACIFIC REGION

(in millions of tons)

COAL	IRON ORE
United States.....3,838,657	United States.....75,105
China.....996,795	D. E. I.....833
Australia.....163,253	China.....800
Indo-China.....20,002	Australia.....345
Japan.....8,051	Philippine Islands...275
D. E. I.....1,417	Japan.....80
Siberia.....500	Siberia.....5
Philippine Islands.61	Canada (Pacific) .negligible
Canada.....819,465	Indo-China.....negligible

The qualification refers to China's reserves of coal. The largest estimate, made by N. F. Drake, Mr. Bain then approved. He gave as well the figures of two other estimates, one by a Japanese, K. Inouye, and the other by a Chinese, W. H. Wong. Where Drake places the total at 996,795, Inouye puts it at 39,365, and Doctor Wong at 23,435 to 50,000 millions of tons. These discrepancies are so enormous that it is only logical to as-



sume that although the general distribution of China's coal reserves seems to have been thoroughly canvassed, the explorations in the actual fields have been too scant to warrant the drawing of accurate conclusions. In conceding the maximum figure, Mr. Bain made the important observation that of China's coal reserves those so situated as to be economically available are estimated by Doctor Wong to amount to only 23,000 million tons.

In a later article (*Foreign Affairs*, April, 1928) Mr. Bain summarizes the results of further studies by the Geological Survey of China and points out that the total for all Chinese fields is now estimated by the geologist Hsieh to be 217,626 million tons. This, he says, is sufficient to furnish power for considerable industrialization but will not last long if consumed with the same liberality per capita as coal is used in western Europe and North America.

Even the largest estimate of China's total deposits is only about a quarter of America's reserves. Japan's reserves are only about 1/450 of America's. In iron the disproportions are even greater, America's reserves being 100 times those of China and nearly 940 times those of Japan. Mr. Bain has figured that on a per capita basis China's reserves, at the rate of present-day American consumption, would last not more than three years, and Japan's only about two years.

It is interesting to note, in passing, that the estimated iron reserves of the Philippines are about 2½ times, and of the Dutch East Indies about 10 times those of Japan. It is more than likely that Japan's resources have been much more closely studied than those of the Dutch East Indies. Siberia's reserves of both coal and iron are comparatively unimportant, though individual deposits of workable size occur.

Among the reserves no mention has been made of oil. This does not imply that the possession of large supplies of oil is unimportant. Far from it. But estimates of oil reserves are not comparable in reliability even to the unsatisfactory estimates of coal reserves in China. When the uncertainty of prediction as to the yield of any given well is considered, it is clear that any general estimate of the untapped reserves must be highly speculative. The best opinion of geologists is that little of the territory of eastern Asia promises large oil yields. In a chapter contributed to Mr. Bain's book, Mr. W. B. Heroy admits small reserves in Japan, possibly larger reserves for the island of Sakhalin, and small reserves for eastern Siberia. Of China he remarks that there are only two areas which seem to have possibilities of commercial petroleum production, "and in neither of these can we feel at all certain of the development of a field of the first magnitude. Nowhere in China do conditions exist which are comparable from a geological standpoint with those existing in the mid-Continent or Pacific oil fields of the United States." The Dutch East Indies, therefore, appears to be the only region in the Pacific outside of the American continents which holds any substantial reserves. The exact extent of these is unknown, but they are thought to be sufficient to promise an increasing production of oil for many years.

Because these estimates are so unsatisfactory, the figures of production must remain our guide as to possible future development. The United States in 1925 produced about 75 per cent of the world's oil output; the Dutch East Indies about 2 per cent, and Japan about one-fifth of one per cent. China's output was negligible.

Japan produced less than one-third of her consumption of oil. Furthermore, there appears to have been very little increase if any, in her output of oil during the last decade. According to the "Japan Yearbook" for 1926 the output has actually declined, but other sources indicate that it has remained more or less stable. This is in spite of intensive efforts to discover new supplies. As in the case of the minerals, the disproportion is striking. For a while it was hoped by the Japanese that the oil resources of the northern half of the island of Sakhalin, most of which Japan now controls through an arrangement with Russia, would yield large returns. Although no official figures are available, it now appears that the field will not increase Japan's production by more than about 50 per cent. The actual development of this oil field will have to be more fully studied before its real value can be appraised. The rest of Siberia produces oil in only negligible quantities.

The oil fields in the Dutch East Indies and in British Borneo, unlike the Japanese, greatly increased their output in the last decade. They contain the most important oil deposits in the Far East. Their development is being carefully pushed with a view to more than the quick cash profit which is the chief and virtually the only incentive of American producers. The close association between the Dutch and the British oil companies is one of the important economic influences in the politics of the Far East. It is impossible here to enter into the details of these interlocking interests. Suffice it to say that the British count on the Dutch oil supplies and the Dutch count on the British base at Singapore in the event of a world war in the Pacific.

In the distribution of mineral reserves of all sorts

may lie a clew as to the future course of events in the Pacific. As has already been made plain, plentiful supplies of the indispensable raw materials are of great importance in the economic development of a nation. The experience of Europe and the United States has shown that large reserves of coal, in particular, and of iron, form the basis of industrialization. England, Germany, Belgium, and the United States, which have become the factories of the world, possess enormous supplies of coal and easily accessible metals. Japan in this respect is not so fortunate. If her consumption continues to increase at the same rate as during the last two decades her coal resources will soon be exhausted. Although she is developing hydroelectric power rapidly, this shortness of fuel is a serious obstacle which may prevent her from becoming an industrial nation of the first order. When the scarcity of her iron supplies is also considered, it is clear that she is badly handicapped in the race for industrial power.

China, although more fortunate in the possession of large coal reserves, lacks iron in sufficient quantities to hold the promise of a large development of iron and steel works based on her own production.

Both these nations, therefore, are likely to turn more and more to other regions for the sources of the basic minerals of industry. The accessible supplies of coal and iron in Siberia are small. While the coal reserves of the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines are inadequate, the iron reserves of these two regions are plentiful. In the natural course of events, iron ores will be exported in increasing quantities from these islands to Japan and—if she ever becomes industrialized—to China. Already China's limited supply of iron goes largely to



Japan, and from China comes much of Japan's coking coal.

Inasmuch as modern warfare is largely a matter of steel—warships, guns, munitions, etc.—it is clear that the position of the eastern Asiatic nations with respect to coal and iron may be a determining factor in the peace of the Pacific. The question of transporting supplies, both industrial and military, is of vital importance. The lines of communication, either up and down the Asiatic coast or across the Pacific, are very vulnerable. Even though Japan commands the maritime approaches to Asia from the Pacific, she would be faced with the necessity of insuring a steady stream of raw materials to aid her if she were fighting a first-class power having large reserves. In this respect Japan's position is even more unfortunate than that of England, for while both are island strongholds, England possesses large coal fields and adequate iron ore reserves that can be used when needed. Both nations, however, would face starvation if effectively blockaded.

If deficiency in raw materials is a handicap in war, there is no denying the fact that the desire to obtain control of large supplies of raw materials has long been a great incentive toward aggression. In the opinion of such eminent Europeans as Doctor Schacht, the President of the German Reichsbank, the rivalry for the control of raw materials is more intense in world politics now than before the war. Imperialism in the sense of going to war to subject an alien people for economic purposes is no longer fashionable or feasible. There are no more free lands to seize. But this does not mean that there will be no efforts to take colonies from other nations, nor does it mean that there will be no attempts



to control the resources of foreign nations by economic penetration and political pressure. It is only necessary to mention the Japanese management of the South Manchurian Railway, the coal mines in Manchuria, and the Hanyehping iron mines in the Yangtze Valley, to see that peaceful penetration is by no means antiquated.

Experience has shown that the possession of colonies does not necessarily assure economic advantages to a nation. The trade of the colonies is not exclusively with the mother country, nor can the colonies furnish all the necessary supplies of raw materials. Nevertheless, when geographical propinquity encourages natural trading relations, it is likely to be advantageous to an industrial nation to possess at least the power of maintaining order and of preventing foreign interference in such backward countries. Peaceful economic penetration seems to be the technique of the new imperialism.

So discredited is the term "imperialism" to-day that it is refreshing by contrast to recall the warmth with which Doctor E. E. Slosson attacked those who belittled it at the National Conference on International Problems and Relations held in Briarcliff, New York, in May, 1926. While deploring some of the evils of the system as practised in the past, he pointed out that the benefit of these pioneering activities in backward lands accrued to the world as a whole. "From my viewpoint," he said, "much of what seems to some people imperialism seems to me merely gumption. I am afraid that I shall have to confess I come of a race of practical imperialists. They used to be called pioneers in other days."

Oil is a striking example of the influence of raw materials on the post-war politics of the world. Great Brit-

ain, having learned a bitter lesson during the World War, set out immediately after the armistice to obtain exclusive control of as much as possible of the unappropriated oil lands of the world. With her superb foresight she has not entered into a race for production with America. Instead, she continues to use North and South American oils in as large quantities as she can buy, reserving for her own future development those fields which she obtained elsewhere. Her leaders have seen the reckless prodigality with which the United States is burning her oil supplies and reserves, and calmly await the day when America will be oil-poor. The Americans, always shortsighted and wasteful of natural resources, have not yet altogether realized what is happening. They may awake some day to find themselves dependent on Britain for oil as well as rubber.

The United States consumes four-fifths of the world's rubber supply, which is almost exactly the proportion of the supply that is grown in Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies. Profiting by the shortsightedness of American rubber users in failing to make long-term contracts with the producers when prices were low, Great Britain succeeded in restricting the output and artificially forcing up the price of this commodity, much to the chagrin of American automobile owners, who found themselves forced for a while to pay tribute to Great Britain for their tires. The Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Hoover, obtained wide publicity for his attack on this monopoly. What bothered him most was the danger that the successful use of this new economic weapon might encourage other nations having monopolies of raw materials to bring political pressure to bear

by restrictive measures. His fears, although perhaps exaggerated by the press, were not altogether unfounded, for during the war even neutral Holland was not averse to using its monopoly of quinine as a club in its dealing with the other nations.

Monopolies of essential raw supplies are potentially a danger to world peace. Even if a monopoly is not made effective, the threat can always be exaggerated until it becomes one of those imponderable factors in international relations which are determined not by reason but by prejudice and ignorance, and so engender hate.

In one other respect the control of raw materials enters into international politics. The recent tendency has been to invest ever-increasing sums of money in foreign countries for the production of raw materials. It is only necessary to recall the large American investments in Cuban sugar and in fruit in Central America, with their consequent influence on American policy, to see the importance of this. In the Far East, China, outside of the colonial possessions of the European nations, has been the principal field for such investments. More than half the large coal mines in China, for example, are in foreign hands, Japan having the major share. About four-fifths of the iron works in China are controlled by Japan. Of the 40 per cent of China's cotton-mills owned by foreign capital Japan controls nine-tenths. In other words, Japan is deeply involved in the financing of China's only manifestations of modern industrialism.

As a matter of fact, if the British Crown Colony of Hongkong be excluded from the total amount of foreign investments in China, it is found that Japan's share of these foreign investments is now almost as

great as England's. According to estimates furnished by Japanese sources, the total amount of Japan's financial interests in China is about \$1,250,000,000. This compares with the figure of \$1,750,000,000 for Britain's investments given in the annual report of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China in 1926. America's investments have been estimated to be about \$160,000,000. These figures are, unfortunately, only very general approximations. They represent such divergent items as government loans, unpaid claims, productive enterprises, and military subventions. They probably take no account of reserve stocks or of merchandise in transit or in storage. The figures should be considered, therefore, only as indicating with fair accuracy the relative proportion of foreign investments in China. In the case of Japan's investments it is pertinent to note that although these are enormous to-day, thirty years ago they were practically negligible.

Japan's astonishing rise to power is usually held up as a measure of what may occur when China modernizes her ways. As will be more elaborately shown in a later chapter, Japan's transformation from a feudal into an industrial state within a half century has been one of the political wonders of the world. But it is necessary to bear in mind that her industrial development still is far behind that of European nations and that it is sure to be handicapped in the future by the shortage of essential raw materials. Furthermore, in comparing Japan's case with China's, it is important not to overlook two essential facts—first, that Japan possessed a highly organized central government capable of enforcing its will and requiring unquestioned obedience, whereas China for several generations had had no gov-

ernment worthy of the name; and, second, that the Japanese leaders did not hesitate to study thoroughly all the developments of Western civilization and adopt these rigorously, scrapping old customs. The Chinese, on the other hand, dabbled in Western political philosophy, and for a time were hypnotized by all the superficial elements of Western education, but they are at heart so convinced of the superiority of their own civilization and their own ways that any change must be very slow. When this conservatism is added to China's shortage of essential raw materials, it is clear that for many decades the leaders of Occidental industry—and the yellow journalists—need not keep themselves and others awake nights for fear of the bogey of a highly industrialized China underselling the world in all lines thanks to Chinese cheap labor.



## CHAPTER VII

### WANTED: MORE MARKETS

The need for markets abroad has long preoccupied governments and economists. More even than the search for raw materials, it has influenced world politics during the last century. The wish to sell goods led the English up the coast of China from Singapore. When Thomas Hart Benson fought in the American Senate for the development of the Far West nearly a century ago, he envisaged the Orient as one of the principal customers of the United States. This same vision stirred the late James J. Hill when he planned the Great Northern. It was the desire to obtain exclusive markets in China that resulted in the attempts to partition that country in the last years of the last century. The effort to keep these markets accessible to Americans led John Hay to reassert the "open door" policy, countering the proposal for the dismemberment of China.

With the progress of industrialization the need for markets has increased. Competition has been and will continue intense. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the most approved method of seeking new markets was to obtain colonies. The scramble for unpre-empted lands reached its climax when Germany sought a place in the sun and Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal decided that the best way to prevent her getting it was to seize the remaining vacant lands first. Although colonies were nominally open to all nations for trade, they became in fact more or less closed to the

merchants of all except the mother-country. This was accomplished by tariff preferences, by financial concessions, and by quiet sabotage of foreign importers, such as delaying their goods in transit and subjecting them to technical obstacles so as to give the advantage of prompt



SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA.

Note the intersection of interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.

deliveries to the traders of the homeland. The United States to-day furnishes most of the imports into the Philippines; Holland furnishes the imports for the East Indies; France sends most of Indo-China's supplies; Korea buys heavily from Japan.

When the empty lands of the world had been seized and the "backward" peoples brought under the tutelage of their more "forward" brethren, there remained only

"spheres of influence" in friendly and supposedly independent countries where the exclusive control of markets might be obtained. This system reached its most advanced development in China during the last years of the Manchu dynasty. The spheres of influence, although theoretically non-existent, were about as follows in 1914: northern Mongolia and Manchuria north of the Nonni River, under Russia; south Manchuria, and, in south China, the province of Fukien, under Japan; Shantung under Germany; the Yangtse Valley and the province of Kwantung and its hinterland under Great Britain; Yunnan under France. To-day Japan has replaced Germany in Shantung and has penetrated the Russian sphere in northern Manchuria.

One of the preferred ways of extending influence within these spheres was to obtain concessions for the building of railways. These not only gave to the traders of the constructing nations large markets for their products but also made possible a degree of political influence resulting from the actual or potential control of the railroads by the foreign governments. Of this the most conspicuous examples are the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway. The former was the principal weapon of political and economic penetration of Russia into northern Manchuria. The latter has made Japan's influence paramount in south Manchuria.

Both the colonial system and the spheres of influence necessitated protective measures. The fear of war led to the acquisition of strategic naval centres such as Gibraltar, Malta, Singapore, etc., together with suitably placed coaling-stations. It is interesting to recall that even before the opening of Japan, Commodore Perry

had advocated the establishment of an American base in Formosa. Commercial shipping, likewise, had to have refuelling-stations and drydocks. Whenever possible, priority of shipment for the goods of the dominant foreign nation was sought and efforts were made to delay rivals. Even to-day American steamships in the Far East stopping for repairs at dockyards owned by European or other powers have to wait until the ships of the owning nation are finished. When American ships use foreign-owned wharfs they find that the unloading is not carried out quite so fast as for steamers of the foreign country arriving at the same time as the Americans. Similar delays have been frequently charged (though rarely proved) on some of the foreign-owned railroads in China. Whatever the causes, the results are that the nation without its own bases, wharfs, and ships is at a disadvantage in the competition for world trade.

Despite the efforts to pre-empt sections of China as the special markets for foreign nations, that country as a whole still is regarded as the greatest field for trade expansion open to the world at large. For centuries the wealth of the Celestial Empire has fired men's imagination. The early traders were stirred by the gorgeous silks and ivories of China, and by its many articles of luxury. These lent color to the apparently fantastic tales of Marco Polo about the splendor of the Great Khan's court and the wealth in jewels and fine garments of the princes of Cathay. The American merchants who made large fortunes in the early China trade were convinced that the Chinese riches must be unlimited. Later, economists were hypnotized by the mere size of the country. Present-day enthusiasts point out that while the per capita imports of South



America, with its 75,000,000 inhabitants, are about \$22, the per capita imports of China, with its 440,000,000, are scarcely \$2. Surely, they say, the hard-working, highly civilized Chinese should be able to buy more than the poor, backward South American Indians. Others, on learning that the total imports of kerosene into China are only about 200,000,000 gallons a year, *i. e.*, less than half a gallon per person, say that it should be at least 5 gallons, and forthwith launch into dreams of untold wealth in the oil business in China.

But the actual extent of this latent wealth of China still remains an enigma. Small as is the total foreign trade of China, it has grown steadily. In the last fifty years the increase has been more than tenfold. The total tonnage of shipping engaged in China's foreign trade has increased correspondingly. With the exception of Japan's share, however, the China trade is only a small item in the world trade of most of the big nations. For example, China in 1925 took only 1.9 per cent of Britain's and the same percentage of America's total exports. Her share of Japan's exports was 20.2 per cent. Her goods constituted 1 per cent of Britain's, 4 per cent of America's, and 8.3 per cent of Japan's total imports.

To what extent can the Chinese markets be increased? No satisfactory answer to this question seems yet obtainable. Messrs. Bain and Leith do not foresee an industrial development in China that will equal or even threaten that of the West. There remain the possibilities of increasing the output of raw and semimanufactured agricultural articles and of building up industries which like cotton and silk are based on farm productions.

On the first of these problems Mr. O. E. Baker, of



the Department of Agriculture, has contributed a study in an article in *Foreign Affairs* for April, 1928. His conclusions are that only about 29 per cent of the land in China is physically and climatically available for agriculture; that of this only a little more than a quarter is under cultivation, the farmers being concentrated on the best lands; that the balance can only be made available by the introduction of machinery, which is socially impracticable until industries are developed to absorb the large number of farm laborers who would be thrown out of work if machinery were used. About half the power on Chinese farms is furnished by human labor, compared with only about 3 per cent on American farms. To substitute mechanical means for this human labor would naturally force many millions off the land who would find no work and so would be in even greater danger of starvation than they are on their overmanned farms.

Persons who have studied the problem on the ground say that machinery cannot be provided, owing to the lack of capital. The average family in China lives so near the starvation line that investments in modern agricultural tools are out of the question. It is probable, however, that a marked increase in agricultural output can be brought about by the introduction of scientific methods, especially by the improvement of the breeds of plants and animals used on the farms. Even in the United States this sort of husbandry has only recently been undertaken on a large scale. It has proved so successful, however, that it holds great promise for China if it can be forcefully pushed there. As it requires no more labor to produce an acre of good than of poor grain, anything that can be done to increase the yield

means an addition to the farmer's income. If America's increase of 18 per cent in the agricultural output per acre during the last forty years can be duplicated in China in a corresponding period, a large amount of wealth will be released for trade.

The purchasing power of the average Chinese is necessarily limited by his exceptionally small income. Mr. W. H. Mallory, in "China: Land of Famine," has shown how the great mass of the people live on the edge of starvation, and how alternate droughts and floods take their tolls of millions through famine and pestilence. The income of the coolie laborer—*i. e.*, of the average Chinese—varies from about \$25 to \$100 gold a year. Even allowing for the comparative cheapness of such poor food and substitutes as they eat, only a bare pittance remains for buying foreign goods.

Such remedies for the agricultural problem as common sense would dictate, *i. e.*, flood control and irrigation and the use of lands still untilled, can be applied only with difficulty, owing to the inertia of forty centuries which is China's curse. Tradition, religion, innate conceit, ignorance, all conspire to hold China a slave to her misfortunes. Poverty and the lack of the spirit of co-operation complete the distress. Until these things are changed, *i. e.*, until mediævalism gives way to modernism, the development of China promises to be slow.

The experience of the Philippine Islands has often been mentioned as an indication that standards of living can be raised by artificial stimulation. On a per capita basis, the imports into the Philippines grew from about \$3.50 in 1900 to nearly \$10 in 1925, thus showing that the actual purchases by the Filipino peoples have much

increased since the American occupation. Old residents in the islands have remarked, for example, that whereas twenty years ago it was rare indeed to see a Filipino in Manila wearing shoes, it is now rare to see a man go barefoot. The demand for American clothes and hats has steadily grown. So also has the demand for food products and luxuries from all parts of the world. In order to obtain these things the Filipinos have begun to work a little harder.

What has happened in the Philippines, say the sanguine, can take place in China. Let the coolies once learn what the inventions of the Western world can give them, and they will manage to earn more so as to buy more. This has been the experience in the cigarette business. Why not in other lines?

The parallel to the Philippines is not altogether sound, however, because of differences in temperament and civilization between the two peoples. The Philippines are still in a pioneer stage of development. Large accessible areas of highly productive land lie idle. Agricultural methods are primitive. Yields per acre and per man are small, owing to ignorance and apathy. Furthermore, the average Filipino shuns work. His industry would be regarded as loafing by the average Westerner. A very little increase of effort in the Philippines, therefore, brings greatly increased profits. In China the maximum effort has already been expended and the soils used to their utmost capacity. When Chinese emigrate to the Philippines they soon become wealthy, thanks to their diligence, energy, and intelligence. The same industry in China would have left them in penury.

The possibilities of factory development in China in such industries as silk and cotton have not yet been ade-

quately studied. There are already 3,500,000 spindles in the cotton-mills of China. Their products have been sold even in distant South Africa. Other industries dependent on agricultural products will certainly increase in numbers and output. But even these are handicapped by the absence of suitable transportation facilities with which to move coal for power, and to carry the produce to distributing centres. Despite the canal system, which served China in an age of agriculture, and the foreign-built railroads, which cover China but scantily, most of the country is still remote from the seaports. This means that the movement of goods in exportable and importable quantities is limited. Oil, for example, is re-tailed by the teacup in the interior. Larger measures are beyond the income of the average coolie, owing partly to the high price that is charged by the Chinese retailers because it has to be carried by manback or wheelbarrow for hundreds of miles over difficult trails. The Chinese laborer, in the final analysis, is the principal consumer, and earning but a handful of pennies he can spend only a few "cash."

However slow the growth of China's markets, Japan, at any rate, is confident that they will repay systematic development. About one-fifth of Japan's exports go to China, and she takes from that country about a tenth of her imports. America, of course, remains Japan's principal customer and supplier, for the reason that the United States buys most of her silk and furnishes her large amounts of steel, oil, and other mineral supplies. But it is to China that Japan sends her manufactures, and as industry develops in Japan the need for the Chinese markets will increase. From China, Japan obtains much of her coking coal and good supplies of iron, not to mention rice and other staples.

One of the most significant facts in the economic politics of eastern Asia to-day is that Japan now plays an even greater rôle in China's commerce than does Great Britain. In 1925 she furnished 31.05 per cent of China's imports and took 24 per cent of her exports. The corresponding figures for Great Britain's share of China's trade (including Hongkong) were 28 per cent and 21 per cent. In other words, Japan is now China's principal customer and purveyor. Thirty years ago her commerce with China was negligible.

The industrialization of Japan, which has made possible this large development of her trade with China, has also greatly increased Japanese trade with the rest of the world. Despite her population of 56,000,000 compared to China's 440,000,000, Japan takes more than twice China's share of America's total foreign trade. In 1925 9 per cent of our imports came from Japan and only 4 per cent from China. Our exports to Japan were 4.6 per cent and to China 1.9 per cent.

Whatever the ultimate development of China, the fact that the nations believe her markets worth acquiring is one of the dominating factors in the politics of the Pacific. As already indicated, it is at the basis of Japan's Asiatic policy. It has largely determined America's Far Eastern policy. It has influenced the course of Anglo-Russian relations.

There has been so much sentimental nonsense written and spoken about the poor, downtrodden, gullible Chinese that Americans have quite overlooked the fact that in matters of trade it is the foreigner, not the Chinese, who has to guard against exploitation. The Chinese are a very practical people. They have been able to look after themselves effectively during the last 4,000 years



and, furthermore, knew how to make two honest pennies out of one long before the ancestors of their present foreign sympathizers had risen much above the stage of barter and highway robbery. They long ago developed the commission system to a high art, and learned how to protect themselves against losses and how to camouflage excessive profits. As a matter of fact, the foreigner is no match for the Chinese, whose capacity for making profits out of what would be losses for less ingenious, less sophisticated races is attested by the hundreds of foreigners who have gone into bankruptcy in China while Chinese business men have prospered.

Despite the many sordid and selfish quarrels about Chinese markets, and despite the fact that the ephemeral Chinese sovereignty has been cavalierly disregarded, it is misleading to pretend that the foreign nations alone have been the gainers in the scramble for trade and privilege in China. The Chinese themselves have profited greatly. The most conspicuous evidence of this is Manchuria, which, thanks to the peace-enforcing control of Japan and the efficient operation of the South Manchurian Railway, has been one of the few spots in China during the last quarter-century where the Chinese have lived in safety and prosperity. Foreign financial aid requires special protection in proportion to the ineffectiveness of the Chinese government.

It has been China's great misfortune that some of the nations have tried to use pressure to force her, against her will and best interests, to participate in political activities in their behalf. In 1896 Russia tried this. In 1904-5 Russia and Japan both sought to use her. In 1915 Japan made another attempt. In 1925 Russia again interfered. The lesson of these activities is that

the future of China is uncertain. Weak, strong, rich or poor, she is the great unknown factor in the Pacific. This is as true in matters of trade as of politics—of the relations of the nations with China and with the rest of the Pacific. More markets are wanted. Will they be found in Asia or in South America?

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PRESSURE OF POPULATION

The restless nomads of central Asia who pushed westward fifteen or twenty centuries ago in search of grass for their stock started a movement of peoples that has proceeded intermittently ever since, reaching its greatest volume in the years just preceding the World War. Westward the waves poured, from Asia into Europe and from Europe to America, until the last good lands in the New World were pre-empted. Had the peoples of Asia turned eastward instead, following some Oriental Columbus across the unknown waters out of which rose the sun, to them rather than to the white race would have fallen an empire in America and Australasia. But Asia, proud of being in its own sight the centre of the universe and content with the ways of the past, preferred isolation to exploration. It was not until the railroads of America pierced the Rockies, and emptied white settlers upon the shores of the Pacific by the hundreds of thousands, that some of the Asiatics awoke to the wealth of America.

The Chinese, first to seek a share, were shockingly treated by the Americans. Even when full allowances are made for the fact that violence in the pioneer communities of the West was not reserved solely for Orientals, the brutality meted out to many individual Chinese remains a stain on the good name of white civilization. It approached, in some cases, the cruelty of the Chinese toward their own people. But the coolies con-

tinued to come to California, and by 1888 were present in such large numbers that the United States signed a treaty with China (which that country never ratified) excluding Chinese laborers as immigrants for twenty years. Not content with the treaty, Congress enacted legislation to keep out Chinese cheap labor. It is interesting to note that the strict enforcement of the exclusion law materially reduced the Chinese population in the United States. In 1860 there were 35,000 Chinese in the country. By 1880 this figure had risen to 63,000 and in 1890 it was 106,600. It dropped to 89,800 in 1900 and in 1920 was only 61,600. Exclusion put an end to racial hostility between Chinese and Americans.

By 1900 the Japanese had begun to arrive in such large numbers that, in 1907, President Roosevelt, in response to strong pressure from the West Coast, negotiated the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement by which Japan undertook to curtail the emigration of its citizens to the United States. In spite of this, the number of Japanese in America continued to increase rapidly. Whereas in 1890 there were only 2,292 Japanese in the United States, by 1900 there were 24,326 and by 1910, 72,157. The 1920 census showed a total of 110,010 Japanese in continental United States. In 1907 alone, more than 30,000 Japanese entered the country. The number of immigrants fell off sharply in the years immediately following the negotiation of the Gentlemen's Agreement, but soon rose again. Where drastic exclusion of the Chinese had resulted in a sharp decline in the total Chinese population in the United States the "gentlemen's agreement" with Japan failed to check the increase of the Japanese population. In 1924, therefore, the Japanese, together with all Orientals, were

barred from entering the United States as laborers or settlers, much as they were already barred from entering Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The Congressmen who voted for this measure probably did not realize the significance of this action. Through them, the New World was checking another movement of peoples out of Asia which might have carried in its train disastrous consequences.

It is important at the outset to distinguish between overpopulation and emigration, with its counterpart, immigration restriction. A common fallacy is to look upon restriction as an obstacle to the alleviation of population pressure. Better alleviants, however, are the cultivation of unoccupied lands, the intensification of industry, and the practice of birth control. Emigration, except on a scale so large that it is impracticable these days, offers only a temporary palliative for overpopulation. Together with restriction it raises many problems quite independent of population density such as racial adjustments, the right of a nation to determine who shall be permitted to settle within its borders, and the kindred subjects of naturalization, assimilation, and the ownership of land.

It has been shown by Professor E. M. East and others that emigration does not in fact prevent the increase of population. During the past century millions of Germans, Italians, Irish, and other citizens of overpopulated countries in Europe have emigrated to America, but the population of those countries has steadily increased. As a matter of fact, every person who leaves a crowded country opens the way for the support of a substitute.

Equally important to consider from the outset is



whether a country, just because its birth-rate is so high that it impoverishes its own people, has the right to dump its excess children upon other nations, thus hastening the day when population pressure there will become as intense as in the overcrowded country. If such a right exists, Japan, for example, which has an annual increase of 700,000 in her population, is entitled to send 700,000 emigrants abroad annually. Emigration of this sort would not check the pressure of population in Japan. At the same time it would create for the receiving nations entirely new problems, and would hasten the day when these other countries would become overpopulated. Furthermore, it would raise serious political questions about the authority of the mother country over the colonists.

It needs no more than this brief statement to show that there can be no right to export population comparable to the right of a nation to say who shall and who shall not be admitted within its borders. In other words, the Chinese, or the Koreans, are not entitled to demand the privilege of settling in Japan. Japan is at perfect liberty to deny them admission and, in fact, does so. If the United States were to insist on shipping its surplus population to Japan as colonists, Japan would be fully justified in resisting with all means in her power. By the same token, the United States has full title to admit or exclude whomsoever she wills, whether Japanese or other aliens.

Against this argument the theory has been advanced that if the right to develop natural resources such as oil, coal, and iron in foreign lands regardless of the wishes of the natives is insisted upon, a similar right to develop farm lands must be admitted. In other words, they say,

it ill behooves the United States, which resents restrictions on American oil production in Mexico, to put obstacles in the way of Japanese or other Oriental farmers who wish to develop the lands of California. Superficially it is illogical to make a distinction between the two processes. But a great difference exists in that immigration affects the actual life blood of a people, whereas the development of resources affects only their wealth and political life.

Those who insist that an abstract right exists for crowded peoples to occupy unsettled areas of the world's surface use reasoning which if carried to its logical conclusion justifies highway robbery. "A" has \$1,000. "B" wants it. Therefore "B" is entitled to take it. The white men have good farm lands. The Asiatics want them. Therefore the Asiatics have the right to settle upon them. This ignores the fact that it was the white man's initiative and energy which discovered, opened up, and settled the empty lands in the Pacific and the probably more important fact that the white man owns them. The Asiatics, as already pointed out, had the opportunity but rejected it. Surely the pioneers are entitled to lands which they won even though other nations now covet them.

But it would be idle to pretend that population pressure is not one of the great political factors in the Orient. The mere figures tell their own story. These must be taken as relative rather than absolute, for the reason that there is no scale for measuring population density which takes into account different standards of living, relative fertility of soils, etc., and that in many countries, notably China, there is a lack of statistics. But they show how great is the disparity in population pressure

between the Asiatic and the non-Asiatic lands. Whereas the population density per square mile of tilled land in the United States is 186, and in Australia 168, in China it is 1,557, and in Japan 2,547. In Great Britain the corresponding figure is 2,116 and in Belgium 1,643. The bare fact is compelling—that the population density in Japan is greater even than in the most thickly settled countries of Europe.

The first question that arises is to what extent all the arable land in these heavily populated countries has been brought under cultivation. Speaking in generalizations, it may be said that the best lands have long been utilized. But according to the "Japan Year Book" there are still about 5,000,000 acres of land in Japan that can be brought under cultivation. Most of this is of only secondary quality but it can support between 3,000,000 and 5,000,000 people. Even with this land in use, only about one-fifth of Japan's total area will be under cultivation. The rest is too mountainous or barren to be farmed. In the northern island of Hokkaido the population density is lower than in the rest of Japan, and it has been estimated that the soil can support a denser population.

In China, according to the studies of Mr. O. E. Baker, only about a quarter of the tillable land is in use. This means that the Chinese are crowded thickly on the best lands and have left the marginal and distant and poorer lands unused. The difficulty lies in the inaccessibility of the unused lands and in the high cost of preparing them for cultivation. In practice they are not available for the great mass of the Chinese people. In spite of the overflow into Manchuria and Mongolia in recent decades, it is safe to accept the statement of Mr.

W. H. Mallory that China, at least for the present, has reached the saturation point of population density.

The statistics of Japanese population density apply only to Japan proper. The Japanese, although excluded from the United States, Australia, and Canada, are privileged to settle in Formosa and Korea, both under their dominion, and in Manchuria, which is a Japanese protectorate. One of the reasons put forward by Japanese propagandists to justify the seizure of these lands was that they could absorb part of Japan's surplus population. And yet what has happened? In 1924, according to the "Japan Year Book," the total number of Japanese in Formosa was 181,847; in Korea, 411,595; and in Manchuria 117,869. In other words, the Japanese have been either unable or unwilling to colonize these lands. In contrast, there are under the American flag (according to the same authority) nearly 300,000 Japanese "colonists," of whom the majority are in Hawaii and California.

It is interesting to compare the Chinese with the Japanese in this respect. As already indicated, millions of Chinese are pushing north into Manchuria and Mongolia. They have proved themselves able pioneers. Other millions have pushed south, to the Straits Settlements, the Dutch East Indies, and other tropical and semitropical lands. Statistics published by the Chinese Bureau of Economic Information in 1926 show the total number of Chinese living abroad to be about 9,634,000, of whom about 1,835,000 are in the Dutch East Indies and more than 1,000,000 in French Indo-China. The Malay Peninsula probably has another 1,000,000 Chinese. As a matter of fact, the peaceful penetration of Malaysian lands by Chinese is destined



in time to be one of the important factors in the politics and commerce of the East.

It does not follow that population pressure is necessarily unbearable so long as industries can be properly developed. If Japan's industries continue to increase she may be able to support another 15,000,000 inhabitants. It is impossible to predict the precise figure, or to offer more than the generalization that she has not yet approached the degree of industrialization of Great Britain or Belgium. The real problem is whether she can ever reach such a stage of industrialization. Her coal reserves are too small, and even her hydroelectric development is not enough to give her a potential power comparable to Belgium.

Industrialization makes it possible to export more and so in turn to buy more. Doctor Isaiah Bowman, of the American Geographical Society, has pointed out that industrialization is one of the methods by which people can emigrate without leaving home. The work of their hands goes abroad in their stead. It is as if each bolt of silk, for example, encased a Japanese immigrant to the United States who, on arrival, was unswathed, and earned enough in the United States to return to Japan with a steel rail on his shoulder. At home the silk grower would not have been able to make the steel, or its equivalent in value. Emigrating by proxy, he earned enough to relieve his large family of want.

Although industrialization can help alleviate the discomforts of overpopulation, it does not actually check the increase. Japan's population has nearly doubled in the last forty years. In fact, the experience of Germany and the United States shows that population density becomes heaviest in regions that are most thoroughly



industrialized. Much of Germany's increase of population in the last half-century, for example, is in the Ruhr and other manufacturing districts. In the United States, although the total farm population is greater than it was forty years ago, the rate of increase has been fastest among the urban residents—*i. e.*, in the industrial centres.

There is only one sure cure for overpopulation—birth-control. Before this can be effective, deep-seated religious, social, and political prejudices will have to be modified. The compelling force of ancestor-worship in China, with its attendant emphasis upon the duty of bearing as many sons as possible, is hard for the average American to understand. In Japan, also, unrestricted procreation has such high sanction that for years not only writings on birth-control but the mere presence of Mrs. Sanger and other advocates of this measure were absolutely barred. It is pertinent, even if unkind, to repeat the question of Professor E. M. East, echoed by some of the American militarists: Do the Japanese really wish to improve the economic situation of their people, or are they merely using the argument that they need room to expand as a weapon in their struggle for world power? Certainly, if they are seeking a remedy for overcrowding, they cannot continue to ignore the advantages of voluntary restriction of births.

It is unfortunate that both in Japan and in the United States few problems have been discussed with so much passion, sentiment, and prejudice and so little regard for facts as the exclusion of Asiatics from the white countries in the Pacific.

First, the principle of exclusion, as already indicated, is upheld in practice by Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, as well as by the United States.

Second, the real cause of exclusion is economic. Japanese laborers cannot compete with Chinese or Korean coolies and so are unwilling to admit them to Japan. Nor can the white races compete on the same ground with the Chinese or Japanese. When these enter a community in large numbers they soon force out the whites. The white man's realization that this is partly due to his own sloth and wastefulness compared to the frugality of the yellow races does not increase his friendly feeling toward his yellow brethren. Social problems have helped to complicate the difficulties. The traditions and customs of Orientals and Occidentals are so far apart that they create barriers which result in the complete isolation of the aliens. This in turn emphasizes the impression that these aliens are forming foreign colonies, which naturally stimulate racial and national prejudice. This would be as true if large groups of Americans were to settle in Japan as it is when Japanese establish communities in California.

Thirdly, exclusion from the United States is not absolute, but applies only to laborers and colonists. Business men, professors, students, travellers, and others are permitted to enter at will. As a matter of fact, Orientals of this class in America move about with even greater freedom than do the corresponding class of Americans in China or Japan.

Fourthly, no hostility toward any particular nation is implied in the policy of restriction. All the people of eastern Asia, not merely the Japanese, are prevented from settling in the white men's countries in the Pacific, just as all foreigners, white or yellow, are prevented from settling in Japan.

Fifthly, exclusion of Asiatics does not imply any "in-

feriority" of these peoples. There is no question of relative merit, but only of differences of standards. This is as true in Australia as in the United States and Canada.

Sixthly, experience has shown that exclusion, by checking the increase in numbers of the unassimilable aliens, lessens race clashes and so in the long run improves diplomatic relations. So long as the Chinese entered in ever larger numbers and formed colonies among the whites, friction increased. When strict restriction reduced the numbers of Chinese in America, hostility toward them slackened. The inclusion of the Japanese in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 put an end to the bitterness of the whites toward these people in California.

Seventhly, the famous Gentlemen's Agreement did not discriminate *against* the Japanese but in their favor. Whereas other Orientals were excluded from the United States by Congressional action, the "gentlemen's agreement" placed in Japan's hands the power of saying how many Japanese might come to America. In other words, America, in order to maintain Japan's friendship, relinquished her sovereign right to control immigration—an abdication of a national prerogative which she refused to perform in favor of any other nation. Although the manner of abrogating this agreement was deplorable, the act itself simply removed Japan from a specially privileged position and put her in the same status as the other Oriental nations. Incidentally, it is interesting to recall that when China in the '80s failed to ratify the treaty providing for the exclusion of Chinese coolies from America, and the American Congress passed an act prohibiting Chinese laborers

from entering the country, the distinguished Chinese statesman, Li Hung Chang, made the statement that "It was not the act of exclusion, so much as the manner of it, that we object to. Its passage, in violation of previous stipulations, was bad faith, and none the less exasperating because of the new treaty under consideration in which China took the initiative by agreeing to stop emigration."

Closely interwoven with the quarrels about the exclusion of Asiatics is the problem of land ownership in California. The Japanese in California form less than 1 per cent of the State's population but they farm nearly 12 per cent of the irrigated lands. As in the case of immigration restriction, the instinct that prompted the people of California to withhold land from the Japanese was sound, but the methods were unwise and unnecessarily abrupt. The fact of the matter is that California applied to the Japanese the same principle that the Japanese had already applied to all foreigners. Despite the fact that a law was passed by the Japanese Diet in 1910 permitting foreigners, under numerous restrictions, to own land in Japan, this was not put into effect until the end of 1926, and then under so many conditions that it is specious to assert that foreigners now have the same rights of land ownership in Japan as have the Japanese. Why should Japanese have the unrestricted privilege of land ownership in America when Americans have no such right in Japan?

Friends and opponents of exclusion alike have kept silent on the gravest problem which has arisen through the failure to enforce restriction a generation ago—the Japanization of Hawaii. In 1900 there were only 12,360 Japanese in Hawaii. By 1920 they numbered



109,274, or 42.7 per cent of the total population of the islands. The Japanese now outnumber the Americans nearly 10 to 1. Five-sixths of the Japanese children are in Japanese-language night schools. Although it is, of course, unjust to indict the Japanese population of Hawaii in toto as disloyal to the United States, it is idle to pretend that Japan through the Japanese-language schools, in which the Japanese lessons of reverence for the divine origin of the Japanese emperor are taught, does not exercise a great hold over this the largest single racial group in these islands of many races. The Japanese stock will soon be able to outvote the Americans. In due time they will nearly all be American citizens. But it does not follow that they will forget their devotion to Japan. The stupidity and intolerance of the Americans in treating the American-born, Americanized Japanese as foreigners have already played into the hands of the pro-Japanese. If, therefore, the Japanese party in Hawaii wishes to take political control of the islands within the law and framework of the American territorial government, it would find its task comparatively easy. On the other hand, if ever a race crisis arises, the American government will be faced with a task more delicate than any with which the nations of Europe had to deal in handling powerful, unassimilable, politically hostile ethnic groups within their borders.

The race question in Hawaii is likely to prove more difficult in time of peace than of war. As the great outpost of American naval strength in the Pacific, Hawaii would, of course, be placed under martial law on the outbreak of hostilities and seditious moves would be summarily suppressed. But in peace time it is almost



impossible for a democratic government dominated by sentimentalists to check disloyalty. The race problem in Hawaii may well cause trouble in the future, which may prove even more embarrassing than the past difficulties in California.

It would be a mistake to assume that because the logic of exclusion is on the side of the white races the problem will no longer trouble international relations. It will be raised by Japan or China whenever the interests of those nations make this convenient. Jingoism will use the fact of exclusion to inflame the Japanese or Chinese or both against the whites. There are few better ways of solidifying national pride than by advancing the claim that foreigners are unfair and even insulting toward the fatherland. Furthermore, the immigration restriction issue can be conveniently used to deflect public opinion from internal troubles. It also furnishes a useful weapon at international gatherings, because pressing it necessarily embarrasses the restricting nations, which are unwilling to give offense to the Orientals by speaking plainly.


For America, of course, Oriental immigration has ceased to be a direct menace. It seems clear now that the nation will not tolerate a relaxation of the restriction principle and that Japan will not go to war about it. The people of Australia have the same determination to keep Australia a "white man's country," but they are less able than the United States to enforce exclusion if ever the Oriental peoples decided that they wish to challenge the issue. To be sure, Great Britain's power per se is sufficient to protect Australia from invasion, but it is not so clear that the empire which rests its might on India can prevail against skilful diplomacy

playing on imperial race problems to force it into tacit admission of the right of Orientals to emigrate to Australia.

Realizing the temptation which a large continent only about one-tenth settled offers to the land-hungry, overcrowded peoples of Asia, the Australians are among the most ardent advocates of confining the Asiatics to Asia. This is an important factor in the political situation of the Pacific. But Australia is not succeeding in giving herself the best protection against an influx of Asiatics, namely, to fill up her empty lands with her own people and their kin. Efforts have been made to induce more English settlers to come to Australia, but these have not added much to the population. The immigration of other Europeans is subject to close restrictions. While this is probably far-sighted and is designed to avoid the mongrelization that has been taking place in America, it is questionable whether such a policy can be long pursued in conjunction with strict exclusion of Asiatics.

The wisest policy is more easily stated than made effective—for overpopulation there is only one sure remedy, birth-control. To remove the objections to the policy of immigration restriction with its kindred problems of naturalization and the right to own land, the equitable solution would seem to be to write into treaties on a reciprocal basis the rights which the different Asiatics may enjoy in America and Americans may enjoy in the various Asiatic nations. Americans should ask no privilege in Japan or China which they are not prepared to grant to Japanese or Chinese in the United States. Fairly drawn up, such treaties should remove the sting of imagined inequality and, incidentally, save the face

of the Orientals. Unfortunately many years are likely to pass before such solutions to either of these problems may be put into effect. In the meantime, both will continue to trouble the peace of the Pacific.



#### IV

### THE CONFLICT OF POLICIES





## CHAPTER IX


### JAPAN: ORIENTAL OR OCCIDENTAL?

The history of nations presents nothing more remarkable than the transformation of Japan within a half-century from a small, isolated, feudal state to one of the three great powers of the modern world. In 1870 her people were steeped in mediævalism; her government was treated with contempt by foreign nations; her army and navy were impotent; she had no merchant marine; her foreign trade was insignificant. To-day she is one of the most modern nations of the world, her territories stretch from the Arctic to the Equator; her government commands the admiration and respect of the powers; her army is second to none; her navy is surpassed only by those of Great Britain and the United States and is paramount in the western Pacific; her merchant ships may be seen in the great ports of the world; she plays a dominant rôle in the trade of the East.

Bare statistics tell the tale graphically. Japan's area has nearly doubled since 1870, thanks to the acquisition of Saghalien, Korea, Formosa, and various Pacific islands. She dominates all approaches to eastern Asia and is supreme on the mainland as far as Mongolia. Her population has doubled. Her army has risen from 15,000 to more than a million and a half. Her navy, formerly non-existent, now numbers about 250 vessels aggregating nearly 900,000 tons. Her foreign trade, which was valued at \$34,000,000 in 1882, was more

than \$2,000,000,000 in 1925. Her merchant marine, insignificant in 1890, to-day is nearly 4,000,000 tons—second only to Great Britain's and America's.

It is not necessary here to go into the details of Ja-



THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN.

pan's modernization. The native genius of her leaders made it possible for them to sift the offerings of Western civilization; the patriotism and loyalty of her people facilitated the adaptation of the most advantageous modern devices to her needs. But a half-century is a short time in which to transform the spiritual elements of a crystallized feudal civilization, so that even though Japan is outwardly Westernized her people have remained at heart devoted to their old ideals and have preserved undimmed their old conception of the state supreme. Western models have been used for the ma-

chinery of administration, and for the schools, the army and navy, and the merchant marine, but the government remains the most autocratic on earth, saturated with militarism; the Emperor continues to be worshipped as the all-highest, to die for whom is the greatest honor. Dominant in all phases of national life is loyalty to the spirit of nationalism, a profound belief in the unity of the Japanese people as embodied in the throne, and a willing subordination of personal to national aims. The idea that the Japanese are a chosen people has been intensified, and with it the determination to become obviously second to no nation in the world. What Rome was in ancient days, the Empire of Genghis Khan in the Middle Ages, and Imperial Britain to-day, Japan aims to be to-morrow—lord of the isles of the Pacific, master of China, sovereign of Asia.

History shows that enduring empire has usually been the product of chance rather than design, the fruit of adventurers, not of organizers. There have been dreamers of empire, but these have rarely been able to put their plans into execution. Instead, empire has grown bit by bit, gaining and losing haphazardly. Too often the home government has been blind to its real needs, as, for example, when England resisted for years the efforts of Sir Stamford Raffles to acquire Singapore for Great Britain.

In Japan, as elsewhere, the imperialists have never remained long enough in power to carry through all their plans. Policy has rarely been consistent. Nevertheless, Japan during the last fifty years has extended her territory and influence much as did England in the eighteenth and the United States in the nineteenth centuries. Florida, Louisiana, Texas, Alaska, Hawaii, the

Philippines, were all added to the original thirteen states during the last century. Japan acquired the Riu-Kiu Islands, Formosa, the Bonins, the Liaotung Peninsula, the southern half of Saghalien, Korea, and the German Pacific Islands. She likewise obtained virtual domination over Manchuria. During the World War, not content with Shantung, which she had taken from the Germans, she occupied eastern Siberia and the northern half of Saghalien, evacuating them only under strong pressure from the powers. Furthermore, she tried to seize control of China in 1915.

It is only fair to Japan to point out that this policy of aggrandizement was not motivated solely by lust of conquest. There were, to be sure, important strategic considerations. The control of Korea, for example, was deemed essential to protect Japan from invasion by Russia. The occupation of Port Arthur and the seizure of Shantung were invaluable for the military domination of north China. By controlling the islands of the Pacific, as already pointed out, she acquired naval domination of the approaches to eastern Asia. But besides these military there were economic reasons. Japan, unable to feed her growing population from her own soil, and poor in natural resources, wanted the control of sources of food and raw materials and of ultimate markets. Incidentally, she hoped that some of her people would settle in the new territories.

Critics of Japan have charged her with international immorality for failure to respect the rights of other nations in carrying out the policy of expansion. But such criticism smacks too much of hypocrisy. Not only did Japan use as her models the great powers of the Western world, whose methods of diplomacy she had closely

studied, but she received from them directly some lessons in international cynicism which removed any scruples that she might have retained as to her policies. When she entered world politics the nations of Europe were quarrelling about the remains of two Asiatic empires—Korea and China—and were blandly ignoring the rights of both. Russia was seizing Chinese territory and was pushing into Manchuria toward Korea.

Foreseeing the danger to the Japanese Empire if Russia succeeded, Japan thought to ward it off by making war on China and obtaining for herself the privileges that Russia sought. She quickly inflicted on China a series of crushing defeats in 1894, and in the terms of peace extracted the promise of a free hand in Korea and the lease of the southern tip of Manchuria, including Port Arthur. China agreed, whereupon Russia, backed by France and Germany, refused to permit Japan to take title. Had the matter ended there Japan might have swallowed her pride. But two years later Russia obtained this same territory from China and forthwith began to fortify it against Japan. The cynical insolence of this act was only paralleled by its stupidity. Small wonder that Japan thereafter viewed the West with deep distrust.

Japan's modernization has brought with it serious problems, foremost amongst which is the question of population pressure, which has created vital needs that have a determining effect on Japan's foreign policies. She must have food. In 1925 Japan imported \$175,000,000 worth of foodstuffs or an average of about \$2 per capita. This compares with \$48 per capita imported by Great Britain. She needs raw materials with which to occupy her industrial population and to pro-



vide wealth for the nation. Finally, she must have an outlet for her surplus products.

It is only natural that there should be differences of opinion among the Japanese as to how to meet these needs. At the risk of oversimplification, however, it may be said that there have been two general plans, one of which has had the support of the powerful naval party in Japan and the other of the army party. Commercial and financial interests have appreciated the advantages in both, but have, in general, inclined to the army plan with a number of important modifications. The navy party, as might be expected, has favored expansion overseas toward the south, and has held as the ultimate ideal Japanese control of all the islands from Kamchatka to Australia. The army party has favored a continental policy, expanding Japanese influence north and west, with the domination of China and perhaps of all Asia as the ultimate objective.

Neither party has yet reached its goal. Japan now controls the Pacific islands north of the equator with the exception of the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and the northern Dutch East Indies. The island world of the Pacific not yet in her possession contains undreamed-of riches in the form of tropical agricultural products and mineral resources which could be of inestimable advantage to Japan. She also has annexed Korea and is paramount in south Manchuria, steadily pushing her influence northward, thus assuring important sources of food supplies and potential markets of great value.

Despite the fact that the territorial gains of Japan to date have all been the result of wars, it does not follow that either the continental or the South Seas policy can be carried out only by the sword in the future. Modern imperialism's technic of peaceful economic penetration

may prove invaluable to Japan. For this very reason the chances are that the continental policy will meet with more success in the long run than the South Seas policy. The latter, to be really effective, implies control of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. Unless American sentimentalists and pacifists force the American Government to grant independence to the Philippines there is little likelihood of Japan's obtaining those islands except by war. Even if Holland were to sink into the sea—the only thing that could force her to relax her hold on her treasure islands in the Indies—Great Britain would seize the Indies before any one else had a chance. Japanese expansion toward the south, whether peaceful or bellicose, is, therefore, blocked by the combination of the United States, Holland, and the British Empire, even though Japanese colonists and business men visit the American and the Dutch islands in increasing number and the trade between both groups and Japan is growing.

No similar obstacles are in the way of the continental policy. Its principal source of danger is contained within the ranks of its advocates. There are two views of the continental policy; one, reflected in the "Twenty-one Demands," believes in the forcible military subjugation of China and at one time favored the military occupation of eastern Siberia. The other believes that Japan stands to gain more by earning the friendship of China than by the inevitable enmity which would result from military control. The second also favors commercial rather than military relations with Siberia. As in the case of the struggle between the naval and the military parties, each of the two groups advocating the continental plan has met with partial success. Japan has

maintained her military and political influence in Manchuria and north China and at the same time has greatly extended her trade with all of China. But it is obvious that the struggle between these two systems has not yet been satisfactorily adjusted.

No account of Japan's relations with China is complete without a careful consideration of the so-called Twenty-one Demands which created such a stir in the world in 1915. It is important to note that this policy has never been disavowed. The laconic "Japan Year Book," which although not an official publication is accepted as authoritative, merely remarks (in its edition of 1926) that "On Jan. 18th, 1915, Japanese Minister at Peking delivered to the Chinese Government a list of 21 demands; May 7th Japan delivered an ultimatum demanding a reply by 6 P. M. 9th; at 1.30 A. M. 9th China delivered a note agreeing to Japan's demands."

These demands included special rights and privileges for Japan, which gave to that country virtually exclusive control in Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien, together with the iron and coal mines in the Yangtse Valley. China also was to agree to employ Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military affairs. In short, China was to become Japan's vassal.

Some of these demands, like the provisions about Shantung, were nullified as a result of the Washington Conference. Others are at present in force, such as the prolongation of the lease of the Kwantung Peninsula, in which are situated Port Arthur and Dairen. With the exception of "Group V," the rest were embodied in treaties, but were never formally recognized by the foreign powers, which looked upon them as infringements of their own treaty rights with China assuring the po-

litical integrity of that country, and reserving equality of commercial opportunity for all nations.

Group V, which contained the demands on China to employ exclusively Japanese military, financial, and diplomatic advisers, were reserved for future consideration. They have never been pushed, but have not been withdrawn. Rather do they seem to be in abeyance, to be used at some convenient time as a weapon against China or the powers. They still have the support of an influential section of Japanese opinion and manifestly express the ambition of the jingoes and militarists.

More distressing to friends of Japan even than the nature of the demands was the attempt to camouflage them. To read the correspondence between the Japanese and the American governments about them is to receive an unsavory impression of the gulf that separates Oriental from Occidental conceptions of diplomacy.

The economic control of China, even if no military control be attempted, lies within the easy grasp of Japan. In the first place, geographical propinquity gives to Japan the advantage of cheap transport, with the consequent reduction in cost of delivery and distribution of goods. In the second place, Japanese knowledge of the Chinese language and customs helps them to merchandise their goods. In the third place, Japan has invested heavily in the infant industries of China. She now controls most of China's coal and iron. Already she has the leading share of China's trade and much of her shipping.

The great enigma in the continental plan is whether Japan will follow a policy of peace or force. Logic would seem to indicate that there is everything to be gained by patience and nothing by armed intervention.



Japan needs the Chinese markets above all things. China can wield an effective weapon against the Japanese economic structure by the boycott. It is almost certain that if Japan tries again to dominate China by force this weapon will be turned against her, with possibly grave consequences to Japan.

But logic rules Japan's policy no more than it does that of other nations. Many of the officials who advocated the Twenty-one Demands in 1915 are still alive and occasionally in power. They realize that in theory it would be best for the world and for the Chinese, given the inability of China to put her own house in order, if Japan could establish a benevolent but autocratic suzerainty over China. Much has been said in many countries in support of the thesis that Japan should be the intermediary between the West and China. But this theory disregards the history of China and the capacity of the Chinese people for passive resistance. A Japanese Government may be able to buy temporary submission to a policy of Japanese suzerainty over China, but the Chinese officials will not "stay bought." They would have to be bought over and over again, so that the cost alone of such a policy would be prohibitive. Furthermore, Japan has to reckon with the fact that no nation—not even Great Britain—could look with indifference on Japanese supremacy in China.

The imposition of alien control on an established civilization has usually tended to strengthen the spirit of nationalism among the governed. It is therefore likely that control of China by Japan would hasten the formation of an effective nationalist sentiment among the Chinese people. This in turn would bring nearer the day when China, by mere weight of numbers, drives



the Japanese into the sea. Japan is fully aware of this danger and now seems to believe that the best way to ward it off is to keep the Chinese government impotent and the Chinese people divided.

Next to China the greatest enemy of Japan's continental policy is Russia, which cannot be expected to tolerate Japan's supremacy in north China or in northern Manchuria. The pendulum has swung back and forth between Japanese and Russian efforts to obtain special influence in this region. In 1893 Russia was pressing China. In '95 it was Japan's turn. In 1898 Russia pressed again; in 1905, Japan. Just before the World War Russia was planning another incursion. Between 1914 and 1921 Japan made industrious advances. In 1923 it was Russia's move and in 1925 Japan's. The pendulum has not yet stopped swinging and a struggle is still in progress under the guise of railroad-building, rate-making, and concession-hunting in Manchuria. The Japanese have planned a series of railroads running northward into the Russian sphere in Manchuria, cutting the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway at several points and giving to the Japanese at the same time economic and military advantages. When the roads are completed Japan will dominate Manchuria, and by crippling the Chinese Eastern Railway may be able to take it over (either directly or under Chinese influence) and shove the Russian influence right out of Manchuria.

The details of this railroad war are not germane to this book. Suffice it to point out that inasmuch as Manchuria is a pioneer country, and marks the meeting-ground of Japan, Russia, and China, the railroads are of exceptional importance, commercially as well as strategically. Control of the railroads implies *de facto*

if not *de jure* domination of the province. Furthermore it means wealth for the railroad owners. In Manchuria the rivalry is particularly bitter because the Chinese Eastern Railway feeds the Russian port of Vladivostok and the South Manchurian Railway feeds the Japanese-owned port of Dairen. It follows that the more traffic can be diverted to Dairen the better for Japanese railroads, shipping, and business. The more that goes to Vladivostok the better for Russia.

The situation is further complicated by the difference in railroad gauges. The Chinese Eastern, which was built by the Russian Government, connects two links of the Trans-Siberian system and so, like that railroad, is broad gauge. The South Manchurian, like the Chinese railways, is standard gauge. The two formerly met only at Changchun, where passengers and traffic bound for the south had to transfer. The construction of a new Chinese-owned road under Japanese direction and control to Anganchi on the Chinese Eastern Railway now provides another junction. By extending the standard-gauge lines north of the Chinese Eastern the Japanese hope to be able to take business away from that line.

This new line at the same time furnishes the Japanese with a strategic railway which enables them to rush troops from the military depots on the Korean coast almost to the border of Siberia without change. This means that in the event of war Japan can cut the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is the principal line of Russian advance, far inland, and so can dominate all of Manchuria and seriously hamper Russian activities. All of this Soviet Russia well knows. But she has been powerless to do anything but protest and threaten. When Russia is strong again and the opportunity presents it-

self, she will surely translate her protests into more direct action.

If Japan attempts again to dominate the rest of China outside of Manchuria she will almost surely have to count among the protestants the government of the United States. America's traditional friendship for China and her belief in the right of the Chinese to rule their own country have naturally aligned the United States against all efforts to partition the Chinese Empire. It was this policy which led to American protests against the twenty-one demands. At the same time it is this policy which is largely responsible for what Japanese term the "American peril."

To Japan—or at least to her jingoes and to the mass of the people—the United States appears as a selfish meddler, interfering unreasonably with Japan's natural aspirations. Not only are Japanese excluded from the United States as settlers and denied the right to own land, but, thanks to American influence, they are kept out of the neighboring New World countries. Not content with excluding the Japanese from the Western Hemisphere, the United States has forced her way into the East, seizing first Hawaii and then the Philippines. If this were all, the Japanese might keep silent. But America has consistently befriended China and is the leading advocate of a strong, unified, independent China, which clearly is against the interests of Japan. Furthermore, American bankers have interfered with Japanese financial schemes in China and Americans have even had the temerity to propose the internationalization of the South Manchurian Railway—the pride of Japanese hearts and the key to Japanese control of Manchuria. America protested against the Twenty-one

demands. America forced the Japanese out of Shantung. America forced them out of Siberia and insisted on the preservation of the territorial integrity of the former Russian Empire. Wherever Japan turns, therefore, she finds her way blocked by America. Is it to be wondered that she sees in the United States a menace to her very existence?

It is only necessary to appraise this "American peril" coolly to see that if the United States were really as Machiavellian as Japan imagined she would not so much have checked Japan as have sought to embroil her with her neighbors. In particular would the United States have encouraged Japan to push into Siberia, realizing that the expense (the Siberian expedition was reported to be costing Japan one million yen—about \$500,000—a day) would probably have bankrupted the Japanese government, and that as soon as Russia recovered, Japan would be forcibly driven back to the sea.

But it is also obvious that one act, at least, of American policy in the Far East was of such a nature as to arouse Japanese suspicions so keenly that it will long serve to keep alive Japanese skepticism about American good faith. No greater diplomatic blunder has been made by the American Government than the effort to bring about the internationalization of the South Manchurian Railway. The plan was a gratuitous slap at Japan. It impugned her good faith and her efficiency. It sought to deprive her of part of the gains of the Russo-Japanese War. If successful it would have involved the United States deeply in the conflicting imperialist rivalries in the Far East—involved her as a champion of imperialism. As the principal guarantor of the proposed internationalization of this strategic

railway America would have been morally bound to support her position with force if need be. In due time it would have made war with Japan inevitable, and might have brought us into serious difficulties with Russia.

It goes without saying that the country would have been most reluctant to face the consequences of this policy. But the acme of stupidity lay in the fact that at the very time that it was being advocated by American diplomats in Asia American politicians were insulting the Japanese on the Pacific Coast and American pacifists were calling for a reduction of our navy. In other words, we were at once trying to deprive Japan of the fruits of a recent war in Asia, we were treating her citizens in America with insolent contempt, and we were neglecting our only defense in case our pusillanimous action got us into war.

Had the stakes been worth playing for there might, in the eyes of the cynical, have been at least some justification for this policy. But despite the dreams of Willard Straight and E. H. Harriman, Manchuria could never have yielded enough wealth, power or prestige to have justified the consequences. The fact is that the cards were stacked against us before even we decided to sit in the game, the play was bungled, and the stakes were wholly inadequate.

Whoever studies the record of American Far Eastern policy realizes that this was not a logical development of that policy. Rather was it a departure from a normal course such as occasionally occurs in moments of aberration. But no amount of protestation will ever make the Japanese believe that this act did not represent the true American policy in the Far East. The negotiations



are a matter of record. How convince them that the project will not once more be revived?

Japanese nervousness about American activities in the Far East has doubtless been intensified by the distraught condition in Japan following the severe post-war economic depression and the terrible earthquake of 1923. Japan is going through a period of readjustment. Her political, social, and industrial system is being re-examined by her people. As already indicated, the pressure of population is becoming more acute. Despite the contention of naval writers like Hector Bywater, war offers no solution. Emigration is no remedy. There remain only the development of industry and the expansion of markets in China. The former is handicapped by the shortage of raw materials. The latter is complicated by rivalries and jealousies, not only among the foreign powers interested in China but among the various Japanese factions and among the Chinese themselves.

The truth is that Japan is suffering from the conflict of her past with her future. Occidental in form, she is Oriental in spirit; democratic, she still practises Emperor-worship; industrialized, she is yet militarized; modern, she is yet ancient. In short, Japan is a nation of paradoxes.



## CHAPTER X


### RUSSIA AND THE MASTERY OF ASIA

Failure to realize that Russian foreign policy is determined by geographical and economic rather than by political factors has been largely responsible for the many mistaken interpretations of Soviet activities in Asia since the Russian Revolution. Because the Czar's government was overthrown it was assumed that with it went Russia's imperialism. What disappeared was the technic of Czarist expansion, aggressive, high-handed, arrogant, brutal. It was replaced by the suaver and more efficient methods of the Soviet leaders. But the objective remained the same, and it is a safe prediction that if a democratic or other government replaces the Soviets, its foreign policy will differ from that of its predecessors only in method, not in ultimate aims.

The reason for this can best be understood by a careful study of the map of Eurasia. It is a broad world which the Russian colossus bestrides, one foot washed by Atlantic, the other by Pacific waters. From the Baltic to the Behring Sea is nearly half way round the globe. But it is also a cold world, and—which is worse—an isolated world, cut off from the principal routes of commerce; hampered in imports and exports by a lack of harbors which are accessible and ice-free all year round. Russia is not so much land-hungry as sea-hungry.

Admiral Mahan, writing in 1900, put it effectively when he remarked that: "Only parts of Russian territory, and those, even in the aggregate, small and unin-

fluent comparatively to the whole, enjoy the benefits of maritime commerce. It is therefore the interest of Russia not merely to reach the sea at more points, and more independently, *but to acquire by possession or by control, the usufruct of other and extensive maritime*



BRITISH SEA ROUTES AND RUSSIAN LAND DOMINANCE.

The heavy black line from England to Shanghai shows the principal line of communications of the British Empire. The shaded area shows Asiatic countries dominated by Britain. The stippled area shows Russia in Asia. The arrows indicate the direction of pressure by Russia on Britain's Asiatic interests.

*regions, the returns from which shall redound to the general prosperity of the entire empire."*

In other words, Russia, deprived of easy access to world trade and handicapped in the development of her own natural resources by her lack of internal communications, is forced to seek power elsewhere. The most natural source of wealth for her is India, but India not only is in British hands but has a splendid barrier in the northern mountains. To seize it militarily from the north is difficult. But west of India lies Persia, not only wealthy in itself but affording through the Persian Gulf an outlet which could be effectively used by Russia to interrupt Britain's communications with India.

Farther west lies Turkey, which, hostile to Russia, bottles up Russian merchant and naval fleets in the Black Sea; but friendly to Russia, affords another weapon to direct against Britain's communications with India—a positive threat to the Suez Canal. Thus Russia is and has long been presented with the problem of how to obtain control over Turkey and Persia—shall this be by alliance or by force?

On the other extremity of Asia, Russia has in China a land of wealth and open harbors. Control over China implies greatly increased power in the world. Furthermore, as in Persia and Turkey, it affords a good opportunity to weaken Britain by necessitating the diversion of British naval vessels to the China coast. If, in addition, Britain's China trade can be seriously curtailed, the entire empire will suffer. Should it prove possible so to shake the empire as to loosen its hold on India, that vast treasure house would be open to Russian exploitation.

Study of the map further shows that although Russia is most vulnerable on her two flanks, and the natural barrier between India and the Russian territories north of it is difficult to cross, intrigue and military excursions along the Indian border are easy for Russia, owing to the comparative nearness of these territories to Russia's home land. These activities naturally disturb the British in India, who have always sought to quell border uprisings and who have looked upon the existence of alien—notably Russian—influence in any of the border states as decidedly menacing to the safety of India. This has given to Russia the advantage of being able, more or less at will, to force the diversion of British troops to the northern portions of India, thus distract-

ing British effort from other regions. The famous Russian General Skobelev—he who in battle rode among his troops dressed in a white uniform mounted on a white charger so that they might the more easily recognize him, much as Cæsar was wont to wear his scarlet toga in the Gallic wars—Skobelev considered indispensable the maintenance of a powerful body of Russian troops, fully equipped, in central Asia for the sole purpose of immobilizing British activities elsewhere. In fact, he advocated such a policy in order to force concessions from Britain in connection with Russia's European activities. "The stronger Russia becomes in central Asia," he is quoted as saying, "the weaker will England become in India and the more accommodating in Europe."

In other words, Russia, with respect to England in India, has some of the advantages that Germany had in holding the central position in the World War. Although she is more vulnerable on the flanks—as Germany was—and, in particular, is badly weakened if she is pressed on both flanks at once, she is strong when she seeks to concentrate on one border. Certainly, whenever Russia wishes to exert effective pressure on Great Britain, she has only to commence to push southward, whether it be along the Indian frontier, or toward the gulf of Persia, or in China.

Nothing less than the mastery of Asia was—and is—at stake. Russia, the great continental power, European in origin but Asiatic by destiny, dreams of restoring the empire of the Moghul Khans, and, her strength based on the wealth of old Asia, taking her place as leader in world affairs. Were it not for England these plans might be realizable. But England blocks her in



the Baltic, England can close the Black Sea, England again dominates Persia, England holds India, England has used Japan to check Russia in north China.

It is, in short, the old struggle of land power against sea power. The great mass of Russia, immobile near the Ural Mountains and weak on its European and Asiatic flanks, is hemmed in by the ubiquitous British fleet in case of war, and—which is just as bad—is blocked in peace by British officials who act in the serene consciousness that the might of the British fleet will support them. What can a land power, deprived of harbors and weak in ships, do against this force?

Although a great Asiatic power, Russia touches Europe and is still a part of the European political system, which through Russia makes European politics felt in the Far East. Not only is Russia in conflict with Great Britain, but she is bound in time to come again into relations, either friendly or otherwise, with Germany. This means that she will influence European politics, and—which for our purpose is most important to note—will be influenced by them. It is a far cry from London to Canton, but, as already pointed out, one of the chief objects of Russia's encouragement of the anti-foreign movement in China was to harm England.

This factor of action and reaction between the politics of the Far East and of Europe has too often been overlooked by Americans. Willard Straight became acutely conscious of it during his attempts to interest American capital in Manchuria and correctly noted that the fate of China was being settled not in Peking nor on the Yangtse but in the capitals of Europe. This is true to-day if Washington and Tokyo be added to them. To understand apparently inexplicable moves on the check-

erboard of Asiatic politics it is necessary to look far afield and to learn what part is being played by distant interests. The report of a Franco-Japanese rapprochement, for example, must be interpreted not as an isolated action but as an incident which may have as its object to bring pressure to bear on England about Turkey or Germany. So also English activities in Egypt are not determined by her supposed partiality for "oppressing" subject peoples but by the necessity of preserving influence in distant China or in India.

Geography, which has had such an influence on Russia's imperial policy, has also determined her relations to Manchuria. That portion of the Chinese Empire, shaped like a great mushroom, projects northward between the heart of Siberia and the coast port of Vladivostok. It was obvious to the Russians, when they planned the Trans-Siberian railroad, that a short-cut across northern Manchuria was an indispensable link and that if, in addition, Russia could get an outlet in south Manchuria she would have a warm-water port open all year—which Vladivostok is not. Furthermore she realized that control of Korea by Russia would at once weaken China and Japan and so hasten the growth of Russian influence in eastern Asia. It was essential—and inevitable—therefore, that Russia obtain political supremacy in Manchuria.

The methods which she used to achieve her ends are interesting as a sidelight on the imperialist technic of the Czarist officials. Waiting until Japan and China had concluded peace in 1895 by the terms of which as already related in the last chapter Japan was to have a lease on Port Arthur and special concessions in south Manchuria, Russia induced Germany and France to

join her in preventing the execution of these clauses of the treaty. She thus naturally ingratiated herself with China. But it was for a price, which was paid the next year when China granted Russia the right to construct the Chinese Eastern Railway and shortly thereafter turned over to Russia the very territory which Russia had prevented China from giving to Japan. At the same time she concluded a secret treaty of alliance with China which Russia later ignored.

The history of the Chinese Eastern Railway can be briefly summarized. Projected by the Czarist Government, the rights obtained for it from the Chinese Government in 1896 were turned over to the Russo-Asiatic (then the Russo-Chinese) Bank, created for the purpose of financing and building it. Funds came from the Russian government and French capitalists. The original concession included the right to build a line south to Newchwang or Port Arthur, and gave to the Russian Government the power to police the line and to establish its own control in cities along its route and to lease lands for farming and colonizing purposes.

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia surrendered to Japan her rights in the southern portion of the railroad and her concessions in south Manchuria. In 1916 an agreement was negotiated between Russia and Japan by which Russia undertook to surrender to Japan most of the railroad in her possession south of Harbin. This was never ratified, as the revolution intervened. The next year the administration of the Chinese Eastern was taken over by the Allies under an American board of engineers. It was thus operated until 1922 when it was formally turned over to China, which had received from Soviet Russia the gift of Russia's inter-

ests in the railroad. The fact that the Russo-Asiatic Bank and its French supporters had a claim to the railroad which is still in abeyance did not embarrass any of the parties concerned.

The next step was the negotiation in 1924 between China and Russia of a treaty by which Russia took back her rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway and it was agreed to operate the railway on a 50-50 basis by the two governments. Experience soon showed that this was but a camouflage for Soviet domination and that Russia was again trying to despoil China and to force back Japan. The old Russo-Japanese struggle to control Manchuria had once more become acute.

Although, as shown in the last chapter, geographical influences have made this quarrel almost insoluble, it has been interspersed with a number of truces. Of these perhaps the most important was that which prevailed between 1907 and the outbreak of the World War. The formal treaty recognizing the respective rights of the two nations in Manchuria and China, which was signed in July, 1907, was accompanied by a secret treaty which delimited the boundary of the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria and inner Mongolia. The text of this treaty has never been published, but one of the diplomats who took part in its negotiation traced on a map for the author of this book the line which this boundary followed, and which he described as running from the meridian of Vladivostok west to the Sungari river, thence northward along that river to its junction with the Nonni, which latter stream it followed to the mouth of the Tolo; westward up the course of the Tolo to its source, and from there straight west into Inner Mongolia to the longitude of Peking.

North of this line Russia was to have a free hand; south of it, Japan.

This agreement was reaffirmed in 1911, at which time Russo-Japanese co-operation was drawn closer by the stupid blunder of the American Government in trying to force the neutralization of the South Manchurian Railway, which the Russians as well as the Japanese considered hostile to their interests. But that the partitioning of Manchuria did not end the Russo-Japanese rivalry may be seen from the fact that the Soviets have bitterly resented the recent advances of the Japanese across the boundary of the Russian sphere. The Russians have done all in their power to prevent the construction of Japanese railroads within it. But Japan, secure in the knowledge that the treaty was secret (even though its terms have for years been generally known) and confident that the Soviets would not dare openly to claim rights assured under it, has gone her way smilingly, making hay while the sun still shines.

Soviet policy in China proper, apart from Manchuria, was well conceived and had two interlocking objectives—to injure British trade, undermining British prestige if possible; and to overthrow the rights and influence of the foreign nations in China so that Russia might the more easily carry out the old Czarist policy of dominating China in their stead. To accomplish this the Russian agents cultivated Chinese friendship, encouraged anti-foreignism and allied themselves with the so-called “nationalist” movement, which offered the best prospects of achieving Soviet ends.

To their work they brought the spirit of organization and the services of experts in arousing public opinion. Faced with the need of finding some group of Chinese



that was bound by more than local ties, they wisely chose the students, who not only had long been allied as a sort of caste but had always been looked to as leaders. These they imbued with the catchwords about imperialism and capitalism that had been so successful in other countries. Furthermore, wisely playing on the age-old Chinese scorn for all foreign barbarians, they especially stressed the anti-foreign propaganda, and nearly succeeded in whipping up the Chinese people to the insensate fury which they showed during the Boxer uprising.

But the Russians were wise in concentrating the positive action of the Chinese, as distinguished from their propaganda, against one nation at a time, thus dividing the foreigners and preventing common action by the powers against the Chinese. They singled out Britain for the first victim, as she was Russia's particular enemy, and as, having the largest interests of the European nations in China, and having the longest history of disagreements with the Chinese governments, she was the most unpopular among the Chinese. They wisely began the active boycott in Canton, which had always been strongly anti-British.

Russia thus succeeded in striking a hard blow at Hongkong and at England's China trade. But she failed to embroil the British in a war with the Chinese. For a while British prestige was badly injured by her failure to act. Throughout the East Englishmen grew bitter over their cocktails, and native leaders became arrogant, both interpreting the English policy of inaction as weakness. But as has always happened in the history of England, long suffering under provocation, she rallied before the crisis became acute. Refusing to be drawn

into war, she likewise refused to permit further insults from Chinese or Russians. By sending naval and military forces to China in large numbers but pursuing a policy of diplomatic conciliation, she thwarted Russia's schemes. Sea power once more curtailed land power.

All the time that Russian agents were disseminating anti-foreign propaganda and stimulating the Chinese to denounce foreign "imperialistic" designs against Chinese territory, foreign "interference" in Chinese politics by furnishing arms to the various military factions, and foreign "injury" to China by financing Chinese railroads, Soviet Russia had the cynical effrontery—worthy of Czarist days—to try to dismember China by detaching Mongolia and attempting to cut off north Manchuria. She also arrogantly assumed control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and furnished extensive military support to several war-lords. In other words, despite her protestations of undying friendship for the Chinese people, she was proving herself true to form—the most aggressive and dangerous of the foreign powers in China.

To the credit of the Soviet diplomats it must be said that they were more effective than their Czarist predecessors. Unscrupulous as were the old Czarist officials and agents, they lacked the finesse of the Soviet representatives. Muravieff developed Russian policy in Asia with hammer and tongs in the '60s. Lobanoff and his successor, the younger Muravieff, a generation later, extracted valuable concessions from China. The Czars, especially Alexander III and his son Nicholas, pushed down on India from the Pamirs. But it was Lenin's keen brain that saw that the way to obtain control of Asia and to deal England and Russia's other Euro-

pean enemies a body blow was by fomenting race feeling in China and the colonies of the European powers in Asia. This was a master-stroke.

But Russia's cause has been handicapped by the lack of military and financial force with which to support her policy. Her agents have used propaganda most skilfully. They have played one country against another with consummate adroitness. For two years at least the Soviet Ambassador to Peking, M. Karakhan, bedevilled the diplomatic corps. To the picturesqueness of his name, which translated means "The Black Prince," he added the appearance of Mephistopheles, the dramatic skill of Disraeli, and the sense of humor of Joseph Choate. Using his advantages to the utmost, and enjoying thoroughly the consternation which he was producing in the Legation Quarter, this adventurer who sat under Lenin's portrait in the magnificent private office of the Czar's Embassy proved himself a worthy successor of a long line of skilled Russian imperialists. But Karakhan failed because Russia was weak.

Whatever may be the outcome of Russian attempts to obtain an ascendancy over the Chinese Government or factions, Russia's interests in Manchuria and Mongolia make her inevitably one of the aggressors against Chinese territorial integrity. Herein lie the seeds of future wars in Asia, for Manchuria, as already made plain, is as vital to Japan as to Russia and of even greater ultimate importance to China. Economically it is the richest undeveloped accessible territory on the eastern Asiatic mainland, the only frontier country outside of Siberia. Strategically it is destined to be a battlefield again as it was in 1894 and 1905. Internationally it will remain one of the danger spots of the world. For

the moment, the war is being waged by railroad building, with China as the probable beneficiary of the struggle. The Chinese are furnishing the man-power of production. If ever China becomes a strong nation she will have no difficulty in taking over Manchuria from Japan and Russia.

Although there are dangers in this situation, the elements of a balance of power, which when evenly maintained is a guarantee of peace, also exist. The European governments, wiser in these matters than ourselves, are cognizant of this and will undoubtedly again, as they did in the past, strive to re-establish the equilibrium so soon as Russia regains her strength. Constant vigilance will be required to maintain it, for the notable preponderance of one power increases the danger of war. The United States is uneasy lest it be to the interest of one or more of the European powers to disrupt this balance for selfish purposes. Tyler Dennett has shown in his volume, "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War," that the German Kaiser, wishing to divert Russian influence in Europe, deliberately encouraged the Czar in the policy of aggrandizement in Manchuria that brought about the Russo-Japanese war. He wished Germany to have a freer hand in European politics. For the moment Europe is free from such trouble-making rulers, but the type is common enough and a specimen may reappear at almost any moment.

It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the United States may again have to step in to redress the balance of power. This was, in effect, what President Roosevelt did in using his influence to bring about the Portsmouth Peace Conference in 1905. He had grasped the principle of political equilibrium and realized that an over-

whelming victory for either Russia or Japan would have been bad for the peace of the world. To-day, the excessive predominance of either Russia or Japan in Manchuria and China might become an unsettling factor in international politics.

In estimating the changing conditions in Asia it is important to bear in mind that whereas Russia used to be a European power with interests in Asia, she is now an Asiatic power with interests in Europe. Geography has decreed that the natural direction of her policy is southward, and that the easiest channels of advance are at the two extremes of her great Asiatic empire. So soon as she is strong again she will exert more pressure at these extremes, to the consequent unsettlement of world politics.



## CHAPTER XI

### BRITAIN, THE CONSERVATOR

"India is the stronghold of British power in Asia, and the security and welfare of India must always be the paramount consideration that governs our Asiatic policy." These words of Sir Valentine Chirol, written in 1905, express a truth which is as vital now as it was a century ago. The possession of India has shaped Britain's relations with China as well as with Egypt and Turkey; with the Pacific as well as with the Mediterranean. It explains Singapore and Suez. Gibraltar, Malta, and Cypress, all key bases for the unhampered control of the Mediterranean, and Aden, Perim, and Sokotra for the domination of the Red Sea, are vital links in the defense of the Empire in India and of British world trade. Singapore, as already explained in Chapter II, is the easternmost outpost of the Empire, guarding British interests in China and the Pacific.


So extensive is this imperial organization that it may be said to be satiated with territory. The British have but one object—to hold as much as they can of what is still theirs. They wish to secure the tenure of India and their other possessions in Asia. They hope to preserve their trade. For the proper accomplishment of both these desires it is essential that they maintain their prestige. If ever a situation should arise in which the choice lay between saving the Empire in India and losing trade or possessions elsewhere in eastern Asia or the

Pacific, the presumption is that the English would concentrate on India.

Hence the deep-seated antagonism of Britain against Russia in Asia. Of all the nations, Russia alone is in a position to endanger Britain's position. In China the primary political objective of the British Government has long been to prevent Russian domination. It is no secret that Britain entered the Anglo-Japanese alliance because she saw in Japan a convenient check to Russia in the East. As shown in the preceding chapter the natural movement of Russia is from north to south. Russian advance in China, whether by violence, by diplomatic concessions or by stirring up the Chinese to anti-British activities, compels the dispersal of British forces. This happened on a small scale in 1927 when Great Britain was forced by Russian activities in China to send troops and warships from the Mediterranean to the China coast. Should Russia succeed in distracting the British in China and at the same time in Western Asia or Europe, she could seriously embarrass the Empire.

Although the British Government is obliged to think of events on the China coast in terms of imperial politics, it is also deeply concerned about the China trade. In fact, the original advance up the China coast from India was in search of trade, and most of England's quarrels with China have been about trade or rights growing out of commercial needs. British merchants in China have always carried weight in shaping the relation of Britain with China in crises, and the machinery of Britain's various governmental agencies was established to further trade. The crown colony of Hong-kong, which until it was ceded to Britain was a barren

rock, was made into one of the great seaports of the world, and served as the clearing house for Britain's South China trade. The International Settlement at Shanghai was built up by the British to further the



SHIPPING IN THE CHINA TRADE.

Showing the percentage of vessels of the principal nations and the changes occurring between 1899 and 1923. From a table compiled by Professor C. F. Remer.

trade of the Yangtse Valley, which it commands. Everywhere in China, the interests of British commerce have been fostered by governmental aid.

British investments in China, as already stated, have been estimated at about \$1,750,000,000. The actual value of British exports to China (including Hong-kong) in 1924, the last good year, was \$144,000,000.

The imports amounted to \$73,000,000. This trade has grown slowly in the last quarter-century but was greater in relative and actual value during the third quarter of the last century than in the early 1900s. To-day it furnishes less than 2 per cent of Britain's foreign trade. In the last few years it has been equalled by Britain's trade with Japan and is now only a quarter of the trade with Australia. In other words, the China trade has steadily lost in importance to the Empire.

In terms of China's total imports and exports the decline of Britain's proportion is significant. Whereas a half century ago the bulk of China's commerce was with England, to-day less than a quarter is with that country. The decline in British shipping is equally striking. In 1895, 65 per cent of the vessels engaged in foreign commerce in Chinese waters were under the British flag; in 1925 only 33.5 per cent.

The British merchants on the China coast and the home government have resented as an impertinent intrusion the growing commercial activities there of the Japanese and the Americans. American exports to China in 1924 were about three-quarters the value of Britain's, and her imports exceeded Britain's by nearly 50 per cent. By 1925 the volume of Japanese trade with China actually was greater than the total British trade with China and Hongkong. When it is realized that even in 1900 Japan's trade with China was unimportant, it is obvious that this rise is alarming to the British.

That these factors are not without political significance may be judged by the report early in 1926 that Japan had suggested that Sir Francis Aglen, the British successor of Sir Robert Hart as Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, be replaced

by a Japanese. The ground for this "feeler" was that when the Customs Service was first created, and, again, when Sir Robert Hart died in 1911, the British supported their claim that an Englishman should hold this post by pointing out that Britain had the major share of China's trade. Inasmuch as Japan now has a greater portion of this trade than Britain, the Japanese feel that the Inspector-General should be a Japanese. Although this official is only an employee of the Chinese Government, he is—or used to be—influential in Chinese councils. There is little doubt that the Japanese would profit by having one of their men hold this important office.

The fear of Japanese competition is further complicated by the natural tendency of Japan to establish a monopoly in those parts of China where she is supreme. It is no secret that in Manchuria the Japanese have profited to the detriment of British and American merchants by their control of the railways. Is it altogether inconceivable that if Japan were to become the dominating power in China, as was planned in the famous Twenty-one Demands, the Japanese might quietly and legally but none the less effectively force the British traders out of north China? Certainly the policy of the Twenty-one Demands with respect to the Yangtse Valley, which had always been regarded as a sphere of British interest, alarmed the British, for the Japanese, by taking over the control of the Hanyehping coal and iron mines and furnaces in the heart of the Yangtse Valley, were bound to weaken Britain's dominance of the central Chinese trade.

This uneasiness about Japan's monopolistic tendencies in China is one of the reasons why England has become more active in her support of the open-door pol-



icy. This doctrine, as already explained, was advanced by the Americans as the only method of combating the movement to partition the trade of China among the foreign powers, to the exclusion of the United States. Although based on high principles, it was essentially the weapon of a weak nation. That Great Britain should have become reconciled to supporting it in deed as well as in word is in itself an indication of her diminished power in China. She had only changed her mind reluctantly, for her supremacy in the Yangtse and in the Canton district has been of great value to her. Now, however, only by joining with the United States in insisting on the open-door doctrine can she hope to prevent her commerce being edged out by Japan.

Britain's experiences with the United States in eastern Asia have not been such as to give her much confidence in the value of American co-operation. The British have found that in the Far Eastern crises the Americans have nearly always temporized, leaving to Britain the onus of upholding the white man's interests, whereas they have never hesitated to profit by the advantages which all foreigners have derived from Britain's actions. It is only fair to state by way of extenuation that our record has appeared exceptionally contemptible in British eyes because the British persisted in the mistaken idea that American and British policies in China are identical, whereas, in truth, the coincidence of interest has been only spasmodic. On many occasions the policies have necessarily been antagonistic.

Only on the question of Asiatic emigration has there been virtually complete accord between the United States and a portion, at least, of the British Empire. The Dominions are so insistent on the exclusion of

Asiatics that they would view with strong disapprobation any action of the home government that tended so to strengthen Japan in eastern Asia as to facilitate Japanese expansion southward. This is a source of embarrassment to the home government which not only has heretofore guided its relations with Japan in accordance with the principles of imperial interests but which hesitates to encourage—or even to admit the existence of—a race barrier in British territory lest this increase the resentment of the Indians against the English. As a matter of fact the question of racial migration is even more delicate for the British Empire than for the United States. To handle it will require the skill of the ablest British diplomats.

The fears of possible Japanese expansion are not unconnected with the problem of Singapore. As the western gate of the Pacific, Singapore is an ideal place for a naval station on which to base the defense of British interests in China and the Pacific. To describe it as a “menace” to Japan and hence as “aggressive” is to ignore its location and the true character of the interest which it serves. Great Britain, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized, is the great conservator, bent only on holding what she has. Hence the fortifications and naval docks and the oil reserves at Singapore are to be used only if the balance of power in the Pacific is disturbed.

If a line be drawn from the northwestern tip of Sumatra to Hongkong and thence to New Zealand, the peninsula and islands that lie east and south of it (with the exception of Timor) will be found to belong to three powers—Great Britain, the United States, and Holland. Within this area, as shown in Chapter II, the preservation of the status quo is the chief aim of all

three nations. In the defense of this area Singapore plays the prime, Manila the second rôle. Hence it is as much to the interest of the United States to see a strong British fleet based on Singapore as it is to those of England and Holland to see a powerful American fleet based in the Philippines. Were the United States to withdraw from the Philippines, the balance of power in this region—and in all of eastern Asia—would be so upset as to endanger the peace of the world. England and Holland, alike, could only view the occupation of the Philippines by Japan with the gravest alarm, for it would mean almost inevitably that the Dutch East Indies and probably Australia would in time fall under Japanese influence.

The importance of Singapore may well be enhanced rather than diminished, as time passes. There have been indications in recent years that Great Britain is slowly falling back on Singapore as her last outpost in eastern Asia. It will be recalled that Hongkong was made into a forward naval depot and that Great Britain originally planned a naval base at Weihaiwei on the north shore of the Shantung Peninsula. This concession she promised to return to China at the Washington Conference. She likewise then agreed not to improve the base at Hongkong. Britain has thus curtailed her potential naval activities in eastern Asiatic waters. In addition, the spheres of influence, of which she formerly had the most important, are doomed, largely through England's own policy. The surrender of the Hankow concession and the expressed willingness to permit the Chinese a voice in the conduct of the Shanghai International Settlement are precedents which sooner or later will be used by the Chinese to force the complete surrender of

these foreign outposts. It may be a generation before this is accomplished, but the tendency is unmistakable. A further loss of British influence is sure to follow.

If the withdrawal of Britain upon Singapore becomes a permanent policy it will have to be carried on slowly and imperceptibly, for precipitate action would be interpreted throughout the East as proof of Britain's weakness. The fact that the Russians realized full well the damage to Britain's influence if she were forced to withdraw hurriedly from China was the reason why they struck so hard at the British in Canton and Hong-kong in 1925 and 1926. To show how tenuous is British prestige in the East, one need only recall that when in 1905 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in a modified form to include British India in the territory affected, this fact was heralded in India as a loss of "face" for Britain, as it implied that she needed the help of Japan to defend her Indian interests. If it was true in 1905, when Great Britain was indubitably supreme, that the mere inclusion of British India within the scope of that alliance implied weakened prestige, it is obvious that lesser signs of apparent "loss of face" can do much to injure British prestige in India in this age of Asiatic revolt. It is no mere chance that the withdrawal of the British Asiatic fleet to European waters in 1910, where it has ever since been concentrated, coincided with the beginning of the decline of Britain's influence in China and throughout the East.

Britain's position is not unlike that of a school-teacher who, having lost the respect of one class, finds it more difficult to maintain order with another. Paradoxically enough, if she were to go to war with China she would lose prestige, whereas if she were to be too accommo-



dating she would lose even more prestige. It is an unsavory fact which sentimentalists have refused to recognize that, as Rodney Gilbert put it in "What's Wrong with China": "Every act of generosity, every show of leniency, and every gracious condescension on the part of a Western power in its dealings with China renders our position in China so much less comfortable and our commerce and lives so much more precarious."

Fortunately the British Government has no illusion about the rôle of armament in the Orient, and its relation to prestige. Sad experience has taught England that in Asia a government that fails to display its force, or—which is as bad—shows indecision, receives but scant respect. Power and pomp are closely allied in the Eastern mind. Only by force does the Occidental maintain his ascendancy over the Oriental. With the collapse of force the sway of the West will end, and, to use the words of Meredith Townsend: "the ancient hostilities of race and creed and history, none of which have we had time to extinguish, will revive at once; and life will again be made interesting as of old by incessant wars, invasions, and struggles for personal ascendancy."

Great Britain is and will probably long remain sorely puzzled about the tactics, as differentiated from the strategy, of her China policy. War is, of course, out of the question, not only on account of the possible reactions in India but because the British people are unwilling to undertake military operations which would surely be lengthy and costly and would probably be futile. Furthermore there is no denying the genuineness of the British professions of wishing to be just to the Chinese and to make a reasonable adjudication with them. On the other hand, to grant too many of the "demands" of the



Chinese is to risk still further injury. To back one group at the expense of the others is to be drawn into the maelstrom of Chinese politics. To abstain from all action is to give tacit countenance to increasingly frequent anti-British outrages. Under the circumstances the policy of 1926—to make a big display of force but to be clearly conciliatory—seems to have merit.

It is not impossible that Britain's proverbial partiality for compromise will in time result in support for the division of China into North and South, the former under Japanese, the latter under British nominal guardianship. This idea, put forward from time to time in England and Japan, might serve temporarily to stabilize conditions in the East. But it would require a readjustment of the spheres of influence, as the British have nothing in the North to correspond to the Japanese interests in the Yangtse Valley and the province of Fukiën. There neither would nor could be any recognition of special rights, for in spite of treaties like the now defunct Lansing-Ishii agreement in which foreign powers recognized Japan's special position in Manchuria, it is unlikely that the foreign nations would again admit that either Japan or England possessed such rights in any other part of China. But the day of private agreements and secret treaties is not passed. Not even the United States has been above entering into confidential commitments. For example, the text of the Gentlemen's Agreement between the United States and Japan has never yet been published. What reason, then, to assume that a tacit understanding between the powers to recognize and maintain a divided China is beyond the realm of practical politics?

As early as 1900, Admiral Mahan wrote that a sepa-

ration of China into two parts of which the southern half would base its rule on the great valley of the Yangtse might be to the best interest of China and the world. In fact, he pointed out that the position of the Chinese capital in Peking was a danger to the Celestial Empire for the reason that it was too easily subject to the nearest strong pressure. He meant, of course, Russia, which then was the only continental nation pushing down on Peking. To-day Japan is also a continental neighbor of Peking and, like Russia before, has made several attempts to dominate north China.

Particularly pertinent is the conclusion which this clear-seeing American drew from these facts—that sea power (meaning, of course, Great Britain), because of the nature of its force which makes it difficult to exert direct pressure away from the seaports and navigable rivers of China, should have as its aim “to develop China through the Chinese, to invigorate and inspire, rather than to supersede, the existing government.” Is it not possible that this, which coincides so closely with the American policy of seeing China unified and strengthened, may turn out to be the wisest course for Britain to pursue?

## CHAPTER XII

### HOLLAND'S TREASURE ISLANDS

The wealth of the Indies, believed by the first explorers to be boundless, has shown promise in recent years of justifying its ancient reputation. In the beginning, spices lured the merchant adventurers of Portugal, Holland, and England to Java and Ternate. Cloves and nutmegs had tickled the jaded palates of the European noblemen of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so sailors set forth in cockle-shells upon year-long journeys of high adventure, and returned with fortunes from the Moluccas.

In modern days the Dutch masters of the East Indian Islands have added to the collection of spices the cultivation of sugar, coffee, and tobacco. They now have a monopoly of the world's quinine production and of gutta-percha. They grow one-third of the world's rubber supply and much of its camphor. In fact, the total exports of the Dutch East Indies in 1924 was about two-thirds the value of the exports from China, and about one-third the value of the exports from British India.

If this were all, it would be enough. But this represents but a portion of the latent wealth of these islands. Millions of acres of the richest virgin lands in the world lie unused. And, even more important in these days of industrialism, the large mineral resources of the islands are almost untouched. They have the only important reserves of oil in eastern Asia. Their de-

posits of iron are ten times as large as those of Japan and four times those of China. They produce nearly a quarter of the world's supply of tin. When it is realized that large portions of this Island empire—notably Borneo—have been only cursorily prospected, it is clear that the latent mineral wealth may well prove to exceed even the most optimistic present estimates.

These islands, which stretch for three thousand miles along the equator, are peopled by one of the most pleasantly indolent races of mankind—the Malays and their kindred. Except on the rare occasions when they run amuck, they are gentle, kindly, easy-going children of nature, content with little and glorying in the voluptuousness of their climate and the prodigality of their soil. Mohammedans by religion, they are nevertheless but little preoccupied with questions of faith and feel that they have rendered unto Allah his dues when they have bowed down at sunrise and invoked his benediction. Their attitude toward work is that the man who does more than the absolute minimum shows a lack of good sense. As their needs are few, their output diminishes in proportion to the increase in their wages. In other words, the Malay regards high pay as an opportunity to work less rather than to earn more money. As one Dutchman put it, "*Nous autres, nous épargnons l'argent; eux, ils épargnent le temps.*" We try to lay by money; they seek to earn spare time in which to sit in the shade of their palm-trees by the coral beaches and enjoy the bounties of nature.

These amiable islanders number about 50,000,000, of whom about 35,000,000 live in Java. The total area of their territory is 733,000 square miles, or more than the combined area of France, Germany, Italy, and

Spain. They are ruled over by the Dutch with a benevolently autocratic form of government. The principal power is vested in the Governor-General, who represents the Crown, receives royal honors, and is housed and tended with all the ceremony and pomp that is so dear to Orientals. He has under him a highly trained Dutch bureaucracy, including provincial governors, called "residents," local mayors, advisers, and other executive and administrative officials. These men for the most part come from families that have long been in the colonial service, with the result that they begin their work with the background of colonial administrative experience. Furthermore, those who have not learned the native dialects in infancy are obliged to learn them before taking service. It has been the principle of the Dutch that all communications with the natives must be in Malay, which is the lingua franca of the Islands, or in the dialects, and that the natives, except a select few, are not to be encouraged to learn Dutch or any European language.

The Dutch, wherever possible, have used the existing native rulers and noble families as the channels of administration. In most instances the Dutch officials have kept in the background but have nevertheless closely supervised the native administrators. The local Dutch "resident" stands in relation of elder brother to the local sultan or other ruler and in public functions sits on his left (which is the Oriental place of honor). The Dutch have wisely refrained from interfering with native customs and religion, and not only have made no effort to proselytize or to "Dutchify" the natives but have discouraged missionaries and others from upsetting tribal customs and beliefs.



Their three centuries of experience as colonial administrators has brought them wisdom. In the beginning they made cruel mistakes. Even the history of the last century is not without blemish. But out of their blunders they learned the truth of the motto of the French Colonial Institute: "Know, understand, watch, love." They have developed a philosophy of Colonial administration that is based on the theory that the native is never at fault—that if anything goes wrong, whether in government or business, the Dutchman in charge is responsible, and to him can be traced the cause. This, of course, is the direct antithesis of the ideal embodied in the conception of self-determination, for it not only undermines the native's capacity of leadership but it assumes that the European overlord knows best what is to the native's advantage. However repugnant this doctrine is to liberal and socialist ideals, it has worked with greater satisfaction to all concerned than theorists are inclined to admit. The reason for this may be in part that there are races, just as there are individuals, needing constantly to be directed in all their activities, and in part because, among Orientals, government by a dictatorship has always been customary. They do not possess the heritage of revolt against autocracy which is the pride of the northern European and American peoples.

With due regard for the native welfare and with full realization that the natives are loath to work more than a few days a week, the Dutch have developed the agricultural resources of the islands—especially of Java—to the utmost. They have established model farms and agricultural stations. They have fought insect pests and animal diseases. They have helped the natives im-

prove the breed of their animals and the seed of their plants. They have encouraged the native tradition as to rotation of crops. At the same time they have insisted that a certain portion of each man's land should be devoted each year to the growth of rice, which is the staple food of the islands. In short, while they have not done much to foster academic learning among the natives, they have diligently looked after their material welfare. The common saying puts it accurately if indelicately, that the Dutch policy has been "to keep their bellies full but their heads empty." The result has been a general level of well-being such as few Eastern peoples have known. In fact, if the comfort of the people and the prosperity of their rulers be criterions of successful administration, then the government of the Indies indeed ranks high.

The reproach that this government has done little to encourage democracy or nationalism among the people overlooks the fact that the Dutch are a hard-headed people who see no object in laying up future trouble for themselves. Long experience has convinced them of the incapacity of the natives to rule themselves—a fact borne out by history, which shows that the Malays have always been subject to alien domination—either Indian, Arab, Chinese, or European. Furthermore, being realists rather than sentimentalists, the Dutch see that the wherewithal does not exist to create Malay nationalism. They are not one people speaking one language, but rather many tribes speaking many tongues, and hating each other with Balkan intensity. No single group, even if it could hope in its immediate territory to drive out the Dutch, would ever be able to dominate the islands, for the reason that local jealousies are too intense and

native inexperience in the machinery of modern civilization is too great. It is a machine, after all, which is based on modern ships, on telegraphs, on modern business, on science and—in the final analysis—on modern guns. In native hands it would rust and fall apart. Why, therefore, should the Dutch seek to encourage nationalism which in this instance would result in bitter internecine warfare, to the misery of the natives, and the financial loss of the Dutch and of the world?

The fact that there is no nationalist cause in the Indies does not mean that there is no anti-Dutch sentiment. Twice recently—first in 1919 and then in 1926—this sentiment took the form of violence. In both instances the inciting cause appears to have come from abroad. The first was indirectly connected with the Pan-Islamic movement, and the second was the direct result of Russian propaganda, working not so much against Holland as against Europe in Asia. The Russians, as already shown, conceived the brilliant policy of striking at Europe, and particularly at England, by fomenting race hatred in the European colonies and in China. They realized that the Javanese, like all Asiatics, resent European rule. This in itself was enough to make easy the task of spreading revolutionary propaganda.

The lack of originality in this propaganda, which harps on catchwords having no significance to the natives and no relation to local conditions, makes it appear that the Bolshevik leaders have never stopped to analyze the real causes for native dislike of European control. It is not because it is too harsh and tyrannical, but because it is too orderly, too restrictive, too dull. The "benefits" which the white men with such pride force upon their little brown brothers are rarely appre-

ciated by the beneficiaries. "Law and order"—those idols of the West—are repugnant to Orientals. They much prefer a native judgment which is personal and venal, to alien justice which is cold, impartial, and incorruptible. Order, when achieved by an infinity of petty restrictions, is less satisfactory than the exciting freedom of disorder.

The Dutch met the revolutionary outbreak of 1926 with prompt vigor. But the fact that it had been intensively planned without the authorities having more than a suspicion of it was a shock to the Dutch authorities and to the entire foreign community in the Indies. It showed that at any time fresh and more violent outbreaks might occur without warning—that the slumbering hatred of the natives for the white men resembles a dormant volcano, which may, like the famous Krakatoa, suddenly explode and send a tidal wave round the world.

Fear of nativist uprisings is not alone in disturbing the tranquillity of mind of the Dutch rulers. They see a latent peril also in the Pan-Islamic movement. The riots in 1919 were brought about by a society known as the Sarikat-Islam, which has received its inspiration from the growing feeling among Mohammedans that they should make common cause against Europeans. This movement is again in abeyance throughout the Mohammedan world, but the element of fanaticism which has lent such strength to those who have propagated the faith of the Prophet may at any time bring forth a new religious movement which, although primarily anti-Christian, would be in fact anti-European in all Mohammedan lands governed by Europe. It has always been the glory of Islam that it overwhelms the



souls of its devotees and, in crises, gives them superb courage. Inasmuch as 90 per cent of the population of the Dutch East Indies is Mohammedan, the possible danger is not inconsiderable. In fact, where "nationalism" is bound to fail because of tribal jealousies, Pan-Islamism may unite diverse peoples of diverse tongues in common action. There are to-day in the Indies, as throughout the Mohammedan world, thousands of Haddjis or returned pilgrims, who have been to Mecca, and not a few missionary Arabs, all of whom are potential agents of Pan-Islamism. The Dutch Government watches them closely and records their activities, for although it knows that there is no danger to-day, it is wise enough to realize that some unsuspected event in Morocco, or in Turkey, or even among the Moros in the Philippines to-morrow, may rearouse Mohammedan fanaticism and touch off the spark of Islamic revolt.

Connected with the dangers of nativist uprisings and of the Pan-Islamic movements is the reaction of American policy in the Philippines. It is no secret in the East that the Dutch, like the English, have long viewed this policy with uneasiness. When America took over the Philippines the Dutch felt that she was inexperienced in colonial administration, unsophisticated, and sentimental. They knew only too well that there exists among Asiatics an underground system of communications whereby anything which discredits the white man's prestige travels with lightning speed, and that, thanks to this system, the acts of a weak or ignorant Governor-General of the Philippines, making unwise or undeserved concessions to the native politicians, would be known among the peoples of the Indies before even it was known to their Dutch rulers. Each major concession in one region strengthens the demand for a similar



concession in other regions. The climax would come if the American people were to grant the Filipinos their independence, in which case the revolutionary movement throughout the East would be immeasurably strengthened and European rule made all the more difficult, if not actually impossible. The Javanese, for example, have always looked down upon the Filipinos just as the Indians have looked down on the Javanese. In the event of Philippine independence these Orientals would say: "We are far superior to the Filipinos. If they are good enough for independence, are we not also?" and forthwith the nativist rulers would be emboldened to new activities.

Another reason why the Dutch fear Philippine independence is the conviction, based on long experience with international affairs in the East, that this independence would of necessity be only short-lived. They fear that even if the Japanese were not to seize the independent Philippines by armed force, they would soon obtain financial overlordship and, taking a leaf from the European imperialist tactics, would follow up their economic with political control. The procedure is familiar—first generous loans, then more loans with which to repay the first; then, when the inevitable default comes, a request to "administer" the customs or some other part of the national revenues. From this it is but a step to the acquisition of so much influence as to constitute *de facto* if not *de jure* political control.

The Japanese in the Philippines would mean the Japanese within twenty miles of the northernmost of the Dutch East Indies. Inasmuch as the wealth of the Indies is vastly greater than that of the Philippines, the temptation to move southward would be very great.

Even if Dutch nervousness be somewhat exaggerated, the fact remains that they are defenseless against a powerful aggressor. Their navy is insignificant. This weakness has caused them worries in the past. They know that England took Java in 1816 and only gave it back because she would not accept Sir Stamford Raffles's correct estimate of its potential wealth. Before the World War they dreaded the Germans, fearing that Germany, so anxious for a place in the sun—and in the Pacific—would annex Holland for the sake of the Indies. From 1915 to 1919, which was the period of Japanese trade expansion to the south, they became genuinely alarmed lest, in the event of the defeat of the Allies, Japan would seek to obtain a foothold in the Indies.

A note of comedy in this alarm is to be found in the fact that when one of the big American health foundations wanted to begin an anti-hookworm campaign in Java after the war, the Dutch for two years held it at bay, convinced that it was a sort of camouflaged advance guard of a new A. E. F. and that it would be followed by American business interests and later by annexation—presumably to the Philippines. The more the modest American doctor in charge of the negotiations protested that his organization's motives were purely humanitarian, the more convinced the Dutch authorities became that there was a nigger in the American woodpile.

Dutch inability to defend the Indies forces them to depend on Singapore for help in case of attack. It is no secret in European political circles that there is some sort of an understanding between the Dutch and the English about the Indies. What its terms are no one knows, but, as indicated in Chapter VI, the presumption is that Holland has granted Britain special rights

for oil in return for which Great Britain has undertaken to use her influence to preserve the status quo in the Singapore region. The truth of the matter is, of course, that Great Britain could never afford to see any other power hold the Indies, for the reason that an aggressive nation there would threaten Singapore and the valuable British holdings in Borneo and the Malay Peninsula.

Aside from the local implications of this interdependence which makes Holland one of the four great Pacific powers, it establishes another link between the politics of Europe and of the East. The Dutch are in the position of a weak nation seeking protection from the strong. In other words, their influence on Britain in the Pacific is less than the influence of the British on the Dutch. In fact, the Dutch are, in a sense, at the mercy of British policy. With an ancient record of rivalry with Britain, they have inherited the continental tradition of "perfidious Albion" and so never feel quite sure as to their future. Their friendship for England is genuine, and their appreciation of past co-operation whole-hearted, but in the background is the knowledge that Britain will be guided only by her own interests, and that if at any moment it is not convenient for the British to co-operate with the Dutch, they will unceremoniously invoke some high moral principle with which to justify turning the Dutch adrift in a perilous political storm.

Just as Holland, by her dependence on Singapore, is affected by the politics of the Empire, so the large Chinese population in the Dutch East Indies—about two million, all told—affects her relations with all of eastern Asia. Although the Chinese form only 2 per cent

of the population, their influence is out of all proportion to their numbers. Chinese have lived in the Indies for centuries. Many of them have intermarried with the natives and are more closely allied with the interests of the Indies than of China. But ever since the Dutch began to open up Sumatra, where pioneer conditions prevail, and a half-century ago found that the Javanese made indifferent workmen and disliked the country, they have been importing Chinese contract laborers by the hundreds of thousands. These coolies have been diligent and faithful, and have returned their pay many times in work. When their terms have expired, they have settled in the islands—many of them—and, thanks to their industry and intelligence, have prospered. To-day there is hardly a village in the Indies which does not have its Chinese storekeeper. The Chinese control the entire retail trade and are among the principal property-owners in the islands. They have long had Chinese schools, and even different courts from those for the Dutch and for the natives. Furthermore, there are a number of Chinese officials in the insular government to protect Chinese interests.

Unfortunately, some of the more recent Chinese immigrants from Canton have been imbued with Bolshevik propaganda, and have been trouble-makers. Chinese agitators were used by the Russians to incite the Javanese to revolution in 1926, and much anti-Dutch propaganda was spread throughout the islands by Chinese agents. But the Dutch as well as the English have been laying up possible future troubles for themselves much greater than those Bolshevik agitations by permitting the wholesale settlement of Chinese in such vast numbers in their territories.



For the moment the white men are profiting from the Chinese cheap labor. But the economic solidarity of the Chinese in Malaysia is steadily increasing, and in time may lead them to seek political influence. Certainly if ever China is united under a strong government, efforts will be made to dominate the Indies and the Malay Peninsula, not only on account of their value to the Chinese, but because of the satisfaction to the Chinese people in at last turning the tables on the hated foreigners and beating them at their own game. This eventuality, it is true, is still remote, but the day may well come when the Chinese intrench themselves so thoroughly in these parts of the world that they will succeed in undermining European control. Nothing could be more fatal to Dutch economic and financial supremacy.

The proverbial unwillingness of the Dutch to be parted from their pennies probably accounts for their past reluctance to admit foreign capital in the development of the Indies. Not only have they guarded their oil fields jealously and have permitted American companies to do business only after trying for years to discourage them, but they have viewed with disapproval the increasing investments of British capital in rubber and other plantations in Sumatra. They apparently dread the influence that this might give the British in the affairs of the Indies.

Only within the last few years have some of the more forward-looking among the Dutch Colonials realized that the best way to avoid the preponderance of British influence is to neutralize it by importing other foreign capital. As a matter of fact, the more foreign capital in the Indies, the greater the security of Dutch control in



peace or war, for not only would capitalists of one nation oppose special demands of another foreign power, but all alike in the event of an emergency would see to it that the Dutch were not forced to relinquish the islands. Foreign capital would be strongly drawn to the Indies by the efficiency of the Dutch administration and the absence of the danger—ever present in the Philippines—of confiscatory legislation or of government action that would damage business.

Just as India is the key to the British Empire and determines England's policy in Asia, so the East Indies are the key to Dutch policy, not only in the Pacific but throughout the world. Like the English, they seek only to hold what they have, for they know theirs is a priceless heritage. Hence they are aligned against Bolshevism, liberalism, sentimentalism, nativism, nationalism, pan-Islamism, and any other ism which threatens the status quo in the Pacific. They are also highly sensitive to American activities in the Philippines, and, as already indicated, look upon the possibility of Philippine independence with unmitigated alarm. Defenseless themselves, they base their hope of protection on Singapore. In other words, their interests are closely bound to those of Great Britain and the United States—a fact which is well enough understood in England and Holland but is unrealized even by well-informed Americans. If anywhere in the East there is that "community of white men's interests" about which the newspapers on the China coast have so often spoken, it is in this island world that lies along the equator and east of Singapore. This interdependence is Holland's best guarantee of peace and prosperity.



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE REST OF EUROPE IN ASIA

Of the other European nations only France has extensive territorial possessions in eastern Asia and the Pacific. Portugal still owns the Chinese port of Macao, and half the island of Timor in the Dutch East Indies. Belgium has a "concession" in Tientsin and large investments in China. Germany, as a result of the war, gave up her holdings in Shantung but is again developing an extensive trade with China. Italy's interests in the East are negligible. But regardless of the extent of their holdings and of their trade interests, all of these nations exert more or less influence in the politics of the East, if in no other way than by their reaction on the politics of Europe.

The position of France in Asia is somewhat anomalous. Like Russia and Japan, she occupied large portions of the former Chinese Empire. To-day her possessions on the eastern Asiatic mainland are extensive, embracing the area of what is generally called French Indo-China. She has her own "sphere of influence" in the Chinese province of Yunnan, adjoining Indo-China. And yet her trade with Indo-China and with Yunnan is relatively negligible, scarcely more than one per cent of France's foreign commerce. Her political power is backed by an army and navy weakened as a result of the World War. In China proper, were it not for the fact that she long ago constituted herself the protector of the interests of the Roman Catholic Church,

she would have little influence. In truth, she is of weight not so much because of what she can do, actively or constructively, as because of her power of obstruction. Eastern Asia and her Asiatic colonies are for her of subsidiary interest and value compared to Europe and the near-by African and Near Eastern colonies and protectorates. Her tendency, therefore, is to use her position in China and the Far East as a pawn in the game of European and Near Eastern politics rather than to regard it as does England India, or Holland the Dutch East Indies, as the foundation of her empire.

France is in the embarrassing position of being imperially "land-poor." She embarked on the policy of expansion at the same time that Russia, England, and Germany were appropriating the last of Asia and Africa. Empire-building was fashionable in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, after the Franco-Prussian War, France had the incentive of seeking to recoup her fortunes through developing colonies, and of obtaining potential man-power so that in the event of a war she could augment her limited army by Colonials. She succeeded in acquiring 4,000,000 square miles of territory, inhabited by brown, black, and yellow people. But her colonies proved an expensive luxury, and, except possibly in Morocco and Algiers, her colonial system did not equal that of Britain or Holland in efficiency. Today she finds her great possessions costly. She has need for an extensive navy to protect them, and yet is so overloaded with debt as a result of the World War that she cannot afford it. Her empire in Asia, therefore, has given her neither the prestige which is Britain's nor the wealth which is Holland's, but only the burden that belongs alike to both.

As in the case of Russia, many of France's activities in Asia during and since this era of expansion are only to be understood in the light of her relations with other powers. It was against England, for example, that France allied herself with Russia in 1894. The hope of being able to make a bargain with the United States about the war debt caused the French Government to delay until 1925 the ratification of the treaties drawn up at the Washington Conference in 1921-22, a delay which did much to hasten the collapse of what remained of the Chinese Government. Incidentally, at the Washington Conference the bitterness of her momentary quarrels with England about German reparations and about Asia Minor led her to do what she could to thwart England's moves, regardless of the reactions in the Far East and the Pacific.

Except in her rôle as guardian of the church in China the part which she is likely to play in the coming events in the Pacific will probably be the same which she has played in the past. In other words, she may be expected to make whichever moves in the East will best promote her more vital interest elsewhere. As protector of the church in China, however, her position is somewhat different. There are said to be some 3,000,000 Catholics in China. The property of the church is worth many millions of dollars. The Catholic missionaries, supported by France, acquired a political status in the Chinese political hierarchy and with usual zeal did what they could to help their Chinese converts when in trouble. The practical result of this was that they incurred the displeasure of the local authorities. The Protestant missionaries charged them with being largely responsible for the anti-missionary feeling that

periodically swept over China, to which Catholic supporters replied that the intolerance and stiffness of the Protestants deserved and had earned their full share of Chinese ill-will.

Although protection of church interests involved France in numerous conflicts with the Chinese, it gave her at the same time the advantages of unexcelled sources of information as to Chinese conditions. The methods of the Catholic missionaries led them into close contact with the Chinese people, whose language they learned and whose works of history, literature, and philosophy they studied. With their proverbial skill for tempering the wind to the shorn lamb, they realized before the diplomats the subversive nature of the revolutionary movement, and prepared before other missions to turn over their affairs to the Chinese converts wherever possible, retaining only the necessary supervision and direction. By a curious anomaly the church—and hence France—found itself in the predicament during the anti-foreign movement of 1925-27 of sympathizing with Chinese nationalist aspirations and yet of realizing the danger to all foreign interests of a policy of excessive conciliation on the part of the foreign powers. It is no secret that among the strongest critics of the British for their failure to employ force after the Canton shooting in 1925 were some of the French fathers. Long and intimate contact with the Chinese mentality had convinced them that Britain's leniency would be misinterpreted as weakness and would lead to further trouble for the foreigners.

It follows that if there is a new movement in China against foreign missionaries and extensive outrages against Roman Catholics, France will be morally



bound to intervene to protect them, as she was—and did—in the past. Otherwise, however, she has no direct interest except that, as the owner of a large concession at Shanghai and a small one at Tientsin, she is naturally concerned about the final disposition of these special territories, and as the overlord of a “sphere of influence” she is desirous of seeing foreign commercial interests unhampered.

Germany’s position is somewhat different. Although of less immediate political influence she promises in time to be of considerable importance in the commercial development of the country. The war had naturally stopped her Chinese trade. Through the Treaty of Versailles she lost all her rights in China. When she resumed relations and her merchants returned to drum up new trade, she found that the Chinese, who in the days of her military strength had respected but despised her, were anxious to court her because she alone of the great trading nations had, like Soviet Russia, lost the privileges of extraterritoriality. But the Germans realized that such favors as they derived from this special position would disappear if the extraterritorial rights of the other nations were removed, inasmuch as Germany profited from the contrast with them, rather than from the fact that she had no such privileges in her own name. They knew that the desire of the Chinese to show how well they could behave gave the Germans protection which they would otherwise not enjoy.

The Germans were thus outside of the quarrels between the foreign powers and the various Chinese groups. They were unaffected by the boycotts against the British and the Japanese. But together with all foreigners they suffered from the stagnating influence on

business of the Nationalist movement, with its uncertainties and its partiality for Russian methods. They went about their business quietly, however, and soon regained their old position in the Chinese markets. It is more than likely that as time goes on they will take an increasing share in the China trade.

From the point of view of the international situation, Germany's rôle in China and the Pacific has two interesting angles. One is that the nature of her relations to the China trade makes it expedient for her to side with the United States against the activities of Japan or Russia or some other power which might tend to give that power exclusive or special economic privileges in any part of China. In other words, she has taken her place among the active defenders of the open door.

The other is by no means so simple nor so clear. Germany wishes to see Russia restored to the family of nations, yet she fears a Russia that might be too powerful in Europe. Her problem, therefore, is to obtain influence over Russia. She may in time wish to join hands with that country to bring pressure to bear on Britain. This policy was once favored by the former emperor. On the other hand, if ever she falls under the rule of another megalomaniac imperialist, the world may again witness Germany encouraging the Russians to advance in eastern Asia, hoping to see them become embroiled there so that Germany will have a free hand elsewhere without fear of Russian interference.

Here again, as in the relations of England and Russia discussed in Chapters X and XI, geography proves to be an important factor in international relations. Germany will continue to be torn between fear of her Russian neighbors and a desire to befriend and use them,

just as she has been in the past. The form which this relationship takes will affect the development of the Eastern political situation. It may be a few years before it makes itself felt, but the greater the recovery of Germany and of Russia, the more important will this relationship become. Germany for the moment is confining her activities to trade. But this is no reason for thinking that she is now divorced from European politics and their Asiatic backwash.

The part played by Belgium is in a sense a minor one, but it is important commercially and politically. The Belgians have been active in developing railroads and public utilities in China. Their investments in that country are extensive. At the same time they have been free from the charge of harboring imperialist designs. By a succession of unforeseen incidents they were jockeyed by the Peking Government in 1926 into abandoning their treaty rights of extraterritoriality, and were forced by circumstances over which they had insufficient control to negotiate a new treaty with the Chinese. Although the negotiations are still incomplete (December, 1927), the significance of the proposed treaty lies in the fact that it will undoubtedly be used as a precedent by China in negotiating new treaties with the other powers. In other words, Belgium, primarily interested in retaining the old rights and special privileges, has suddenly been put in the front rank of those making special and unwilling concessions to China. Although this may for the moment be of help to the Belgians, it is likely in the long run to redound to their injury.

Italy's interests in China are even smaller than Belgium's. She hoped, during the scramble preceding the Boxer troubles, to be able to pick a port for herself in

the East, but she failed and to-day has only a small "concession" in Tientsin and her prestige in the world to involve her in affairs of the East. It is true that under the leadership of Mussolini her own conception of her importance has become greatly expanded, and there have been signs that Italian imperialism might follow the evil example of German imperialism. But in the main there is little likelihood that she can affect the political situation in the East except through the pressure which she brings to bear on the politics of Europe. Like France, she may on occasions be able to embarrass England by an aggressive policy in the Mediterranean. She may ally herself with Germany and Russia—always with non-Asiatic objectives in view. She may on the other hand support England against Russia in return for English concession or assistance in Africa. But her rôle promises to be that of a modern Autolycus among the nations—"a snapper-up of unconsidered trifles," bent on making what she can out of little or nothing.

As already emphasized elsewhere, it is essential to bear in mind constantly this interrelation of European and Asiatic politics. Europeans understand it. Americans, unversed in world affairs, and accustomed to think in terms of cases rather than of tendencies, have so far been unimpressed by the efforts of men like the late Admiral Mahan and other realists to drive home this lesson. While admitting that there might be a conflict of interest between European nations about China, for example, they have persisted in regarding this as an isolated affair, instead of tracing it back to Europe and studying its relation to European developments. And yet the reaction is patent so soon as the history of Europe's relations with the East is examined even casually.



It is unnecessary to point out more than a few of the best-known instances, most of which have already been mentioned elsewhere in this volume, to show the truth of this statement.

Germany joined France in her support of Russia when that country in 1895 demanded that Japan be not permitted to occupy Port Arthur and to establish herself in south Manchuria. Germany's purpose was not to help China, but to embroil Russia and to embarrass England. Germany, again in 1904, encouraged Russia to go to war with Japan not because she liked Russia and had a grudge against Japan, but because she wished to distract Russia so that Germany might have a freer hand in dealing with Russia's ally France about Morocco, where Germany for the moment had imperialistic ambitions.


The Anglo-Japanese alliance, as already pointed out, was formed so as to place a check on Russia in her moves against England. The strengthening of the German fleet in European waters in 1910 obliged Great Britain to concentrate her naval forces in European waters, with the result that Britain's prestige in the East began to wane. Due to the World War, the rights and concessions which Germany had acquired in China in the course of her expansionist policies were transferred, at least temporarily, to Japan.

A pertinent example of the influence on American interests of the failure to take account of this reaction between the politics of Europe and Asia is to be seen in the fate of the Knox proposal for the internationalization of the South Manchurian Railway, discussed elsewhere. Commenting upon this, Herbert Croly, in his life of Willard Straight, points out that: "It was scarcely reasonable to expect British statesmen to pay the high price which vigorous diplomatic support of the



American proposal would have cost them. They were obliged to consider the reverberation of American diplomacy in China upon the delicate balance of power in Europe. Considering the awful dangers which then threatened the peace of the world, the British Foreign Office could not afford to imperil the good will of Japan and Russia for the sake of co-operating in China with a country like the United States, which was neither ready nor willing to support British diplomacy in any of its Asiatic, African or European policies." In other words, if England had backed the United States she would have alienated two allies, Japan and Russia, and got nothing for her pains. This she properly hesitated to do. The abuse which she received from Americans for this abstention was unfair and showed a curious lack of political sophistication on the part of her critics.

As a matter of fact, the balance of power which preserved the peace of Europe prior to the World War, predicated on a military-political equilibrium between two camps with conflicting interests, served as a stabilizing force in the Far East. The defeat and consequent weakening of Germany, together with the collapse of Russia, upset the old alignment in the Pacific. Two new powers, which had formerly been of secondary, became of primary, importance in the East—Japan and the United States. Until the World War Japan had participated in the balance as an aide of England. The United States had been more or less disregarded by the other powers for the reason that before the cutting of the Panama Canal her mobile naval strength that could be effective in the Pacific was small and she could not, in consequence, be considered as a great Pacific naval power.



But the war changed this. Japan became prosperous, powerful, and aggressive. The United States began to build a navy destined to be second to none. England and the European powers interested in the Far East were distracted elsewhere. It was thus natural that America's influence became greater in counterpoise to Japan's. The net outcome was that by 1921 there was a new alignment in the Pacific, three powers alone having great naval forces, of which only two had them concentrated in the Pacific—Japan and the United States. How America sacrificed her supremacy at the Washington Conference is a story to be related in a later chapter. The main point to bear in mind is that the equilibrium in the Pacific is still unsteady, and that as Russia and Germany grow powerful, or if Italy goes to war in Europe, the balance in the East may be altered. The United States is thus destined to be affected by European politics and perhaps even to become involved in them through the back door of Asia. The political significance of this in coming years may be great. It places on American public men and students of world affairs the duty of watching the machinations of European politicians, with a view not to the affairs of Europe alone but to the reaction of their motives on the politics of the Pacific.

## CHAPTER XIV

### AMERICA IN THE EAST—IDEALS

It is not surprising that American imperialism in the Pacific has been tempered by altruism. The nation's youth rendered it less prone to view the rights of Orientals with the cynical indifference which characterized the policies of the European nations, and unbounded natural resources relieved it of the pressing need of obtaining the material privileges of territorial concessions sought by Europe in Asia. Not that America's policy was altogether unselfish or free from mistakes. Only a cursory reading of Tyler Dennett's admirable history, "Americans in Eastern Asia," is necessary to see that the American Government was from the beginning looking toward the protection of future as well as of current commercial advantages and that it hoped to see a large Oriental trade developed. But at the same time it is clear that America's interests happened to be best furthered by fair play to China, and that the United States Government, in consequence, opposed the Europeans when the latter tried to dismember China. The development in Asia of governments capable of preserving order was—and is—to America's interest. The Americans fought against the granting of special rights to any nation or nations in China. Their policy was consistent—to demand equality of opportunity for all nations and special privileges for none—in other words, the open door.

Mr. Dennett reminds us that this policy, contrary to popular conception, did not originate with John Hay

in 1899, but is as old as our relations with Asia. It was first formally enunciated on the coast of Africa in 1832 and was pronounced in China as early as 1842. Hay, by his skilful use of the occasion, managed to give the policy life and to win for it a certain measure of world attention, and did so without resort to force or to alliances. Since his day the policy has acquired new vigor and bids fair in time to prevail.

As already indicated, the open-door policy was originally the resort of a weak nation unable or unwilling to meet with force the encroachments of aggressive European powers, which, as Dennett well puts it, sought privilege, not justice, in China. The United States stood to profit by seeing China kept sufficiently strong to hold the door open by herself. To the extent that American influence has prevented the further territorial dismemberment of China by foreign powers, the policy has succeeded. But American efforts to bolster up the Chinese Government have failed, not so much because of American action or inaction as because of the inability of the Chinese to govern themselves.

Failure to appreciate the impotence of China during the last century was one of the first and most natural mistakes of American policy—a mistake still repeated and which to-day renders futile much of the effort of well-meaning American friends of China who refuse to face facts. The Chinese Government not only could not, but often would not maintain its part of the various agreements and treaties entered into with foreign powers. The Americans, wilfully shutting their eyes first to the weakness and treachery of the Manchu dynasty and later to the utter incapacity of the governments of the so-called “republic,” accepted China as an equal sovereign nation and negotiated with her as they did

with the powers of Europe. They overlooked the fact that the Chinese treated them not as equals but as inferiors; that the Chinese Government did not control China; that Chinese officials were notoriously corrupt; and that promises readily made were too often meaningless. From the beginning, therefore, the Americans experienced constant disillusionment. Chinese ways have not changed, yet Americans still maintain faith in Chinese official promises. It is doubtful whether this is entirely to the Americans' credit.

But in one respect the Americans were more fortunate than the Europeans. They approached the Chinese without the racial prejudices which had resulted from unfortunate contact with the Indians and Malays. They were prepared to treat the Chinese as equals—individually as well as nationally, and lacked the arrogance manifested by most English traders. Hard experience disabused many Americans of this attitude, but in the main they have owed a deal of their success in China to the fact that in their contacts with individual Chinese there has been lacking that stiffness and impoliteness which has long been so common on the China coast.

It is true that the Americans lost something by this, and that on occasions they failed to appreciate the importance of dignity and firmness. In particular did the Americans underestimate the rôle of prestige in all dealings with Orientals, and suffered through their failure to abide by the conventions and proprieties and by their unwillingness to assume the outward trappings of wealth and style in their business and diplomatic intercourse.

Almost from the beginning the Chinese were aware of the good and bad points of this easy-going friendliness and realized that the Americans would in time



become more sophisticated. Sam Shaw, the able and engaging first supercargo of the *Empress of China* and later first American Consul in Canton, records in his diary in 1784 the remarks of a Canton merchant about the difference between Americans and English. After prolonged wrangling over a sale of goods, the Chinese asked Major Shaw if he was English, and when told "No," remarked:

"But you speak English word, and when you first come I no can tell difference; but now I understand very well. When I speak Englishman his price, he say, 'So much,—take it,—let alone.' I tell him, 'No, my friend, I give you so much.' He look at me—'Go to hell, you damned rascal; what! you come here—set price my goods?' Truly, Massa Typan, I see very well you no hap Englishman. All Chinaman very much love your country."

But before the conversation was through the Chinese merchant sagely remarked: "All men come first time China very good gentlemen, all same you. I think two three times more you come Canton, you make all same Englishman too."

Some Americans have never yet appreciated the truth that is hidden in this last sentence.


In order to understand the significance of the American policy it is necessary to bear in mind that the original struggle of the foreigners was to be treated as equals by the Chinese rather than as tribute-bearing barbarians. The various quarrels were for the most part to obtain rights which were commonly granted to aliens in civilized countries—the right of residence and travel, of doing business, of worshipping God, of receiving the protection of the law and the police, of diplomatic representation. Not until the foreign powers bombarded

the cities of China did the Chinese begin to grant equality of treatment. Force, and force alone, broke down the arrogance of the Chinese leaders.

It is perhaps not unnatural that the use of force brought in its train abuses. The deep subtlety of the Chinese has always enraged the slow-witted Anglo-Saxons. Like most strong men thwarted by cunning, the English had recourse to violence by way of redress. So great was the conflict of aims and civilizations, that out of the quarrels there gradually grew up a special status for foreigners in China—a status, be it ever borne in mind, which would have been unnecessary had China been willing to treat foreigners as other powers do, and had she been able to maintain order in her own house. The Chinese refused to permit foreigners to live in Chinese cities, but were finally prevailed upon to allow them to build European cities on the so-called “foreign concessions” which were for the most part composed of lands so undesirable that even the poorest Chinese refused to live upon them. Western engineering skill transformed them into cities so comfortable and safe to live in that they were soon flooded with Chinese residents.

The Chinese long refused to permit foreigners to trade, save under the most rigorous restrictions. Even to-day foreigners are denied the right of carrying on their business in person in the interior. Gradually, however, the Chinese were forced to give up the most unreasonable restrictions which had, in fact, been used primarily so as to facilitate personal graft on the part of the Chinese officials, and to replace the incalculable levies and transit taxes with clearly defined customs dues.

[The Chinese, whose early experiences with Christians



had not disposed them to friendliness, strongly resented the demands of the missionaries to be permitted to propagate the faith in China. It was not until force had been used that the rights of the missionaries were clearly established and suitable protection guaranteed them.

The Chinese had originally refused to have anything to do with the administration of justice for foreigners, but when later they asserted jurisdiction, it became obvious that their courts were so corrupt and their legal and judicial system so antiquated, that foreigners could obtain neither justice nor protection at the hands of the Chinese. Hence the system of extraterritoriality was developed whereby foreigners in China became subject to the jurisdiction of their own government representatives—a system which had ample precedent in international law.

In these various demands upon China the United States occasionally joined, but more often waited until others had paved the way. Although reluctant to use force, she was not averse to profiting from the use of force by others. She did not, however, obtain any naval bases (as did Britain and other powers), and the efforts of the ex-missionary envoy, Doctor Parker, to obtain coaling-stations in Formosa were not approved in Washington. She refused to hold any territorial "concessions" at Shanghai or elsewhere and early used her influence in behalf of the internationalization of the foreign settlement there. She consistently fought the system of "spheres of influence" and opposed all efforts to abridge China's control of her own affairs.

In all of these matters she showed a judicious regard for China's—and her own—interests. This tradition,

early established, has remained a guiding factor in America's Eastern policy. The United States, of course, participated in the suppression of the Boxer uprising. Her Minister was being besieged in the Chinese capital. But America opposed the partitioning of China and at the same time worked for a modification of the demands on China in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. A few years later she remitted the unpaid portions of her share of this indemnity. In 1915 she did what she could to check Japan's aggressive policy. In 1919 she led the fight for the return to China of the sacred province of Shantung. At the Washington Conference she championed China's cause, and favored the preparation of plans for the ultimate restoration to China of tariff autonomy and for the gradual abolition of the right of extraterritoriality.

The contrast between this policy and that of the other powers (until the Washington Conference) must be clear to all who have read the foregoing chapters. In endeavoring to win over the other nations to support her policies the United States, instead of seeking to protect only her own interests, has had in mind what Stanley Hornbeck has well called "the principle of co-operation in a course of self-denial and restraint." In other words, America has sought to obtain joint action of a negative sort, in order to offset the positive individual acts of other powers. This has not been postulated on isolated opposition. As a matter of fact, the United States Government has always been most successful when it has acted concurrently with other governments. In Asia as elsewhere in the world, America's foreign policy has been in the main a policy of co-operation without commitments, of independence without



isolation. She has joined with other powers when her interests have coincided with theirs. She has followed a different course when it has seemed best for her to do so. Her failure to endorse the British policy has, from the very beginning, earned the criticism of British residents—and numerous Americans—on the China coast. She has been damned for not “co-operating.” What these critics have overlooked is that “co-operation” to most Englishmen means accepting British leadership, regardless of the interests of the United States.

The greatest obstacle to effective Anglo-American co-operation in China has been that American and English policies have not always had the same objective. The first notable break came during the Taiping rebellion in the '50s of the last century, when the British did what they could to encourage the revolutionists and the American commissioner sought to strengthen the hands of the Imperial Government. There were, of course, American missionaries who sympathized with the Taiping cause, but the American Government was already acting on the policy that a strong and unified China would best serve the interests of the United States, whereas the British Government favored a weakened China. The American representatives therefore tried to hamper British plans to undermine the authority of the Imperial Government.

Again, the United States has been peculiarly free from ulterior political motives in her China policy. Great Britain, as explained, has always considered China as an incident in her Asiatic relations, and has been guided by the urgencies of Imperial policy. She has therefore taken action in China from time to time which had as its real objective to influence the political situa-



tion elsewhere. The United States has not been under this necessity.

Furthermore, the United States has never been partial to military intervention leading toward the seizure or policing of portions of Chinese territory. Over this point there have been many camouflaged quarrels between the United States and Britain or Japan. America has participated in punitive expeditions and has used armed force to protect American citizens in emergencies. But the American Government has never acquiesced in the policy advocated by many Britishers of occupying portions of China by force of arms. By the same token the United States has never looked with complacency on the various moves of Japan to place Chinese territory under martial control.

Over the question of spheres of influence the United States and the other powers also have quarrelled. These are in flat violation of the American contention that there should be equality of commercial opportunity for all in China, and special privileges for none. The nearest that the American Government came to abandoning this thesis was when the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement was negotiated in 1917, according to which the United States agreed that "geographical propinquity creates special relations between countries and that, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interest in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." It is interesting to note that this agreement was heralded by the Japanese in China as a recognition by the United States of Japan's *supreme* position in China, even though in Washington this interpretation was denied.

On many of these questions the division of opinion was not so much American vs. English as it was by classes of occupation. In the main, it may be said that the missionary interests of both countries were more sympathetic to America's policy and the commercial interests to England's policy. The business men tended to stand together less than the missionaries, for the reason that each commercial group was primarily interested in money-making, and so followed any course which brought in most cash. A notable example of this business rivalry occurred in the years 1925-26 when the Cantonese boycotted Hongkong and all British goods. The English merchants were bitter because the American business men used this opportunity to extend American trade instead of joining with the British in a boycott of Canton.

The antagonism between the missionary and the business communities on the China coast has resulted in so much hard feeling that there has been an undue amount of misrepresentation by each side about the other. A few facts stand out plainly. The interests of the missionaries were primarily idealistic. They sought to spread the gospel. They tried to check moral abuses. They taught the principles of cleanliness and fought disease and ignorance. They spread ideals of political liberty and social equality in the firm conviction that these principles would help the Chinese. They encouraged political reformers and revolutionists in the honest belief that by doing so they were furthering the cause of humanity.

Had the missionaries confined themselves to matters of soul and body they would probably never have brought upon themselves the criticism which has been

particularly acute in recent years. But they made the mistake of mixing into politics, both in China and at home. The fact that many of them spoke Chinese and had lived in the interior, among the people, gave them to believe that they understood the needs and aspirations of China better than any one else. This was true in comparison to the members of the business community, most of whom were always lamentably ignorant of China and the Chinese. But it rested on the assumption that a knowledge of Chinese aspirations implied ipso facto wise judgment about the political situation. Unfortunately nine out of every ten missionaries were—and are—politically unsophisticated. Their training and experience have not prepared them to understand political problems.

In later years the part played by the missionaries in Chinese politics was further complicated by the fact that many missionaries felt compelled to support the Chinese against the foreigners, fearing that not to do so would antagonize the Chinese and that thus a life work of devotion might be undone. By the same token the realization that they were dependent upon American supporters for the funds with which to run their missions and schools led them to send home statements about conditions in China which were based more upon hope than fact. This professional optimism has been partly responsible for the American people obtaining a distorted picture of Chinese conditions. To this extent it has hurt, rather than helped, the cause of the new China.

American Protestant missionary endeavor in China has been of three general types: religious, educational, and medical. Often the three have gone together. A

century of devotion has shown upwards of a million converts out of a total population of 400,000,000, a number of schools, several hospitals, and a general infusion of Western political and social doctrines, which have helped to hasten the collapse of the old Chinese Empire. If this effort were translated into terms of imagined Chinese attempts to "civilize" the United States we should find some 250,000 Confucians, Buddhist, and Taoist converts each taught that his own was the only true method of worship and that the mode of life of his unconverted brethren was pitiful; a Chinese medical school in Washington and another in St. Louis, run by Chinese witch doctors; several small hospitals; two colleges in which courses about Chinese government and civilization were taught to a few hundred Americans, and perhaps a score of high schools and a few hundred mission primary schools in which most of the instruction was in Chinese, and most of the teaching was designed to "Chinafy" the young American neophytes.

It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the influence of American missionary endeavors—especially on the political development of China. The missionaries have taken credit to themselves—without denial—for the revolutionary movement in China which it is hoped will culminate in the new nationalism. In so doing, however, they have aroused distrust, on the part of both the Chinese and the Japanese.

The conservative leaders in these two countries have realized that the ideas perpetuated by them would, if widely adopted, do much to shatter the old Chinese and Japanese traditions. Furthermore, they have resented the tendency of the missionaries to mix in politics

and have disliked the fact that many of them sought to interfere locally in defense of their Chinese or Japanese converts. Moreover, neither nation has forgotten experiences with Christians in previous centuries which had left Christianity in disrepute. Hence, while many individuals have been grateful for aid rendered, it is doubtful if the people as a whole have welcomed missionaries with a fervor comparable to the zeal of the foreign teachers.

The original distrust has been modified in recent years, but the Japanese, who no longer fear the influence of missionaries in Japan, are nevertheless still suspicious of American religious efforts in China on the ground that American missionaries have so often before in that country and in Korea expressed active sympathy for the Chinese or Koreans against the Japanese. This has led the Japanese to believe that American missionary endeavors are not without political implications. Some of the Japanese leaders have even gone so far as to intimate that American missionaries have been acting in secret concert with the American Government with the deliberate purpose of winning China's friendship for America in order that the United States may the better use China to check Japan. Any one familiar with the rivalry between missionary groups and with the lack of political understanding on the part of individual missionaries, realizes that even if such an idea had been contemplated, its execution would be practically impossible. What the Japanese have overlooked is that in many cases the missionaries have, perhaps unconsciously, worked against the interest of the United States.

Misunderstandings such as this have, of course, con-



tributed to the political complications of the situation and have had a direct bearing on international politics. In fact, the missionaries have always been a factor in America's Eastern policy, sometimes, as in the early days, by reason of their aggressiveness, sometimes as a result of their political ineptitude, and sometimes as the result of propaganda with which they have bombarded (and occasionally bamboozled) the Department of State.

America's altruistic efforts have not been confined to China. As the protector of the Philippine Islands the United States has become the overlord of the only large body of Christians in the East. There are, all told, about 10,000,000 Christian Filipinos, nearly all of whom have been brought up in the faith of the Catholic Church. The Spaniards, who did little to care for the material well-being of the Filipino peoples, spent 300 years in converting them to Christianity. The impress of Spanish Catholicism is deep and the devotion of the people beyond question. Although the American Government in the Philippines has nothing to do with the perpetuation of religion, it stands to reason that as trustee of the Islands it is morally bound to protect the spiritual well-being of the people in the event that they are threatened by external forces hostile to Christianity.

Not content with this guardianship of Christianity in the Orient, the American people have embarked upon the task of helping the Filipino people in every possible way. It may be said that in one hand they have carried a schoolbook and in the other a bankbook. The latter, when fairly balanced, will show that the United States has spent much more on the Philippines than she has ever got out of them, and that the Filipinos have gained

much more than the Americans from the relationship. The American effort in the Philippines has rested on the highest motives. Unfortunately, in too many instances, America's altruism has proved to be misapplied, as it has failed to take account of actual conditions and tendencies.

This inability to understand the relation between aspiration and actuality has been an outstanding defect of the American people. So divorced has opinion on international subjects been from reality that Americans are as yet hardly aware that two events occurred within the last thirty years which transformed the United States, internationally viewed, from a well-meaning child whom it might be best to humor if he became petulant, into a vigorous and powerful young man who remains ignorant of the real cause of his strength, and who does not fully understand whither his road is leading him.

## CHAPTER XV

### AMERICANS IN THE EAST—REALITIES

The sinking of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor in February, 1898, resulted in the United States becoming an Asiatic power. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 made her an insular power. Her wealth, unbounded resources, and capacity for organization, all freshly stimulated in the Great War, have since made her a world-power of the first rank.

The occupation of the Philippines came as a windfall for American policy in the Pacific. It gave the United States a base comparable to the British port of Hong-kong, and necessitated in the early days the presence of American troops in considerable numbers. The development of the naval station in Manila Bay made the Philippines the natural centre for the American Asiatic Fleet. These two factors taken together have greatly enhanced America's prestige and have made her a force no longer to be ignored in the development of eastern Asia.

It is not mere chance that the occupation of the Philippines and America's first effective rôle in world-politics in the East were coincident. The fact that the United States had several regiments in the Philippines made available enough troops to send an important contingent for the relief of the legations in Peking in 1900, during the Boxer uprising. This fact, in turn, gave her a right to be heard at the peace negotiations. She had now be-

come a power to be heeded in the East, whereas prior to the occupation of the Philippines the other nations had paid little attention to her wishes. The mere presence of her army and navy in the East made it easier for her to further her policy of protecting China against the aggressive designs of the powers. It was another illustration of the paradox that idealism, to be effective, must rest on force. The strong man who favors a course of righteousness is more likely to be supported than the weakling.

The Philippines gave us at the same time a reason and the wherewithal to maintain more ships in the East. Manila Bay is one of the great harbors of the world. This, coupled with the increased mobility of our fleet which resulted from the opening of the Panama Canal, greatly expanded the moral support which the navy could give to American policy. The cruise of the American fleet around the world in 1907, together with the cruise to Australia in 1925, made it plain to all doubters that the American navy is a thoroughly effective organization, well disciplined and well directed.

As a matter of fact, our present influence in the affairs of the Pacific is out of proportion to our immediate interests there. American missionary efforts, although important, are not overwhelming. American business investments in China are estimated at less than \$100,000,000. America's trade with the East is still, comparatively speaking, small. During the years 1910-14, for example, our exports to Asia averaged 5.6 per cent of our total exports. In 1925 they were 9.9 per cent. The corresponding figures for Oceania were 2.2 per cent and 3.9 per cent, making a total increase in our exports to the Pacific of from 7.8 per cent to 13.8 per cent. China

alone in 1913 took just 1 per cent of America's exports. In 1924 she took 2.4 per cent. Exports to Japan in this same period increased from 2.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent. The exports to the Philippines, although increasing sevenfold since 1910, still form less than 1 per cent of America's total exports.

Although these shipments to the countries of Asia and the Pacific furnish but a small percentage of our own trade, they are an important part of the commerce of the countries concerned. The United States provided 18.4 per cent of China's imports in 1924; 27.4 per cent of Japan's imports; 24.6 per cent of Australia's imports; and 15.6 per cent of New Zealand's imports. About 60 per cent of the Philippines' imports come from the United States.

The lesson of these figures is the steady growth of America's trade with the Orient, presaging a continual increase in volume. It has, of course, been accompanied by a corresponding decline in the percentage of trade with the other sections of the world. Europe has been losing in importance as a market for American goods, and has been furnishing a decreasing share of America's imports. Where in 1900 we sent 74.6 per cent of our exports to Europe, we sent in 1926 only 48 per cent. Asia, South America, and North America have absorbed this difference. There is every indication that our trade with eastern Asia will increase. For a number of years we have also been interested in extending our financial operations throughout the East. American bankers have invested extensively in Japanese securities. If ever the Chinese chaos is cleared they will probably consider loaning money to China for the development of industries and natural resources. In the Philippines we have





invested very little so far, owing primarily to the uncertainty of the political conditions there.

But the problem of finding markets for our potential future surplus of manufactured goods is not the only commercial interest of America in the Far East. The United States now imports about \$2,250,000,000 worth of tropical raw materials of which much comes from the Pacific. Nor is it generally understood that we import more from eastern Asia and Oceania than we do from any other region. In 1926 33.1 per cent of our total imports came from this part of the globe. The corresponding figure in 1900 was 20.6 per cent.

The acquisition of tropical raw materials in the East presents two problems—the establishment of closer relations with the Indies, and the development of the Philippines. We obtain at present most of our rubber, gutta-percha, and many other tropical products from the Dutch East Indies and from British Malaysia. There is before us the choice of continuing to buy from British and Dutch producers and merchants or of investing more money in tropical agricultural enterprises in their territories. Some of our capitalists have been interested in this proposition for a number of years. A recent report issued by the Chamber of Commerce of Medan, in the Dutch island of Sumatra, shows that American capital controlled nearly 15 per cent of the area under rubber cultivation on the east coast of Sumatra, being outdistanced only by England and Holland. Incidentally, the yield per hectare on the American plantations in 1920 was 456 kilograms, compared to 380 on the Dutch plantations and 361 on the English.

This is, of course, only a small factor in the total production of rubber of the islands, but it points the



AMERICA'S TRADE WITH ASIA BY ECONOMIC CLASSES, 1905-1926.  
A. Exports to Asia. B. Imports from Asia.

way which American capital may be willing to follow. We have seen in a previous chapter that the Dutch, who at first were reluctant to admit any foreign capital, are beginning to look upon it with more favor. Their long experience in governing the islands, together with the excellence of their technical experts, has brought to business in the Indies a stability which is and will be lacking in the Philippines so long as politics is allowed to take precedence over economics.

Whatever our final decision about our supplies of tropical raw materials, time will elapse before we can put it into effect. This is as true if we decide to find sources of rubber on the American continents as if we develop the resources of the Philippines or enter into extensive agricultural operations in conjunction with the Dutch in the Indies. A rubber plantation cannot be expected to begin to yield until after the trees are seven years old. Other tropical products also require a long period to become established.

It is to our interests, therefore, to foster, in the meantime, close and cordial relations with the Dutch East Indies. Their resources are greater than those of Malaysia, and the Dutch have not the inclination of the British to use their economic weapons in a political struggle with the United States. As they continue to develop their islands they will be more in need of markets for their products. What is more natural than to encourage closer commercial relations with the Indies?

The alternative to relying on the Indies for supplies of tropical raw materials is, as already implied, to develop the enormous latent wealth of the Philippines. This, despite the American genius for organization and mass production, we have failed to do during the last

quarter-century. In fact, we have even gone so far as to prevent ourselves by act of Congress from developing the islands. It was the Americans and not the Filipinos who restricted the holdings of agricultural lands by corporations to 2,560 acres of owned and another 2,560 acres of leased public lands. It is the Americans who are to blame for the continued unstable political conditions in the islands which have resulted in discouraging the investment of American and foreign capital in agricultural enterprises. As a result four-fifths of the total area of the islands is still unsettled and classed as public domain. Much of this is rich in forests which will yield valuable grades of tropical timber and which, when cleared, will provide large areas of fruitful soil. Of the arable land in the islands, only about one-third is under cultivation. Most of this is tilled with implements which would have been considered primitive in the days of Israel. Experience has shown that, with proper methods of cultivation, the soil and climate are suitable for the growth of almost all tropical crops, including tobacco, coffee, camphor, rubber, gutta-percha, and tapioca. It is not unlikely that experiments will soon be made in growing some of the more precious spices.

Of rubber lands alone there are estimated to be more than 1,500,000 acres. These, if properly developed, should be able to bring wealth to the Filipinos and to furnish the American people with a big share of the rubber which they now buy from the Straits Settlements and the Dutch East Indies. The problem of developing these islands is one of politics and education—of breaking down the prejudices of politicians against the improvement of agriculture by foreign capital and of

overcoming the tradition of the people that farming is an undignified occupation.

Instead of doing anything practical to help the development of the islands, we have not even been able to protect the Filipinos in the single agricultural monopoly which they enjoyed—manila hemp, or abaca. Until a few years ago more than 90 per cent of this invaluable fibre came from the Philippines. To-day, thanks to the indifference of the Philippine legislature and the ingenuity of the Dutch and British planters, abaca hemp is being extensively planted in Borneo, Sumatra, and elsewhere under suitable climatic conditions. The Philippine industry in time will have to meet the competition of neighboring countries which combine the advantages of cheap labor with highly skilled direction. The future of Philippine hemp promises to be like the fate of Brazilian rubber and of quinine. These two articles were once a monopoly of South America. But Dutch and English scientists and agricultural experts domesticated the *hevea braziliensis* and the *cinchona* in the Straits Settlements and the Indies and to-day the South American production is insignificant. Cannot American enterprise and skill match those of the English and Dutch?

American occupation of the Philippines, besides offering this opportunity for development of the economic resources of the islands, has placed on American shoulders the responsibility of bearing the white man's burden. This has created a special set of problems which, while to be settled only between the Americans and Filipinos, are of general concern to the entire East.

It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the Philip-



pine question is international, not local. What is done internally in relation to the Filipinos themselves—the measure of self-government granted, the restrictions placed upon them, etc.—as well as our decision on the question of Philippine independence, will vitally affect the entire situation in the Orient. If we withdraw we shall, as already indicated, upset the political equilibrium in the Far East. Furthermore, it is hardly possible that in so doing we should be able to escape responsibility, as the very sentimentalists who in recent years have been crying “Give the Filipinos their independence” would be the first to demand that we mobilize our army and navy to save them in case they fell into the hands of a non-Christian nation.

In order to appreciate the nature of the internal problems in the Philippines it is necessary to bear in mind a few statistics. There are about 7,000 islands, of which scarcely 300 are inhabited. Their total area is 115,000 square miles, or the equivalent of New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. They are only 500 miles from the China coast. The northernmost of the Philippine Islands is only 65 miles from Formosa, which is the southern outpost of Japan. The southernmost of the islands is within twenty miles of British Borneo and the Dutch East Indies. The Philippines thus may be said to form an essential link in the chain of islands lying off the Asiatic coast from Japan to Australia.

The total population is nearly 12,000,000, of which 90 per cent are Catholics, and the remainder divided about evenly between Mohammedans and pagans. There are two classes of Christian Filipinos, the “*ilustrados*” or men of wealth, education or political power,

and the "taos" or peasants. The former contains upwards of 20,000 persons and is largely of Spanish and Chinese mixture, locally known as "mestizos." The latter is predominantly of Malay blood with a mixture of Mongoloid and Negroid element. There are seven lin-



THE FRAME OF THE PHILIPPINES.

guistic stocks, differing from each other as much as do the languages of western Europe. More than 80 dialects are spoken in the Islands.

Only  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the area of the archipelago is under cultivation. Of the arable land only a little more than a third is in use. Eighty per cent of the total acre-

age is still classed as public domain, title to which was vested in the United States under the Treaty of Paris. If the available agricultural lands are properly developed, they should be able to support four or five times the present population.

When we went into the islands, we undertook to establish a stable government and to lay the economic foundation of a state that in time was to be self-supporting. We taught them the rudiments of self-government, and agreed to break down the barriers of illiteracy. We determined to eliminate the plagues and diseases which take their yearly toll of the Filipino peoples.

It is pertinent to compare promise with performance.

The Philippines to-day have a stable government. But its stability rests on our strength alone. Were it not for the presence of American officials and the prestige of the American Government, this stability would cease to exist. General Wood well phrased it when he remarked that "stability under the flag must not be taken to mean stability when that flag is withdrawn." It is the consensus of opinion of Americans and of intelligent Filipinos in the islands that if the American Protectorate were terminated war between the Moros and the Filipinos in Mindanao would break out almost immediately and there would be chaos throughout the islands within eighteen months.

We promised to help the economic development of the Philippines. Nearly 4,000 miles of road have been laid down, to the great profit of the islanders. But we have done little to encourage interisland shipping, which is obviously one of the most important economic factors in tying together peoples living on widely scat-

tered islands. We have done little to foster the encouragement of modern agricultural methods. Such technical and farming schools as we have established have attracted few Filipino students. Our efforts to fight animal and plant pests have been successful in so far as they have gone but have been conducted only on a limited scale. We have done nothing to equal the Dutch system in the East Indies of improving the varieties of seeds used and of teaching the natives to make the most out of the advantages of modern agricultural methods.

Our promise to prepare the Filipinos for self-government has been so far carried out that the Filipinos to-day have virtually complete autonomy. Less than 4 per cent of the officials in the insular government are Americans. The local mayors and provincial governors, the judges with the exception of a majority of the Supreme Court, the members of the Legislature, of the Senate, and of the Cabinet are all Filipinos. As a matter of fact, we have given to a people who only a quarter of a century ago were subjected to a mediæval despotism, a form of government modelled closely along the lines of American State constitutions. We have done this without inquiring into the suitability of the system to the Filipino peoples and without taking account of the fact that they do not possess the traditions of a republican form of government which has been the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon peoples and which has facilitated the success of the American political system. We have ignored the fact that public opinion is one of the safeguards against abuses of the republican form of government and that public opinion is virtually non-existent in the Philippines. The total newspaper circula-

tion is under 200,000 for a population of 12,000,000, as compared with about 35,000,000 for our population of 120,000,000. Furthermore, there are in the Philippines no organizations of semipublic nature like our civic leagues which can help check the mistakes of officials.

We agreed to break down the barriers of illiteracy. When we went into the islands, about 85 per cent of the people were illiterate. In 1926 about 60 per cent still were illiterate. Only about one million of the total population of twelve millions speak English. In 28 years about 7,000,000 Filipino children passed through school age, of whom only 530,000 finished the primary schools. The Monroe report showed that only 18 per cent of the Filipino children had gone beyond the fourth grade in school, whereas 91 per cent of the children in America finished the seventh grade. The average length in school is less than three years. During this period they learned little more than in the first grade of the United States schools. Only about 40 per cent of the children of school age are in school.

Excellent as is this record when it is realized that most of it has been done by a handful of Americans assisted by Filipinos who themselves have only an inadequate education, it has been marred by a defect of direction which has already caused many complications in the islands. Our emphasis has been almost exclusively on academic rather than on practical education. We have taught them stories about Patrick Henry and the American Revolution and have done little to show them how to become more useful citizens. This is strikingly borne out by the fact that less than 2 per cent of the total school population has taken farm schooling. As agriculture is the essential industry of the Philippines,



it is obvious that this failure has been a handicap to the Filipino peoples.

We promised to clean up the islands. This we have done and the record is one of which we may well be proud. When we went into the islands in 1900, the annual deaths from communicable diseases, such as smallpox, cholera, tuberculosis, and malaria, were in the neighborhood of 300,000. Within 15 years we had virtually wiped out these plagues. The deaths from cholera, which had been 100,000 in 1900, were only 820 in 1915. The deaths from smallpox, which had been 40,000 in 1900, were 276 in 1915.

Then came the period of Filipinization of the government service. Strict American supervision was relaxed. Almost immediately health conditions began to decline. By 1919 the deaths from cholera, which in 1915 had been 820, were 17,537. The deaths from smallpox, which in 1915 had been 276, were 49,971 in 1919. The situation was so alarming that the Americans again gave their close attention to this phase of public work and by 1921 the deaths from cholera had dropped to 48 and from smallpox to 728. In 1924 there were no deaths from cholera and only six deaths from smallpox. During the winter of 1925-26 there was a recurrence of cholera, but this was promptly checked by the anti-cholera campaign which General Wood inaugurated.

Two points stand out clearly in this connection: first, that close American supervision is essential if the serious diseases are to be held in check; second, that there is still an enormous amount of work to be done on minor ailments which are sapping the vitality of the Filipino peoples. It has been said by no less an authority

than Doctor Victor G. Heiser, Director for the East of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, that 90 per cent of the Filipino peoples are suffering from intestinal parasites of one form or another.

From this very sketchy summary of our achievements, it is obvious that our work in the Philippines is unfinished. The greatest need is for the economic development of the islands. If ever they are to be self-sustaining and if ever that independence for which the Filipino politicians struggle is to be realized, the resources of the islands will have to be utilized. Not only will more roads and railroads have to be built, but a system of interisland communications will have to be carefully worked out. An extensive and intensive programme of agricultural development will have to be inaugurated, and farm schools and demonstration farms for each of the principal districts established. This means that experts in practical agriculture will have to be summoned from various parts of the world in order to show the Filipino people how best to develop their land. It means that the present political obstacles to the opening up of virgin lands will have to be removed and everything possible done to induce the Filipinos themselves to extend their agricultural activities. Above all, the old prejudice against farming, as work fit only for coolies, will have to be overcome. This implies revision of the educational system, with a greater emphasis upon practical rather than purely academic subjects. Public opinion will have to be greatly developed and newspapers and radio communication increased.

It is curious that an overdose of idealism has come near defeating America's altruistic designs. Excessive

partiality for abstract theory has prevented us from doing for the Filipino peoples what common sense shows to be best for them. Hypnotized by such phrases as self-determination, we have excused our unwillingness to shoulder the responsibilities of carrying out our promise to the Filipino peoples by saying that their own wishes should guide us and that it is not for the American republic, cradled in liberty, to withhold independence from another people.

This excuse rests on a strange example of political unsophistication—the assumption that in seventeen years a conglomeration of 12,000,000 illiterate people, but little advanced from their primitive civilization, speaking many different dialects and living on hundreds of remote islands, could be prepared to carry on by themselves the intricate machinery of a modern democratic form of government. Discarding the teaching of history and wilfully closing our eyes to the fact that this system, which was the gradual development of generations of experience, is only applied with great difficulty even by our own people, who have inherited the traditions and background of constitutional government, we assumed that a few years, a few laws, and many speeches would suffice to fit our wards to control and steer the ship of state through the perilous currents of international rivalry, commercial jealousy, and racial overpopulation.

Not that Americans should be blamed for the high ideal which they have cherished of welding these island peoples into a nation, capable of taking a leading part in the affairs of the East. But their failure to realize that this requires time—much time—and that the task of preparation is enormous and cannot possibly be

finished overnight, is a striking example of their unwillingness to face facts when in the pursuit of an ideal. To turn the islands loose to-day, with our task only half finished, would be a betrayal of our promises to the great mass of the Filipino peoples, and would result in such work as has been done soon falling before the relentless pressure of disease and indifference.

America's relation with the Philippines is an essential part of her policy in the Pacific. The problem cannot be separated from the rest of Asia and be regarded as a domestic issue concerning only ourselves and the Filipinos, for the reason that even negative action is certain to have far-reaching consequences. It is intimately connected with all our interests in the Pacific—with religion, commerce, and naval strategy, with our international ambitions and our altruistic ideals. Our prestige will rise or fall according to our conduct in the Philippines, and with our prestige will rise or fall our influence in the East. America's interests in the Pacific are thus intricately interlaced. If our idealism is to be made practical, it must be supported by a consistent policy in which right will rest on fact rather than theory and, if challenged, will be supported by might.

## CHAPTER XVI

### CHINA, THE PUZZLE OF THE ORIENT

One of the greatest mistakes made by the Western world in considering China's troubles is to think of that country in terms of twentieth-century America or Europe. Because China is officially styled a "republic," persons who have never been there—Americans in particular—are inclined to visualize an orderly and effective government, based on the consent of the governed, and divided into an executive, a legislative, and a judicial branch, with elective officials—in short, a government not unlike that of the United States to-day.

Nothing could be farther from the facts. China is not a republic but an agglomeration of jealous military dictatorships. There is neither order nor efficiency in the land. Officials are not elected by popular vote. The executive in each region is supreme, arbitrary, and ruthless. There is no legislature. Justice goes to the highest bidder. The governed have no opportunity to give or to withhold their consent. Government may be said to be by sufferance rather than by suffrage.

Furthermore there is no unity in China, no conception of loyalty to the nation comparable to the patriotism which has grown so slowly even though so assiduously fostered in the Western nations during the last three centuries. Loyalty is to the clan. The sense of common interest does not extend beyond the province. Not even the language is the same throughout the empire and coolies of the South do not understand those



from the North. Only the upper class, which forms less than one per cent of the population, has a common tongue. Until a decade ago instruction in the few schools that existed was conducted in the classical language which ceased to be commonly spoken in China nearly 2,000 years ago. Its relation to the current vernacular is not unlike that of Latin to the modern tongues of Europe. About 90 per cent of the population is illiterate. Two-thirds of the people live on the verge of starvation. Outside of the treaty ports and a few inland cities where Western influence has penetrated, social conditions are not unlike those of Europe during the Middle Ages.

Mr. Walter J. Clennell, British Consul in Foochow until 1924, has made a plea for perspective in considering the Chinese situation and, in so doing, has drawn illuminating parallels between conditions in present-day China and in England of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This analysis, unfortunately buried in a blue-book of "Papers Respecting the Labour Conditions in China" published by His Majesty's Stationery Office in 1925, reflects the ripe thought of many years of study by a mind that is essentially scholarly and yet has not been altogether divorced from practical matters. Living and economic conditions in China (always excepting those in the Treaty Ports and in the few places where foreign influence has prevailed) are, he insists, much as they were in the 1300s in England, when pestilence, famine, baronial banditry, and tyranny were customary. In fact, in the reign of King Stephen the state of affairs in England showed, according to Mr. Clennell, "a condition of violence, lawlessness, and misery far surpassing anything to be found at present in Fukien, though

in some ways not dissimilar." Even in the days of Richard III occurred in England an event that closely paralleled an incident in China in 1920 and caused little more comment in old England than its counterpart did in modern China.

King Richard had long quarrelled with Lord Hastings, whom he feared and hated. One day, at a meeting of the Council Board, feeling that the time had come to get rid of Hastings, he pounded his fist on the table and called out to him: "I shall not dine, my lord, till your head is brought to me." Forthwith troops entered the room and hurried Lord Hastings to his execution.

In 1920 General Li Hou-chi, war-lord of Fukien, invited his principal rival, General Hsia, to dinner and during the meal had him taken out into the courtyard and shot. The incident provoked enough criticism to induce the war-lord to publish a justification, but it was not looked upon as particularly cruel or treacherous. As Mr. Clennell pointed out, the England in which the Hastings incident occurred had a long way to go before law could mean what it means to modern Englishmen, and China must travel an equally long journey.

In other words, it took Europe about twenty generations to grow out of a social and economic condition not unlike that which prevails in China to-day into its present system. About which Mr. Clennell sagely remarks that: "however highly we may esteem the virtue and intelligence of Asiatics, it seems improbable that they are so far our natural superiors as to be capable in one act, by the promulgation of one law or code of regulations, or by the united efforts of one generation, should one generation ever be so happy as to be united, of accomplishing what it took Europeans about five cen-

turies to effect." He adds that it is his opinion that if we in our generation can help China raise its average level to the English average of 1450 or 1500 we shall not have done badly.

It is obvious that to attach to events in such a China the labels of "nationalism," "imperialism," "self-determination," and all the terms which we associate with contemporary politics is to give a false impression of true conditions there. This is equally true of the word "revolution," which has been freely used with the purpose of carrying the implications to Americans that China is passing through an upheaval which parallels the American revolution and that the real struggle is for liberty and independence from tyrannical control. Rather than "revolution" the political disturbances should be described as organized banditry on a large scale, with each super-bandit (call him "war-lord," "Tuchun" or "military governor" if you will) bent on making as much money as possible for himself and family and friends and, if not too expensive, on trying to occupy the throne in Peking. The lure of the Forbidden City, with its magnificent "swank" and its truly imperial grandeur, is as compelling to the Chinese generals as it is picturesque and impressive to foreigners. The position of "Son of Heaven" is vacant in China. There are many who are willing to accept it if they can have any prospect of holding it.

The present chaos in China is nothing new. It is but a stage in the revolt against the old order which began as early as the Taiping rebellion in the 1850s. Then as during the Boxer uprising and again in 1927, the movement had a strong anti-foreign tinge. The Manchu dynasty, it should be remembered, was always regarded

by the southern Chinese as alien. This fact, coupled with prolonged dissatisfaction magnified by some Christian converts and abetted by numerous American missionaries, led to a formidable anti-dynastic uprising that was not quelled for twenty years. In the late '90s the anti-dynastic feeling became resurgent again, in the form of the Boxer uprising. The old Empress Dowager, seeing her throne menaced, skilfully turned the movement away from herself and against the foreigners. In 1911, when it was clear that no member of the imperial family could maintain the hold that the "Old Buddha" had exercised over China, the dynasty was ousted and the "republic" was established. Its success was short-lived and revolt broke out anew in different provinces, only to degenerate into civil war. For a brief moment in 1927 the Southerners through the "nationalist" party came near uniting the country on an anti-foreign platform. But this organization went the way of its predecessors and collapsed when its sway became too extensive and its funds too restricted. The nationalist cause, however, persists, and in time will gain strength. The effectiveness of its service to China will depend upon the extent to which it can avoid being used by unscrupulous powers and persons who find it a convenient cloak for their own rapaciousness.

Too much emphasis has been placed on the purely political side of the Chinese chaos. This is perhaps unavoidable in view of the fact that to the Western world as well as to China the political aspects—more particularly military and international—have been most in evidence. The absence of effective government, together with the demoralizing influence of the war-lord system which has resulted in a number of military dictators



ruling different sections of China for their personal profit, has brought political problems to the front. Furthermore, the young students who have done so much to attract attention to the Chinese "nationalist" cause have been more interested in doctrinaire political theories than in social and economic realities.

The foreigners, for their part, seeing the treaties by which their status in China is set forth first neglected then openly defied by the Chinese, have directed attention to this aspect of the political situation. The Chinese in turn, by denouncing these treaties as "unequal" and by pretending that they are the causes of all of China's ills, have given a distorted appearance of importance to the international side of China's political life.

In the meantime, social and economic changes have begun which are destined to be of greater significance than the purely political manifestations. For the first time during 4,000 years of Chinese history the old order is being shaken. Respect for parental authority, with all that it implies in the way of family unity, of ancestor worship, and of nepotism, is being discarded by some of the younger element—mostly educated under Western influence. There are signs that for the discipline of ancient China is being substituted the lawlessness of the post-war youth of the Western world. Old standards are being defied, old customs ignored. This in a land where custom is less crystallized has but a passing importance. In China it is devastating. What will come of it no one can tell. The inevitable first result is wide-spread increase in the social chaos and disorder.

It is one of the cardinal principles of the liberals that the hope of China lies in the so-called "Young China"



movement, which is composed largely of students who have studied abroad or under foreign instructors in China. To support this view is naturally flattering to the pride of the missionaries and teachers who have helped these youngsters see the light of modern civilization. But persons without this prepossession are of the opinion that there is little hope for China until "Young China" grows up. They are distressed by the immaturity, the lack of balance, the lack of knowledge, and the lack of character of the students. Brilliant they are, without doubt. Their keen minds have avidly devoured the theories of government and of the social order which the West has produced. But few indeed are those among them who have been able to view these theories in their proper background. As a result they are full of plans, platforms, programmes, resolutions, reforms, and declarations which are impressive as aspirations, but which bear little relation to actualities and which have no foundation in the experience of those who advocate them.

Most distressing of all is the lack of discipline which many of the students display. They seem to have aped the worst in the American system and made it their own. Rioting, insubordination in the schools and colleges, defiance of the authorities, meddling in governmental affairs, have characterized much of the movement. Without questioning the motives, it is permissible to doubt the propriety and efficacy of the methods. When to this is added the fact that they are lacking—with a very few exceptions—in those qualities of thoughtful culture and studiousness which characterized the Chinese scholars of tradition, small wonder that observers question their fitness to take the places

of guides and leaders to which they aspire. Mr. Clennell reminds us that: "Among a people who have for ages looked on meddling in politics as bad manners, it is persons of bad manners, unprincipled and reckless adventurers and the like, who will take first and most readily to the new notion of talking politics."

It was inevitable that this student movement would be used by unscrupulous persons for ulterior purposes. The most successful exploiters have been the Soviet Russians, who saw in the students one of the few more or less united groups in China and who therefore found them convenient mouthpieces for their propaganda. Owing to the traditional veneration for scholars, the students were heard with respect, albeit observers doubt that they deeply affected more than a small portion of the Chinese population. But their influence on officials, manifested by terrorism, arson, and murder, was inordinate.

It is only fair to recall that in Europe in the 1830s and again in '48 the student movement was an important factor in politics and the students did not hesitate to try to terrorize officials. But there was little to parallel the wave of insubordination, violence, and disorder which swept through the Chinese schools and colleges in 1925 and 1926.

The most successful single item of propaganda used by the students was anti-foreignism. A high Chinese official in America once advanced the ingenious theory that the Chinese were not anti-foreign but anti-foreign treaties. This did not prevent them from placarding China with posters of foreign soldiers bayoneting Chinese women and children. Nor did it stop their looting missions and schools, or forcing out foreign business,

or insulting and on occasions even attacking foreigners. It is doubtful whether Chinese coolies, however subtle their minds, saw this fine distinction and if their fundamental purpose in looting missions was the abrogation of a treaty whose contents they did not know.

The truth is that scorn for the foreign barbarian is deep-rooted and ineradicable among the Chinese. Hence the campaign which sought to blame the foreigners and their treaties for all of China's ills had an auspicious background. Furthermore it suited admirably the purposes of the war-lords to divert criticisms from their own acts to those of the foreigners. Finally, the Chinese, like all other humans, love to find a scapegoat and to blame some extraneous power for their own shortcomings.

The anti-foreign campaign was further useful in that it embarrassed the foreigners in the extreme. Reluctant to lose the status which was theirs under the treaties, they resented the wilful violation of parts of these treaties by the Chinese—a violation which they felt was but to test the foreigners' willingness to support their rights by force. Hence the more the Chinese ignored the treaties the more the "old China hands" called for gunboats. It remained for the British to devise the best policy of checking the Chinese—being liberal in their attitude and conciliatory in their negotiations, but summoning large forces to the China coast. Americans more or less bashfully followed suit, deterred from pursuing the policy whole-heartedly by the excited protests of those who had always cried loudest for a policy of generosity toward the Chinese.

The Chinese showed themselves skilful in profiting from all these differences of opinion. They applied the

## CHINA



principle of the old Chinese warrior Pan Chao in the first century A. D., who, when asked by the Emperor how best to ward off the encroachments of the foreign barbarians pressing down on the Middle Kingdom from the North, replied: "Use barbarians to fight barbarians." Thus, for example, they directed the boycott against only one power at a time, in the knowledge that the others, profiting rather than suffering from it, would not help the victim and so would incur his displeasure. In the United States they mobilized all their friends to support the policy of complete submission to the Chinese demands, however extreme, hoping thus to force the hand of the Government into pro-Chinese action which would produce a break between the powers.

As a matter of fact, their campaign was in many ways one of the most remarkable examples of bamboozling propaganda that has ever been attempted in this much-bepropagandized nation. Chinese spokesmen and their American friends presented a picture of China so skillfully concocted of half truths that for a while it deceived well-informed persons. But as usual, misrepresentation hurt, rather than helped, the cause which it was designed to further. With unparalleled impudence they played on American ignorance of things Chinese to drum up American sympathy without regard to America's interests and with but little adherence to facts. They described China as a modernized republican state like the United States, whose citizens were being daily murdered and robbed by foreigners who had despoiled the poor down-trodden Chinese of their liberties and wealth. China was said to be shackled by the "unequal treaties" and overrun by foreign soldiers and



gunboats. Law and order were pictured as prevailing everywhere in China, and by way of "proof" the fact was cited that when money is transferred from bank to bank in the United States it goes in an armored car under guard, whereas in China it is taken in an open wheelbarrow. Many other similar plausible but irrelevant parallels were brought forth, all carefully couched in language to make the ignorant think that conditions in China were the same as those in the United States.

The campaign culminated in the attempt to force through Congress a resolution fostered by professional advocates of the Chinese cause and supported by the Chinese Minister, calling on the President forthwith to negotiate with representatives of the Chinese people for the revision of all treaties. When this resolution passed the House the Chinese Foreign Ministers (North and South) cabled their congratulations to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is easy to imagine the sensation that would have occurred had agents of Great Britain, for example, endeavored to ram a pro-British measure down the throats of the American Government without regard to American interests, and had Lloyd George or Sir Austen Chamberlain thereupon cabled congratulations to the House leader. But the American people, easy-going and always anxious to please the Chinese, dismissed the incident on the ground that conditions in China were not normal.

No Chinese has yet been able to explain in what manner the abolition of the "unequal" treaties would improve the internal conditions in China. One of the wisest of the younger Chinese leaders went so far as to remark that it was quite possible that if the treaties



were revised the cause of Chinese unity would collapse, as anti-foreignism alone held the different factions together. Others admitted that extraterritoriality in no way harmed the Chinese and that the foreign settlements, instead of hurting, helped China. All resented the presence of foreign ships and troops, and most of them resented the fact that China's tariff was held down by treaty with the foreign powers. Many of those who objected to this in principle realized that in fact to remove these restrictions would result in increasing the power of the militarists, who having a new source of revenue would be able to keep more troops and to extend their operations.

Impartial observers agree that militarism is the chief curse of China, and that the war-lords are the greatest enemies of Chinese reform and of Chinese nationalism. The system is in part due to the collapse of the old imperial authority, which, being derived from heaven, was respected. No government that has taken its place has had similar sanction. Hence any one capable of raising a few thousand troops feels that his claim to rule is as good as that of the neighboring general or bandit.

The success of the war-lord system, or "tuchunate," as it is so often called on the China coast, lies in the fact that soldiering is one of the few profitable occupations in China. All central government having long since ceased to function, there is no authority powerful enough to suppress the bandit leaders who, having got together rabble armies and plundered the neighborhood, embark upon a policy of organized brigandage. In China the soldier has always been regarded with contempt. Hence only the lowest classes take up soldiering and its counterpart, banditry. They show no mercy to-

ward the poor peasants of China and delight in extorting large ransoms from the prosperous. It is almost impossible for us in our security to appreciate the utter insecurity of life of the average Chinese in the interior. He is constantly in danger of being captured by bandits or soldiers and forced to work for them under penalty of torture or of a heavy ransom being extracted from his already overburdened relatives. Writing of conditions in the province of Fukien in 1924, Consul Clennell remarks that if the unfortunate peasant fails to find some means of buying himself off, he is "commandeered to carry stores for some wandering 'army' or other, engaged in an unintelligible civil war, or in plundering the countryside for the support of a predatory adventurer and to endure this invasion of his personal freedom without notice, without wages or any sort of compensation, without the remotest chance of obtaining redress from the law, exposed to every extremity of brutality, and lucky if he should be among the 50 per cent or so of such pressed men that ever live to see their homes again."


For the most part the war-lords confine their operations to given regions. But the stronger, seeking greater revenues and more power, are engaged in a constant struggle with their rivals. In one respect they follow the teachings of old China—they accept the maxim that the best general is he who wins a battle without fighting—*i. e.*, by bribing his enemy or by so disposing his troops as to render opposition profitless. Hence Chinese warfare consists of much marching and manœuvring, accompanied by plundering and by frequent desertions. As the war-lords are out for themselves, they do not hesitate to abandon a friend who faces defeat, or to attack an ally who is becoming too strong.

Under this system of government a few provinces have prospered—notably all of Manchuria, the province of Shansi, and for a brief while Kwantung until the Cantonese nationalist movement overstepped itself. To the credit of the moderate leaders of Canton it must be admitted that in the early stages of their movement they tried earnestly to put into effect a policy of eliminating graft and of stamping out militarism. Having organized their own army and trained it well, they “cleaned up” the bandits in Kwantung and maintained order. But the task of “cleaning up” all the bandit-militarists in China was too great for them. There are still many, however, who believe that until there is a genuine “national army” directed by men who are loyal to the state and supported by modern arms, there is no hope for ending the war-lord system.

One of the special curses of the system is that it not only prevents the unification of China but hampers the economic development of the country. In the first place, the constant fighting disrupts business in the war zones, and the plundering of the farms upsets the balance of supplies. In the second place, the appropriation of the railroads by the war-lords has resulted in their virtual ruination. Equipment has been used without regard to upkeep or repairs. The roadbeds have been allowed to deteriorate. In many cases there has been actual destruction as well as the losses which have resulted from neglect. The movement of trains has become fitful, everything being subordinated to the wishes of the local war-lord, who, incidentally, has, whenever possible, appropriated such revenues as he has been able to obtain from the railroads. Because of the lack of technical experts and the fact that Chinese engineers do not


consider it part of their duty to keep up their locomotives, the loss from carelessness has been great. An outstanding example of this occurred in the winter of 1925, when Chang Tso Lin, the Manchurian war-lord, evacuated Tientsin and took with him to Manchuria a number of new locomotives belonging to the Peking-Tientsin line which had recently arrived from America. His engineers left them on a siding just across the Manchurian border, with their boilers still full of water and the fires out. As the thermometer in Manchuria in the winter often drops below zero at night, the engines were so damaged by frost that they could not be repaired with Chang's own facilities. His people thereupon blamed the Americans for having sent such "shoddy" locomotives.

Furthermore, the taxes and levies imposed by the militarists have upset trade. Attempts to control the various national revenues which have been security for important foreign and internal loans have disrupted China's credit. The Maritime Customs Service of China, it will be recalled, is operated by foreign employees of the Chinese Government and collects 5 per cent duty on all imports into China. These revenues are deposited to the credit of the Chinese Government and are security for part of China's debt. The salt industry is also supervised by foreign employees of the Chinese Government and its revenues assigned to protect other loans. As these furnish a sure supply of cash, the militarists have always looked upon them jealously and have tried to seize them for their own selfish ends. They succeeded in the case of the salt revenues. As a result, Chinese bonds have steadily declined and Chinese and foreign bankers are less and less anxious to lend money to any



CHINA'S TRADE BY COUNTRIES, 1913-25.  
EXPORTS.

Note: Most of Hongkong's share is for British account.



CHINA'S TRADE BY COUNTRIES, 1913-25.  
IMPORTS.

Note: Most of Hongkong's share is for British account.



Chinese Government. If the control of the tariff were put in the hands of the Chinese and administered by them, the revenues would simply go to enrich the chests of the war-lords.

The crying need of China is for peace and order. If a strong nation is to be built, it is necessary to give China the benefit of modern mechanical inventions—modern roads and railroads, telegraphs and telephones, automobiles, steamboats, etc., on such a large scale that the entire empire will be bound together and easily accessible from the capital, whether this be Peking or Nanking. Until this economic skeleton is constructed there is little prospect of enduring administrative reform. Herein lies the vicious circle of China, because there is no prospect of foreign money being lent to China to develop this economic structure until there is peace and order.

How to break the circle is a great problem. There are some who say that it can only be done by creating a sort of Dawes plan for China, backed by foreign force. But this, in the present state of world affairs, is an academic rather than a practical solution. An alternative has been proposed—to back some General or faction to the limit. This presents the practical objection that it is in effect interference in the internal affairs of China. Owing to the extent of the anti-foreign feeling it is likely to turn against the chosen agent all the other forces in China—in other words, to defeat its object.

Under the circumstances there seems nothing to do but to accept the verdict of numerous students of Chinese history—that the present political chaos is likely to continue for a period of from twenty-five to seventy-

five years. This does not mean that there will not be lulls of stability, nor does it preclude the splitting of China into two or more parts for awhile. But it does imply that there is little prospect of the creation of a strong government and of a unified and modernized China for a long time to come.

It would be a mistake for this reason to become over-pessimistic. The inherent good qualities of the Chinese people—their industry, their frugality, their family loyalty—are such as to warrant optimism when the long view is taken. Most encouraging of all is what may be termed the Chinese renaissance, a movement of only recent origin, which promises to infuse into China a new spirit of progress and ultimately to create among the Chinese the sense of national consciousness which till the present has been lacking and which is so essential if China is to take that place in the society of modern nations to which her history and the capacity of her people entitle her.

The underlying idea of the renaissance is the re-examination of Chinese history, civilization, and learning in the light of modern Western knowledge with a view to ascertaining how these may best be used to serve her present needs. This does not mean imposing upon China a civilization altogether alien. It is not a process of Westernization. Rather is it directing consciously in China a movement like that which proceeded disjointedly in Europe in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, breaking through the superstitions and crystallized traditions of the ages and, by turning back to the wisdom of the ancients, surveying modern needs and applying the new-old learning to them.

The part played by Western teaching in this is to provide the scientific or logical method of thought and to furnish the idea of a modern state and civilization based on machinery rather than on man-power. In Chapter VI it was pointed out that the available power in the United States is to that in China as 30 to 1. What this means is that most of the work done in China is done by man-power, whereas in the United States it is done by machinery. The leader of the Chinese renaissance movement, Doctor Hu Shih, has had the courage to contrast favorably the mechanical civilization of the West with the sweating labor of China and to contend in China that the former has greater spiritual qualities than the latter. To suggest such a heretical—and revolutionary—idea is in itself a hopeful sign that standards will be properly re-evaluated in China.

A detail of the Chinese renaissance which is likely to be of increasing importance is the "mass education movement" started a few years ago. The object is to make it possible for the many millions of illiterates to read at least the simpler Chinese characters so that they can understand newspapers and pamphlets written in the vernacular. This is being accomplished by an ingenious system of posters and simple text-books, based on a selected list of one thousand characters. It has so far met with genuine success and, being for the most part on a voluntary and unselfish basis, is doubly important as a promise of what may be accomplished when proper organization is developed among the Chinese.

The renaissance will doubtless be slow to influence politics. But it is certain to help the Chinese people realize that reforms can come only from within. In time the Chinese leaders will understand that China's

ills are largely of her own making and that they can best be cured by internal measures. Contrary to the oft-repeated assertions of Chinese "nationalist" propagandists, the special privileges enjoyed by the foreigners in China do not hinder the establishment of an orderly, effective government. It goes without saying that so soon as such a government exists the reasons for the special privileges of foreigners will disappear. But had the Young Chinese devoted half the amount of energy to considering constructive methods of improving the Chinese Government that they have given to their denunciations of the foreign treaties, they would have hastened the realization of their aspirations for a China freed from foreign influence.

The true principles of conduct for the nations toward China have been embodied in many public utterances:—to preserve the territorial and political integrity of China; to abstain from interference in China's internal affairs; to demand equality of commercial opportunity for all nations and special privileges for none; and to expect the Chinese to observe the accustomed practices of civilized nations with regard to the rights of alien lives, property, and interests in their territory. However desirable may be the revision of the treaties, there is no reason why the foreign powers should abandon their rights before China has shown at least a sign that she is capable of fulfilling obligations which a civilized state assumes toward aliens according to the accepted practices of international law.

How to apply these maxims, which like the pronouncements of the leaders of the Young China movement are easily written and glibly proclaimed, is not the least part of the Chinese puzzle. He is rash indeed who un-

dertakes to foresee the future of China. It is the enigma of the East, the great unknown quantity, much in potentiality, little in actuality. Will it ever become a strong, unified nation, or will the weight of inertia cause it to lie supine until such time as it is invited to commit harakiri?

In the meantime China, though changing, is a large body to be transformed. The political agitation is like a stove in the centre of a very large hall in winter—it gives much heat and even sheds a little light in its immediate neighborhood, but the remoter parts of the room remain but little affected until it has been burning for a long time. Is not the cause of Chinese nationalism like this stove, and are not the greater portions of China still chill with inertia and conservatism?



V

THE IMPONDERABLES



## CHAPTER XVII

### WHEN EAST MEETS WEST

To pretend that a wide gap does not exist between the point of view of the average Occidental and the Oriental is idle. The real nature of this "separateness" has been obscured by misguided efforts to evaluate it in terms of superiority and inferiority, whereas it is really a difference caused by a conflict of standards which have been moulded by antagonistic traditions. The Westerner, mentally rigid, is inclined to condemn severely those attitudes in the Oriental which are at variance with his own. The Easterner, in return, observes the ways of the Westerner with profound contempt.

The Oriental's attitude toward facts differs from that of the Occidental. To the latter a fact is compelling, definite, absolute. It is closely associated with truth, which he regards as of such importance that from early childhood he impresses on his children the necessity of being honest. His tendency to be literal, to be accurate, has been strengthened by the scientific training of the age, which seeks ever to attach values to the tangible and the concrete. This is at variance with the training and tradition of the Oriental, to whom a fact if inconvenient is a thing to be ignored, and to whom truthfulness is a relative ideal, to be adhered to or not according to expediency. The Easterner recognizes that falsehood has distinct value, and so does not regard lying with the same moral distaste as does the Occidental. A lie is reprehensible if it is rendered futile by discovery. It is a legitimate weapon in the battle of life.

The successful liar is the better man than he who "swareth unto his neighbor and disappointeth him not though it be to his own hindrance."

The mistake of the Occidental has been to look upon the Oriental's indifference to fact and to truth as a moral obloquy. This is to judge him by European, not Asiatic, standards. It has its counterpart in the undue scorn with which the Oriental regards the Occidental's blindness to deceit—his inability to detect even the more obvious untruths. This to the Easterner is proof of the Westerner's stupidity, of his mental obtuseness and slowness of wit; in short, another demonstration of his immeasurable inferiority. Thus they are led farther apart, and each becomes more set in his ways and more convinced that his alone are right. Finally, the difference between manners is such as to create silent but none the less genuine discord. The suavity and apparent humility of the Easterner is taken by the Westerner as a mark of a servile and therefore an inferior nature. The impatience and brusqueness of the Occidental are regarded by the Oriental as proof of ill-breeding.

These differences, which Meredith Townsend in his brilliant book "Asia and Europe" analyzed so skilfully after a half-century of keen observation in India, exist throughout Asia in varying degrees. The contempt of the Chinese for the foreign barbarian is based on his conviction that his people and his civilization are immeasurably superior to any other and are incapable of further perfection. Among the Malays of the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines the scorn for the white interloper rests perhaps on less intellectual bases and is better camouflaged, but it is none the less deep-rooted. Quite naturally the Asiatic is convinced that, when he

has completed the schooling of the white man, he is the latter's superior even in the special fields which are the white man's own. As the European or American is equally convinced that however "smart" the Western-educated native may be, he is not sound, the gulf that separates the two points of view is not yet bridgeable by education.

As a matter of fact, the two social systems, with all that they imply in the nature of differences of religion and moral training, of relations to the family, of the rights of the individuals and of classes, are incompatible. This is one of the reasons why when Western political and social ideals actually penetrate an Asiatic country they bring chaos in their wake. Uprooting the old, they give nothing sufficiently tangible in the new to replace what has been destroyed. The Westernized Asiatic is an outcast among his own people without becoming a European or an American. This phenomenon distressed Meredith Townsend in India, and has been observed in China and in the Philippines. In fact, the most potent criticism levelled against the American system in the Philippines is that it has tried to make Americans out of Malays. There is no reason why it should be any easier to make an American or a European out of an Asiatic than it would be to make an Asiatic out of an American.

The foundation of the social order in China, and to an only slightly lesser extent in Japan, India, and the Philippines, is the family or clan. This is bound together by the firmest and most immutable traditions. The basis of the entire structure is the perpetuation of the family name so that the ancestors may receive proper veneration. Among the living the head of the



family has patriarchal powers. The unfortunate are sheltered by the successful. The rich man is expected to find employment for his poor relatives. Hence nepotism flourishes in all occupations, including government. Loyalty to relations is undeviating. When the interests of the individual conflict with those of the family, the former must give way.

These influences have crystallized customs and responsibilities. They direct the inferior position of women, placing on the daughters of the house the duties of constant submission to their men and to the women of their husband's family. Everywhere they impose restrictions and prescribe formalities. In China the codes of ethics and rites of etiquette are so intricate that the Westerner is unable to master them. And yet their violation, although overlooked if committed by foreign barbarians, is a serious breach for any Chinese.

When this system meets the Western, with its emphasis on individualism and personal liberty, it is obvious that the result can only be explosive. Disrespect for parental authority, insistence on the equality of the sexes, the flat disregard of age-old customs, and the introduction of the brusque manners of the West, are so subversive of the entire social structure of the East that social chaos is inevitable. No wonder that the East looks upon the ideas of the West as obnoxious, and that the conservatives are as determined to throw off Western influence as are the radicals. No wonder that Christianity, which in so many instances has been the channel for the dissemination of these socially revolutionary ideas, is becoming more and more unpopular among the Chinese.

Besides these differences of point of view there is a

conflict between feudalism or an even more primitive social organization (as in the Philippines) and industrialism. The contrast between conditions in China and in the West to-day is much greater than that between England at the end of the eighteenth century and the United States to-day. Not only has China—and the rest of the Orient outside of Japan—to undergo the social throes and economic consequences of the industrial revolution through which England and later the rest of Europe and the United States went, but it has to pass through the previous stages of social transformation which England and the Western nations experienced between the end of feudalism and the beginning of the industrial revolution.

In China the introduction of the very fundamentals of modern civilization—roads, railroads, steamboats, telegraphs, etc., has been resisted with a determination not even matched in the early mill riots in England. When, as in China, transportation is mostly on the backs of men and women, or, at best, by wheelbarrow—save along the rivers and canals—the prospects of modern mechanical transportation or of railroads are resisted literally with violence. In a city of rickshaws the automobile is fought because it throws hundreds of people out of work. As in Europe in the early stages of the industrial revolution, the new innovations and machines for the nonce overthrow the balance of economics and force thousands already starving to be idle. Is it surprising that industrialism and its tangible signs such as machines of all kinds increase the natural dislike of the Easterner for Western civilization? The more he sees of it, the more profoundly distasteful it is to him.

Why, under these circumstances, should Japan,

which seventy-five years ago was in a state of feudalism like China, have succeeded in modernizing her life without disaster? This anomaly has long puzzled students of the East. The common explanation is that Japan had a strong government to begin with, and that the demand for reform, coming from above, could be forthwith acted upon. China neither had nor has such a government. Furthermore the impulse to learn from the West was lacking in China until 1900, and even then was but feeble. The Chinese considered that their civilization was so superior to that of the whites that they could learn nothing. The Japanese, perceiving the advantages to themselves of some of the Western learning, forthwith began to examine it systematically and adopt what seemed most useful. They sent experts to study railroads and science, government and education, religion and war. They employed European and American instructors in different fields. The directing force was intelligent, capable, and powerful. Hence the change was effected by mandate, and the people obliged to obey. In China the desire as well as the power was lacking. Such demands for modernization as there were—and are—come from the bottom up. All that they have done so far has been to deprive the already enfeebled government of what little authority remained to it, and so, instead of bringing about the modernization of China, have only hastened the destruction of the old order.

A curious survival of mediævalism has added to the difficulties of modernizing China—superstition. The illiterate—that is, the average—Chinese is full of beliefs of spirits good and bad, of ghosts, and of all manner of magic forces. Superstition helped check the building of

railroads, as these were considered to be forces of evil. When Li Hung Chang first embarked upon his policy of establishing telegraph lines throughout the country, they were often torn down as "bad magic," responsible for new ills in the locality. They were only accepted when the explanation was widely broadcast that Li Hung Chang in a previous incarnation had been a spider and hence was doomed in his present life to spin his web all over China.

We of the West, reading about these matters, are inclined to feel unctious pity. "Surely," we say to ourselves, "a people with such benighted views must welcome our civilization." It comes thus as a shock to learn that our civilization, which we so complacently view as superior, has been weighed in the balance by their learned men and found wanting. Our arts appear to them unsophisticated; our literature of puerile value; our religion unsatisfying and unconvincing; our ethics lacking in wisdom. The only one of our philosophers whom they admit as more than a child is Plato, albeit two moderns, Bertrand Russell and John Dewey, have been well received because they have championed the political revolt of the East against the West. It would be unkind alike to these professors and to the Chinese to inquire whether their Chinese followers are any more familiar with their philosophical writings than American liberal supporters of China are with the works of Confucius and Lao Tze.

The young Chinese thinkers—including the leaders of the renaissance—are of the opinion that the West can offer China only two things—the logical method of thinking, and its counterpart, science, including not only chemistry, physics, biology, medicine, and kindred

branches, but also engineering. However unflattering this may appear to those who think well of our arts, our religion or our literature, it is nevertheless a fact which cannot be evaded. Our only comfort must lie in the thought that these are the fields in which Western minds have achieved special distinction. By chance they are at the opposite poles from the religious and speculative specialization of so many Eastern—particularly Indian—thinkers. The Western training is logical, factual, categorical; the Eastern, ethereal, illogical, mystical.

Even modern medicine and sanitation, in which Americans have succeeded so strikingly, have not been received by Chinese leaders without serious misgivings. While recognizing the splendid work that has been done throughout the world, they have not been convinced that its application to China would be altogether beneficial. They welcome Western medical schools and hospitals, but many doubt whether it is to the advantage of China to effect the wholesale saving of human life which would ensue if modern sanitary and hygienic practices could be made mandatory throughout China. They say that the country is already overcrowded and that nature's check through pestilence and disease is salutary. Furthermore, even the most enlightened cannot convince themselves with finality that no merit resides in the medical practices of old China, based almost entirely on superstition and witchcraft. It is interesting to recall that the famous Doctor Sun Yat Sen, "father" of the Chinese republic, a graduate of a Western medical school, placed himself under the care of European physicians at the beginning of his last illness, but just before his death called in the native witch doctors, ap-



parently unconvinced in the crisis that science was more effective than superstition.

The truth is that the East has in its heart little but contempt for Western learning, the logical and scientific method of approach to intellectual problems alone being excepted. It is unflattering that the Orientals who hate us most are as a rule those who know us best. This was noticeable in India even forty years ago. The "returned students" who have studied abroad are, for the most part, more bitter against foreigners than the unlettered Chinese. This may be partly due to unpleasant personal experiences with foreigners on the China coast—experiences which have unfortunately been altogether too common—but it may also come from the fact that intimacy as often breeds hatred as it breeds understanding or affection.

Opinions differ sharply as to whether the remedy for this is more, or less, contact between the races. The accepted theory is that the closer they are brought together the greater will be the mutual respect and understanding. Only such realists as Meredith Townsend and Rodney Gilbert advocate keeping them apart as much as possible.

The white man cannot escape the unflattering knowledge that wherever he has imposed himself on the Orientals, whether this has been with violence or with kindness, the gifts and advantages which he has brought have not been appreciated or welcomed. Furthermore he knows in his heart that if he were to withdraw tomorrow from India or the Philippines it would be only a few years before even such tangible monuments to his civilization as roads and railroads would disappear and the days of the white rule would be as a nightmare happily ended.

Curiously enough, the Oriental, with his endless capacity for resisting, has, with the exception of the Japanese, never displayed the quality of prolonged energetic action—the capacity of carrying on—which is so common among white men. The Westerner (and to a slightly lesser degree, the Japanese) seems to possess the power of continued supervision, of incessant “checking up” which is essential if the machinery of modern civilization is to be run smoothly and efficiently. The Oriental is a great planner, but in nine out of ten cases he fails to put his plan into effect. He is the visionary, the poet of projects. The white man is the executive, the man at the throttle. In fact, one of the essential intellectual defects of the Oriental is his tendency to confuse plan with achievement and to think that the mere formulation and publication of a project is tantamount to its execution.

The lack of capacity to push things through, together with the inability to resist the traditional nepotism of the East which makes it incumbent on an office-holder to find work for as many of his relatives as possible, are the principal defects in Oriental leadership. Intellectually most of the educated Orientals are more than the equals of the whites. But intellect alone is not enough to make a good leader. Most important is character—those instinctive qualities of devotion to duty, of loyalty to a cause, of capacity to resist criticism and to do the right thing regardless of personal consequences. Whether it is that these, being more highly cherished in the West, have been more developed among white men, or whether there be more subtle reasons, the fact remains that Occidental leadership or its Japanese counterpart is essential for progress and modernization. The

Oriental type of leadership is admirably adapted to the older order. But it has so far failed to compete successfully with the whites in their own fields.

Unfortunately for the Westerner, practical leadership among Oriental peoples, whether in business or in government, is complicated by the subtleties of "face" to which he is usually a stranger. This indefinable factor is forever active; of utmost importance to the Orientals, and rarely understood by the Occidentals. Even "old China hands" and students of the Orient, although aware of its importance and knowing what it is, are at a loss to define it. "Prestige" is not sufficiently inclusive, for appearance, whether it hides reality or fiction, is of the essence of face. Although make-believe enters into face, yet it has a direct relation to power. Manners and propriety, social codes, affect it. As if this were not enough, there is in face an element of equilibrium; when one man loses face another gains it.

Any loss of dignity implies loss of face. Hence familiarity, bad manners, rudeness, lower the white man's standing. Ignorance of customs is treasured against him. Conversely, signs of pomp and ceremony, the outward trappings of position and power, enhance face. To insult a man is to cause him to lose face, with a corresponding gain for the insulter in proportion to the success of his sally or act. When nations are concerned, the unwillingness of a foreign government to uphold its rights is regarded as weakness which implies a loss of face. The conclusion of the Oriental in such a case is that the foreign government is afraid of the superiority of the Oriental and that the latter may, consequently, insult the foreigner with impunity. On the other hand, if the foreign power shows its strength

(even though it does not use it) it gains prestige and respect.

Among the "imponderables" in the Pacific, face is probably the most important. Intimately bound up with many of the subtleties of social intercourse and life which to the average Westerner are so superfluous and distasteful, it is one of the concepts that separates the East from the West. Similarly, the Westerner's impatience, his hurry, his desire for "results" are among those of his qualities which the Oriental most dislikes. If only the Westerner were satisfied to keep his unpleasant ways to himself, the East might not be so resentful. But the Westerner in his conceit wishes to "reform" or to "modernize" the East. The impact of these two contrary forces is hardly designed to engender brotherly love and mutual understanding between the East and the West.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### RACE, RELIGION, AND REVOLUTION

No one has satisfactorily explained the causes of racial antipathy. Although some deny that it exists, mankind in the mass is still keenly race-conscious. Europeans—travellers excepted—are as distasteful to their neighbors in China as are the Asiatic residents in California to the Americans. In any consideration of political forces in the Pacific, race feeling, therefore, must be taken into account. Even where the races intermarry, as in Hawaii and in the Dutch East Indies, the blending is not complete in the brief space of a single generation. The conflict of traditions and customs which the individuals inherit usually persists.

Not even when different Asiatic races like the Chinese and the Malays mix is the product altogether stable. Fortunately the good qualities of the Chinese—their energy, persistence, and industry—are likely to dominate, with the result that the Filipino or Javanese with Chinese blood in his veins rises to the top quickly. The Spaniards mix freely with the Filipinos and produce a strain which is less distinctive than the Chinese. The children of Filipino mothers by American fathers have not yet been studied in sufficient numbers or at an advanced enough age to estimate their place in the scale. In each region the mixed race presents new and different problems.

In the Dutch East Indies alone has intermarriage between Europeans and the natives been socially sanc-



tioned. Dutch officials and planters have taken brides from the upper class among the Javanese for a number of generations. The children of these marriages are classed as Europeans, politically as well as socially. There are still differences of opinion as to the merits of the system. It was the hope of many of the Dutch leaders that the Eurasians would form a sort of intermediate class which would help rule the country. But the gap in customs is so wide that the adjustment has been difficult. If the novels of Louis Couperus correctly reflect social conditions in the Indies, the usefulness of the Eurasians is doubtful. Incidentally, should the views of the alarmists about racial mixtures prove true, the Dutch will have cause to look ahead with misgivings, as a strain of Malay blood has been carried back to Holland through the many families of officials and planters who married half-caste wives. In time we may see under the gray skies of the Low Country the dark hair and skin of the tropics.

Advocates of racial theories have, for the most part, been so extravagant as to bring about a reaction against their generalizations on racial characteristics. But it is none the less true that there are differences due to custom and tradition which sharply separate the races. Most of the tropical peoples, for example, are inclined to be indolent. This is due partly to climate, partly to the fact that so many of them suffer from debilitating diseases like malaria and hookworm, and partly to the lack of incentive to work long and hard when life is easy and nature generous.

The Chinese, on the other hand, are famed for their incessant industry—at least when working on their own account. They appear to be abstemious, cheerful, and

capable of suffering without complaint hardships which white men would consider unbearable. The Japanese in many ways resemble them, and have, in addition, some of that capacity for prolonged exertion in a given cause which is so often found among the white races.

The effect of religion on customs, which, in turn, influence racial characteristics, is interesting. There are, broadly speaking, three religious forces which are important among the "imponderables" of the international situation in the Pacific area. These are Confucianism, using the term in its broadest sense to include the ethical and social teachings of Confucius; Shinto, which has become a powerful factor in Japanese nationalist policies; and Mohammedanism, which is all-important in the Dutch East Indies and touches the Philippines.

The most interesting because the most important political factor is the Japanese cult, Shinto, "The Way of the Gods" which teaches the divine origin of the Japanese imperial family and the specially favored position of the Japanese people in the world. Many Christians and Buddhists deny that it is a religion in the proper sense of the word. The student of international affairs is not so much concerned with labels as with the fact that this doctrine or cult, deliberately revived after the opening of Japan to the West, has been moulded into a compelling force for the unification of the Japanese people and for giving them the sense of loyalty to the Empire which makes them such a power in the world to-day.

To the Western mind the prominence given to reverence for the Emperor as the direct heir of the gods seems like the personification and deification of nation-

alism. The fact that Japanese children from infancy are taught to revere the imperial authority and are taken to shrines where they pay respect to the spirit of the Sun Goddess from whom the Emperor is said to be descended, shows that in the minds of the ruling powers of Japan there is a close association between the concepts of loyalty, reverence, and patriotism. To promote and foster devotion to the Empire and the nation, the Japanese Government has been at pains to encourage the building of shrines and to induce the people to visit them on pilgrimages. "The shrines are unique institutions of our nation," a Japanese official recently explained. "They are the essence of our national organization. They are inseparably related to the state. Thus the great shrines (Ise, Meiji, etc.) must become the centres of our nation, while the small shrines must become the centres of the life of the villages and hamlets." He then went on to express his conviction that the people's faith in the state and their loyalty to the imperial house would grow deeper as the system of shrines was made more and more complete.

In an enlightening monograph, "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto," Mr. D. C. Holtom, *inter alia*, summarizes the writings of one of the lecturers on Shinto in the Tokyo Imperial University which go to show a basic difference between the Japanese and other races. This, he says, manifests itself primarily in the attitude toward the state. "In the foreign point of view," Mr. Holtom paraphrases, "the state is ultimately subordinated to individualism. The Japanese spirit, on the other hand, characteristically expresses itself in the complete abandonment of individualism to the support of a state life organized around the princi-

ple of imperial sovereignty. This fact has given extraordinary stability to Japanese political institutions."

Another lecturer, in the Law Department of the Imperial University, is quoted by Holtom as explaining that: "Subjects have no mind apart from the will of the Emperor. Their individual selves are merged with the Emperor. If they act according to the mind of the Emperor they can realize their true nature and they can attain their moral ideal. This is the fundamental relationship existing between the Japanese people and their Emperor, who is the descendant and extension of the Great Deity."

Even if these precepts be taken as ideals rather than as common beliefs, it is clear that in Shinto the Japanese Government possesses a splendid weapon for inculcating a rigid moral training in the young, and for solidifying and unifying the nation. It amounts, in effect, to making nationalism a cult, and to exalting as virtues the principles of loyalty and duty to the state, of the subordination of personal to national interests, which we of the West practise with most zeal in time of war. There can be little doubt that this teaching is largely responsible for the present greatness of Japan, and that as a solidifying force it has given the Japanese people the strength that only comes when many act as one.

Foreigners, and especially Americans, to whom the idea of the divine right to rule is archaic, are inclined to misjudge the nature of the reverence accorded to the Mikado by his subjects and to say that it is confined to forms and ceremonials rather than that it is deeply seated in the heart. Few foreigners are competent to speak about this with authority. But even the outward



manifestations of this loyalty and devotion cannot help but impress the traveller with the wide difference between the Japanese and, say, the American attitude toward the head of the state. When travelling from Dairen to Mukden, in Manchuria, on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway in the spring of 1926, I noticed that at every station was drawn up a guard of Japanese soldiers together with all the Japanese civilian officials in full dress. A Japanese officer descended from the train reverently bearing an object covered with a piece of purple silk. Upon inquiry I found that he was presenting to the different garrisons photographs of the Emperor, which were received with ceremony and humility. I could not help thinking of the sensations of the inhabitants of a small town in Nebraska had they, as "No. 9" pulled in from Chicago, been thus drawn up to receive a lithograph of Calvin Coolidge.

In Japan, Shinto has been a constructive force. In China, Confucianism and Taoism have been potent factors in crystallizing customs and in preventing progress and change. It is not necessary here to go into the details of the teachings of these systems. Suffice it to say that their precepts and rules of conduct have exerted a profound influence on millions of people throughout many centuries and that they embody much wisdom which the West could study with profit. In our present investigation the effects of these teachings are of importance in three ways: their conservative influence on political and social changes; their intensification of the population problem; and the part played by ancestor worship in requiring the utilization for graves of larger areas of Chinese soil which might otherwise be cultivated.



The ethical and political doctrines of the Confucian school tended to atrophy China. Adhered to scrupulously by many generations, they gathered the sanctity of immemorial custom and hence presented a formidable intellectual barrier to progress and modernization. Even to-day, outside the treaty ports and beyond the reach of the Western missions and the "returned students," they dominate the social and intellectual life of China. Hence it has been difficult for modern ideas to penetrate China. When they have entered, the results, as indicated in previous chapters, have usually been disruptive. To-day, for the first time in history, there is an earnest movement of doubting and questioning, of weighing and examining and appraising the old customs and traditions. It promises a transformation of China; slow, to be sure—probably requiring many generations—but none the less certain. Had it not been for the conservative force of religious and ethical training, it might have begun long ago.

One of the cardinal religious teachings of China is that men should placate the spirits of the dead. As those who bear no sons are in danger of having no one to care for their graves, the possession of many sons is regarded as a sort of insurance of perpetual well-being in the next world. Hence there is a premium on the begetting of male children which has resulted in a high birth-rate for the entire country. As the margin of living is narrow, and millions are constantly on the edge of starvation, infant mortality is high and, which is just as bad, the population remains at its maximum, thus insuring a continued low standard of living, which, in turn, implies suffering by the masses.

A concomitant of this demand for children to min-

ister to the spirits of the ancestors is the enormous area in China given over to graves, and religiously tended for countless generations. No accurate survey of the area has been made, but it has been estimated to be at least five per cent of the cultivable land. The difficulty lies in the fact that where population is densest, as in the rich valley lands, the area given over to graves is also largest. As the demand for acreage for crops is of course keenest in these districts, it follows that in a country where starvation is always so close, even a few hundred square feet in an acre are of utmost value. Unless the renaissance succeeds in ending ancestor-worship—which is unlikely for a number of generations—there is no prospect that these areas can be made productive.

In contrast both to the Confucian system and to Shinto, Mohammedanism is an aggressive force which is not closely affiliated with race or nation. It has been called a sort of international patriotism, uniting devotees across racial and national boundaries, making all good Mohammedans "neighbors of Allah." Wherever a Mohammedan goes within the territory which is occupied by his co-religionists he is not a stranger. A Javanese "haddji" or man who has been to Mecca will not be considered an outsider among the Moors of Mindanao or among the Moors of Morocco. All are brothers serving the same God and observing similar customs.

The aggressive nature of Mohammedanism, which resulted in its being spread by the sword throughout the world, has given strength to the believers in proportion to the firmness of their faith. From the beginning, the love of battle was inculcated among the followers of the Prophet. In later days, even the Arab traders who sailed the Indian Ocean and reached as far as the Phil-

ippines were the means of spreading the faith. It is a virile religion which easily lends itself to fanatical devotion.

Mohammedanism in the Dutch East Indies, as already explained, has on occasion threatened to become a political factor. But close students of the modern trend in the world of Islam in general agree with the famous Dutch authority, Snouck Hurgronje, that Mohammedanism is lending itself to modernization, and believe that the gulf which separates the Christian from the Mohammedan is narrowing. As in all profoundly conservative bodies like religious organizations, the resistance to change is great. Hence the old idea still persists that Mohammedans throughout the world owe their real allegiance to their religious leaders and that their submission to the temporal power of Christians and other infidels is only temporary.

This makes all the more important and interesting the fate of the Moros in the Philippine Islands. They are to-day the only group of Mohammedans in the world who are petitioning a Christian power to protect them and govern over them. The United States thus has a double responsibility: toward the Moros, on the one hand, and toward all Christian nations having relations with Mohammedans, on the other. The American army, having defeated and disarmed the Moros only after a long struggle, succeeded in winning their loyalty. They are a self-respecting, vigorous people, quick and hard fighters, and immensely proud. When they surrendered they received the assurance of the American officers that the United States would not permit their age-old enemies, the Filipinos, to rule over them. For years this promise was kept. But in time Filipino

teachers and justices of the peace were sent to Mindanao and gradually the control of these people was put in Filipino hands, albeit under American supervision. The bitterest resentment was inevitable, for to the Moros the Filipinos were still a slave-people.

If the Americans cannot make a suitable readjustment of this problem they will lose the confidence of their Mohammedan wards. This may have a bad effect on the relations between the white races and Mohammedans throughout the world. Islam could not but regard America's action as a betrayal of the faithful. It would also consider that the American Government had deceived the Mohammedan world when in 1903 it brought influence to bear on the Sultan of Turkey to use his power as nominal head of the church to induce the Moros to surrender to the Americans, who promised in return to protect the Moros from their enemies. Thus would the Mohammedans have reason to say that the Americans were as faithless as the Europeans, and that all Christians, like other infidels, were untrustworthy. In the event of new friction between Mohammedans and Christians this might become an evil factor.

Christianity is subversive of these Asiatic religions. The social system which it teaches, based on the brotherhood of man, is disruptive; the philosophy of individualism, which is opposed to the family system of the Orientals, is revolutionary. Furthermore, it has not been divorced from politics and from foreign national ambitions, with the result that Christianity has become in a measure identified with foreign aggression. The early contacts of Christianity with the East were not altogether happy. In the Philippines the Spaniards completely crushed what few vestiges of native culture had



developed. In China the Christian priests lost respect in their first years by demanding special privileges and aroused the antagonism of the Emperor. In Japan, where Christianity had made big headway before that country was "closed" to the outside world, the reaction against it became so violent that rewards were issued for the apprehension of all Christians, and all who propagated their "pernicious" doctrines were ordered thrown into prison.

This was before the modern missionary movement took root. It is significant that in the nineteenth century Christianity was ushered into China and Japan only under the sheltering force of foreign warships. In due time the churches learned to stand by themselves. Today they are following the logical consequence of their teachings and planning to turn over the control of the Christian movement to native priests and ministers. In other words, Christianity in order to be successful in the Orient has had to abjure all taint of alienism and join hands with local nationalism.

It is interesting to note that the Dutch in the Indies were among the first Europeans to realize the disturbing effects of Christianity on local customs. When the foreign mission movement became powerful during the last century, the Netherlands Government established rules restricting missionary activities in the Islands. In particular they set aside districts in which one sect alone might proselytize, knowing that there is nothing more subversive of the white man's prestige than the sight of missionaries quarrelling about converts—of Protestants trying to win over Catholics, or vice versa. This policy has earned the condemnation of the various Christian sects on the ground that it is an abridgment of the right



of freedom of worship. But the Hollanders value order and the contentment of the natives above all. Hence they do not hesitate to discountenance anything that threatens either.

Like Mohammedanism, Christianity in the East is a force of intolerance. It sets itself up as the only way to salvation, and endeavors to change social as well as religious customs. This is in contrast to the catholicity of the Chinese religions, which lay no claim to exclusiveness. Hence we have the interesting picture of a Chinese arranging for religious ceremonies by the priests of several different religions in the hope that one, at least, may satisfy the powers-that-be.

It is not improbable that the white man's gratuitous assumption that his ways and his religion are superior is partly responsible for the spirit of revolt against the whites that has swept over Asia since the war. In too many instances this intolerance has resulted in foreigners maintaining an offensive air of arrogance toward the Asiatics. This has been particularly noticeable in some parts of China, where the utmost lack of sympathy is displayed by English and other business men toward the Chinese. Countless individual Chinese, men of culture and education, have treasured with festering bitterness the memories of rudeness to them individually on the part of second-rate European underlings of foreign houses in China. One of the wisest missionaries, after sixty years' residence in China, remarked apropos of the so-called "nationalist" movement: "We may be seeing the dawn of public consciousness in China, but up till now it has been nothing more than private animosity."

The latent dislike of the white races which as al-

ready indicated, had long been used by local revolutionaries to further their own cause, was seized upon by the Soviet Russians and was skilfully directed to their selfish purposes. They found the ground well prepared. Fortunately for them, wide publicity had been given after the war to Woodrow Wilson's theory of "self-determination." This, as Secretary of State Lansing had rightly foreseen at the time, proved to be an inflammatory doctrine, destined to engender hatred and set nation against nation.

If applied to Asia this principle would spread chaos and war throughout that continent. It would result in a reversion to an infinitude of petty tyrannical states, mutually jealous and hateful. India would sink back into disjointed fragments, torn by civil wars. The Dutch East Indies would be split into warring principalities and their economic prosperity would disappear overnight, to be followed by famine and suffering. The Philippines would fall a prey to tribal discord. Throughout the East the intricate machinery of foreign trade, on which the Easterners as well as the people of the West have come to depend so much, would be disjointed.

If this affected the East alone it would be a matter of only local concern. The Orientals are probably entitled to bring upon themselves such sufferings as their leaders may see fit to inflict. The statement of Senator Quezon of the Philippines, "Better a government run like hell by the Filipinos than one run like heaven by the Americans," expresses a common sentiment in the East. But in these days of world interdependence the result would be little short of disastrous. The inevitable interruptions of channels of trade would bring

economic crises in Europe and America. So acute would these become that they would surely be followed by new and determined efforts on the part of the trading nations to obtain by force the right to buy needed supplies and to sell surplus. In other words, after a period of chaos and destruction we should see a new wave of "imperialism," perhaps more damaging than what had gone before because the product of urgent necessity. Decay followed the failure of the Roman Empire to maintain peace and order throughout the heterogeneous Roman world. The West of that day—for imperial Rome was to the near Orient what the Western world to-day is to Asia as a whole—succumbed when it relaxed its control over the East. But America and Europe to-day would never tolerate such a reversion to stagnation. Furthermore, they would not be inclined to repeat the experiment of lenient co-operation which has been their policy during the last few decades if, after evacuating the Orient, they were forced to move in again.

In revolution, not race, lies the real "yellow peril." The day when the hordes of yellow and brown men will march against the whites is far distant. In fact, the theory associated with the phrase "the rising tide of color" does not withstand close examination. During the past three centuries the white races have increased much faster than the colored and have extended their sway out of all proportion to their numbers. The prospect that Asia's many millions might unite—even to drive out the hated foreigners—is hardly worthy of serious discussion. So long as China is torn by factions, India is split into jealous groups, the Chinese hate the Japanese, and the Indians look with scorn on the Ma-

lays, what likelihood is there that they can ever unite—even to the extent that the nations of western Europe joined to crush Germany in 1914?

The danger lies not in cohesion but in disruption. Revolution in the sundry Asiatic states and dependencies, especially if simultaneously wide-spread, would threaten the world structure. Successful revolt in India, for example, would mean the collapse of the British Empire. It is difficult to visualize the profound effect that this would have in international politics. The economic results would be more disastrous even than the political. Inasmuch as the present rôle played by these Asiatic countries in the business of the world is determined almost exclusively by white supervision and protection, the removal of the small but powerful group of European officials and business men would cripple their production and commerce. The white man is the bearer of modern Western civilization, with its evils and benefits. On his shoulders the burden brings him weariness. If he drops it he will see the work of his forefathers undone.





VI

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE  
PACIFIC



## CHAPTER XIX

### THE NAVAL ARM OF DIPLOMACY

A direct relation exists between naval strength and foreign policy. The navy is, in fact, part of the machinery of diplomacy. In peace as much as in war the mere existence of a strong, efficient navy is of great value in the pursuit of legitimate national aspirations. As Admiral Mahan phrased it, one of the functions of force is to give moral ideas time to take root. Had it not been for the British navy the Monroe Doctrine would never have survived its first half-century. Were it not for the American navy the open-door doctrine would be a mockery and China would long since have been carved into foreign protectorates.


To go into the details of the functions of a navy in war is unnecessary. The principles of naval strategy have been lucidly set forth in the writings of Mahan, Julian Corbett, and others. What concerns us here is the fact that however much we may deplore possible war, we must realize that in the world to-day armament is still an instrument of national policy. The theory of Clausewitz, the famous German military philosopher, has yet to be disproved: that war is a mere continuation of policy by other means. War is, in fact, a crisis in policy, resorted to when diplomacy has failed to achieve its object. It follows, therefore, that the machinery of war should be proportioned to the demands of policy.

Even more difficult for the lay mind to understand is that the possession of an effective navy does not imply

that it has to be used belligerently. As a matter of fact, one of the paradoxes of politics is that the larger and more efficient the force, compared to that of potential enemies, the less the likelihood that it will ever go into action. The reason for this is obvious—no enemy will risk war with a nation which is almost certain to be the victor. In civil affairs law is enforced, in the final analysis, by the potential rather than the actual strength of the police power. So is it among nations. An ancient Chinese philosopher, Sun-Tzu, laid down the principle twenty-five hundred years ago that the greatest general was he who won the battle without fighting. A corollary of this is that it is an essential function of a navy to support policies so effectively and to safeguard interests so surely that any one tempted to thwart them will not dare do so.

Pacifists and sentimentalists have attempted to discredit armed force as an instrument of policy because cynical militarists have pronounced the vicious doctrine that "might is right." Attacking this, they have juggled words and argued that might is wrong, thus overlooking the fact that armed force is not an ethical quantity but a weapon. All depends on how it is used. In support of wickedness force is evil. But in support of righteousness it is one of the greatest powers for good in this disordered world. Effective idealism, in the final analysis, rests on might.

The United States, fortunately, has no aggressive designs. She cherishes no ambitions of territorial expansion. She seeks no exclusive trade rights which are not already hers. Like Great Britain and Holland she has one primary objective in the Pacific area—the preservation of the status quo. Her navy has therefore as its




mission to protect the Philippines and America's other external interests and, in the event of war, to be able to assure the uninterrupted flow of America's commerce while inflicting defeat on the enemy's armed forces.

It is only necessary to glance at a map to see how vulnerable would be America's line of communications in the event of an attempted campaign to protect or to recapture the Philippines. Thanks to the secret treaties made just before America entered the war, which were superseded by the agreements as to mandates in the Pacific, Japan now controls the former German islands north of the equator. Under the terms of the mandate she is prohibited from fortifying them. No charge has ever been made that she has violated this provision. But in the event of war many of these islands would form admirable points of supply and departure for hydroplane and submarine commerce-raiders and convoy-destroyers. They lie athwart the shortest route from Hawaii to the Philippines and are the stepping-stones of the future aerial route between America and Asia.

Their potential naval value was demonstrated to the world in 1914 when one of them, Pagan Island, which lies about 200 miles north of Guam, was used by the German Government as the rendezvous for German ships in western Pacific waters on the outbreak of the war. It had been secretly fitted out by the German Admiralty and had been chosen because of its advantageous harbor, which was situated about equidistant from Hakodate in Japan, Tsingtau, Amoy, and Shanghai in China, Manila, and the Dutch island of Celebes. Up till then the world knew of the island only as one of the thousand little dots in the Pacific. Its significance



in the last war is still but rarely recognized. Is it unkind to suggest that in the event of war, Japan, to-day a militarist nation not unlike Germany in 1914, would use it and others like it which are under her care?



NAVAL BASES IN THE PACIFIC.

At first glance it would appear that by relinquishing the Philippines the United States would be able to curtail her naval forces in the Pacific and would avoid a possible cause of war. This ignores the fact that the support of the Philippines is not the only interest of America in the Far East. We are morally committed to play our part in maintaining peace from Java to Japan. The Philippines are essential in this connection and to withdraw the American flag from Manila would very probably precipitate international complications of a grave order.

Furthermore, such action on our part would show a strange lack of a sense of moral responsibility. When we took over the Philippines we assumed obligations toward the Filipino peoples which we have not yet discharged. Could we sit by, washing our hands in Pilate fashion, as another power seized the Islands? Those very sentimentalists and pacifists who to-day urge us to grant them independence would be loudest in demanding that we rush to the rescue of our former wards.

In the meantime we should not be able to escape the problem of protecting our trans-Pacific commerce—especially our imports, which, as already indicated, form about one-third of our total foreign purchases. The idea that the United States is self-sufficing in the event of war is misleading. The people would not starve, nor would they suffer under a blockade as much as did the British or Germans during the World War. But the United States is now dependent on distant parts for many essentials. To mention all the articles which would have to be imported from Asia in the event of war would fill a long list. Among them are antimony, camphor, coconut shells, quinine, rubber, silk, and tungsten.

In the Pacific our capacity to protect the Philippines and to prevent our commerce from being raided by a potential enemy is determined by our naval fleet together with its bases. The importance of the latter has never been understood in this country. The public has assumed that a large fleet well manned and well supplied is enough. The truth is, however, that the areas in which a fleet may operate effectively are largely determined by the location and serviceability of its bases. A ship of war has to take on fuel, food, and water and

must be periodically within reach of drydocks for repairs. It is therefore restricted in action by its cruising radius. In an article published in *The Atlantic Monthly*, in April, 1922, William Howard Gardiner used the simile that a battle fleet is like a tremendous gun that can be moved from base to base and that will be overpowering within the limit of its range. Beyond this limit it is powerless. In other words, not only tonnage but also geography must be considered in weighing a fleet's utility.

The effective cruising radius of the American fleet has been estimated at only about 2,000 miles. This does not mean that individual ships cannot steam much farther. But it implies that a fleet starting from Hawaii would not be able to conduct operations beyond a radius of 2,000 miles and yet be able to return for refuelling, revictualling, and repairs. It was doubtless with this in mind that American strategists urged the necessity of retaining and fortifying Guam when the Philippines passed under American control. That island, properly developed, would have been, in the eyes of many naval experts, an effective base in the defense or recapture of the Philippines, being only 1,500 miles from Manila and within easy cruising distance (*i. e.*, less than 4,000 miles) from Hawaii. Others insisted, however, that it was not sufficiently impregnable to warrant the excessive cost of fortifying it.

At the Washington Conference the United States forfeited the right to strengthen Guam and to improve the defense of the Philippines, with the result that in the event of war America will be seriously handicapped in the western Pacific. The Philippines have always been considered difficult to protect because of their dis-

tance from our continent. If taken, their recapture would be very costly thanks to the fact that at the Washington Conference the United States Government was divested of power to support its policies and safeguard its interests in the Far East, leaving Japan free as the maritime power paramount in the western Pacific. This does not mean, however, that the United States would be thrown out of the Philippines in a few weeks. The fortifications commanding the mouth of Manila Bay are among the strongest in the world. They have been called incomparably stronger than Gallipoli. If adequately manned, munitioned, and supplied, they could hold that great harbor as a base for our fleet's operation in the western Pacific—always provided that the navy was reasonably ready to move.

The common explanation of America's sacrifice at the Washington Conference is that the arrangement has made war between the United States and Japan impossible. It is true that as a result of the treaties there signed it would be difficult for an American fleet to operate in Japanese waters or for a Japanese fleet to attack the American coast. But were the Philippines to be seized America would be put in the embarrassing position of having to fight an offensive war of probably long duration in order to take them back. Failure to do this would mean so great a loss of "face" that America's influence in the East thenceforth would be curtailed.

Opinion still differs as to whether or not the American delegation at the Washington Conference understood the importance of the naval bases in the Pacific. It is of record that the naval experts warned the civilian delegates about them. It is also of record that the

civilian delegates sacrificed the bases. Either they did this through ignorance, or with their eyes open. If the former, they failed in their duty to their country. If the latter, their only possible excuse is that they believed that unless they made this sacrifice the conference would fail and not only would its immediate objectives be not attained but grave dangers might arise. In fairness to them it should not be forgotten that naval experts were of the opinion that a war between Japan and the United States was a real possibility in 1921. The Japanese saw the Americans proceeding with a naval programme which would have made the United States supreme in the Pacific. The Americans were distrustful of Japan's naval and political policy. There was much friction about diplomatic problems. Japan's internal condition was bad, and might be improved by the distraction of a foreign war. It was, so to speak, Japan's last chance to strike with any prospect of success.

To-day, fortunately, the likelihood of war between the United States and Japan seems almost negligible. This is due to a number of factors, including the earthquake of 1923 and Japan's prolonged financial difficulties resulting from overexpansion. The growth of liberalism in Japan is another. But far more important than these considerations is the fact that for several years Japan has been facing an increasingly precarious situation on the Asiatic mainland caused by Russia's activities. Another Russo-Japanese war is not out of the question. So long as Japan believes that there is a real menace from Asia it would be suicidal for her to do otherwise than court the friendliness of the United States. Finally, the fact that a modern war is a process



of attrition has begun to be appreciated by the Japanese war party leaders. As shown in previous chapters, the inequality in the mineral resources of the United States and Japan is so enormous that it is difficult to see how Japan could possibly be victorious unless the American people refused to support their government.

One other political factor strongly works against war—the desire of the British and the Dutch for the preservation of the status quo in the Pacific. It is true that there are in England and on the China coast many Englishmen who would view a war between the United States and Japan with satisfaction. They see in it great commercial profits for British traders and, confident of the ultimate outcome, they feel that it would leave Australia and Canada in a safer position. Against them are powerful liberal forces in England and the Dominions which not only are sincerely opposed to war but feel that this particular war would endanger the empire. To these must be added the influence of the Dutch, who may be counted upon to urge Great Britain to throw her weight against war in the Pacific.

On the other hand, should America fail to keep up her navy and should Japan be freed from the menace on the Asiatic mainland, there might be danger of war if Japanese reactionary leaders, like those who forced the Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915, found war expedient. It is not inconceivable that they might be driven into it if the United States embarked on a policy of insulting Japan or if some other power tried to force the issue for selfish purposes. However costly to the United States such a war would be, it would almost surely be ultimately disastrous to Japan. Fortunately for the peace of the world, the inherent common sense

and the growing mutual esteem of the two peoples make such a mistake altogether unlikely.

Whether or not the fears of war in 1921 were exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the Washington Conference brought a period of stability and amity in the Pacific. At the same time it postulated three great principles: (1) that armaments may be limited by international agreements; (2) that a fixed ratio can be established for naval strength; (3) that the British and the American navies should have an equal tonnage.

To underestimate the value of these principles to world peace would be foolish—if they were adhered to. But unfortunately agreement was secured only as to capital ships and aircraft-carrier ratios, leaving the nations free to build as many war vessels of other types as each might choose. Signs of renewed expansion in these unlimited classes soon became evident, with the result that the United States called a supplementary conference at Geneva in the summer of 1927. It was hoped to bring about virtually all-inclusive limitation in accordance with the ratios agreed to at the Washington Conference. But the British delegates at Geneva harped again on the old theory that the strength of a nation's navy was a matter to be decided by itself alone. They strenuously objected to the application to cruisers and other vessels of the ratio postulated at Washington for capital ships, except on a scale so high as to amount in effect to limitation upward. They went so far as to deny the principle of equality between the American and British fleets agreed upon at Washington, despite the fact that even if the United States had ship for ship, Great Britain, by the possession of many bases, would have a much more effective fighting force than the United States with its few and inadequate bases.

As a matter of fact, the British spokesmen at Geneva were not altogether frank about the relation between cruisers, tonnage, and naval bases. Their contention was that the tonnage of individual cruisers should be reduced. They insisted that the small cruisers which Britain wanted were for defensive purposes only, whereas the larger cruisers which the United States needed were for aggressive purposes. They kept silent on the all-important fact that as Britain possesses naval bases all over the world, and that with the exception of the stretch between Ireland and Halifax these bases average about 1,000 miles apart, Britain could afford to have smaller cruisers, whereas the United States, with her few bases widely scattered, had to have ships with a larger cruising radius. At the same time the British pressed for an enlarged quota of these small cruisers, with the result that their plan, if accepted, would have meant increase, rather than limitation, of armament.

Viewed in retrospect, we see that at the Washington Conference the United States paid the biggest price for what she deemed the interest of world peace. She seriously handicapped her ability to defend her Pacific possessions. She abandoned a naval programme which would have given her the world's largest fleet. As a result Japan's naval power in the western Pacific was made more effective and Great Britain saw her only rival on the seas deprived of the right to outbuild her. In exchange for these sacrifices the United States received the acclaim of the sentimentalists of all countries and of the "hard-boiled" in England and Japan. She also received the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which, as already shown, Great Britain had sought an excuse to end.

These sacrifices, in the eyes of many people, are justified by the resulting benefits of the three principles laid down at Washington. Unfortunately, however, these principles are not yet securely established, and we see Great Britain forging ahead again to build the world's greatest navy.

Despite the limitations placed upon us by the Washington Conference, the United States is to-day one of the three great sea powers of the world. America, as already explained, is in effect a great mid-ocean island standing in relation to both Europe and Asia as England does to the Continent. Her overseas interests are constantly growing. Her trade is developing in all regions of the world. From a small, unimportant power, she has risen into the first rank of nations. It is only proper that her navy should bear a relation to her new responsibilities.

In "The Influence of Sea Power on History" Admiral Mahan has shown the part played by foreign commerce in the development of sea power. The two go hand in hand. A large foreign commerce demands a large merchant marine which, in turn, requires protection. The merchant marine in time of war serves the navy and army as transports for men and supplies. Furthermore, the merchant marine in peace is one of the best training-schools for the navy's personnel.

In the early days America had a merchant marine and a navy of which she could be properly proud. To-day she has the navy, but the merchant marine still is far behind her needs. Not only does she pay to other carriers money that might go to American ship operators, but she faces the possibility of being again without ships as she was when the World War broke out. Had



she possessed a suitable merchant marine in 1914, she would not have had to see her commerce made subsidiary to the military needs of other powers. Should she become involved in another war before her merchant marine is developed, she would be handicapped by the lack of suitable transports and supply ships. As America begins to come into her own she will find it incumbent to develop a merchant fleet which will be able to compare in efficiency with the service which was hers before the clipper-ship era came to an end.

As a result of the development of commerce and naval power, the United States not only is gaining a preponderant influence in world affairs, but is also laying the foundations of future cultural greatness. The relation between sea power and a nation's intellectual triumphs deserves special study by students of the philosophy of history. It cannot be mere coincidence that the golden age of Greece was synchronous with the maritime supremacy of Athens, or that the great epoch of Roman architecture was during the time that Rome was supreme in the Mediterranean world. Is it mere chance that the development of Venice as a commercial centre was accompanied by a florescence of the arts, and that Titian, and Giorgione in Venice, and Michael Angelo in Florence were most active in the heyday of the sea power of the Italian city states? El Greco and Cervantes, Spain's great geniuses, were in their late thirties when the Spanish Armada controlled the seas. The greatest of English geniuses, Shakespeare, flourished in the days when the British fleet broke Spain's naval power. Milton was doing his best work during the Cromwellian period of expansion. In Holland Rembrandt and Frans Hals were at their zenith as the



Dutch sea power was threatening British maritime supremacy. France reached her cultural peak under Louis XIV, during whose reign her navy threatened to rule the world. The modern expansion of Britain's navy and commerce was marked by a revival of letters. Even in America the New England of the days of the China trade and the clipper ships produced Emerson and Thoreau. Mercantile New York of this same period fathered Walt Whitman and Herman Melville. Is it not probable that the resurgence of American interests in overseas affairs will be marked by a renaissance of American literature and art?

In the meantime America's sea power enhances her prestige, and so makes easier the peaceful pursuit of her policies and the spread of her ideals. But if her naval power is to be upheld, it is incumbent on her officials to adhere in practice as well as in principle to the ratios established by the powers at the Washington Conference. This means not only that she must keep up her capital fleet and maintain the efficiency of its full quota of enlisted men and officers, but that in other classes of ships she must strive to maintain the same ratio. If the 5-5-3 principle cannot be extended by treaty to cruisers, submarines, and other auxiliaries, the United States Government has only one course open—to build up the navy until the ratios are in fact assured. The purpose of the navy is defensive, but if war comes it must be able to control the enemy's fleet and commerce. The last war taught the world the value of "commerce prevention" in bringing a hostile nation to terms. Should America be drawn into another war this would be one of the principal weapons of victory.

Although America is insular, Americans have lost

their sea sense. The days when the whalers and merchantmen were the schools which made men out of the boys of the Atlantic seaboard are now but a memory. We turn to Conrad, Melville, McFee, and Tomlinson to be refreshed with the tang of salt water. Our ancestors thrilled in the flesh to adventures on the high seas which we can parallel only in fiction. Those who sailed in tiny ships to China, or who pursued the white whale in the fierce waters of the Antarctic, knew better than we of the twentieth century the daring and spirit that characterized the men who "go down to the sea in ships."

Fortunately, the spirit of intrepidity still lives in the American navy, and so long as it persists such a fleet as remains to us will be well led. The danger lies not among those who command at sea but among the landsmen who in Congress have the power of hampering the naval forces. They are the men to whom the sea is strangest. How to convince them that the brilliant feats of Perry, Farragut, and other famous naval officers are but applications of the principles of Admiral Mahan, and that these principles should guide the naval policy of the United States, is one of the greatest educational problems which the country still has to solve.

## CHAPTER XX

### AMERICA IN THE PACIFIC ERA

Seward's prophecy has been fulfilled. The scene of world events has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. America's political, commercial, social, and intellectual interests and responsibilities in the Pacific have steadily increased in importance, with the result that the United States has become one of the three dominating powers in that region. The meeting of Europe and America in Asia has brought about a new series of world problems in the solution of which the United States is destined to play a vital part.

Unfortunately, public opinion in America has not kept pace with the facts. Except on our west coast scant attention has been paid to the changes that have taken place in eastern Asia since 1898 and their influence on our interests. What little has been spoken and written has been largely by superficial travellers or by persons having special causes to advance. Hysterical ideas have been broadcast about Japan's bellicose intentions. Much misleading propaganda about China has been spread. Discussions of the Philippines have been obscured in a maze of generalities about "imperialism" or "self-determination." Little attention has been paid to the geographical and economic fundamentals.

The elemental facts are these: that America's skilful utilization of her enormous natural resources has made her the most powerful industrial nation in the world; that her great surplus of capital has led her to invest

abroad on a large scale; that partly as a result of this and partly owing to her ever-growing manufactures she is already assuming a leading position in world trade. Formerly an exporter of agricultural products and an importer of manufactured goods, America is now an importer of raw materials and an exporter of manufactured goods. As a result, Europe, which used to be America's biggest customer, has become her principal competitor in the markets both for the purchase of raw materials and for the sale of finished products. As America's trade with Europe has declined in relative importance, commerce with Asia has increased. There is every reason to expect this tendency to continue.

This shift in the balance of production is bringing in its train a re-orientation of world interests. So long as Europe used her resources and her industrial capacities on a larger scale and more efficiently than the United States, she remained supreme in international trade and politics. But as Brooks Adams foresaw, the enormous mineral resources of the United States furnished the opportunity which American business skill utilized to transform the United States into a great commercial and financial power.


One of the results of this has been to alter the direction of world trade. Instead of one great industrial centre—Europe—exporting finished goods and importing large quantities of raw materials, there are now two. The United States not only has become a great source of supply of industrial products in competition with Europe, but she has curtailed the quantities of raw materials which Europe used to obtain from her and has gone afield—again in competition with European nations—to seek new sources of raw materials. This has

complicated the currents of commerce and in time will have political consequences.


The prosperity that has come to the American people as a result of the successful development of their economic resources has made the United States a great exporter of capital. Aside from the governmental war loans, American private investments abroad at the end of 1926 totalled \$11,215,000,000. Prior to the World War they were almost negligible. What this means is that the United States has gone the way of England, which during the nineteenth century became an enormous investor in foreign stocks and bonds, adding each year to its holdings both under the British and other flags. Although it does not follow that remittances on American investments abroad will be paid only in goods, it has been the experience of England that foreign investments have been accompanied by a material increase in foreign trade.

Everything points, therefore, to a steady growth of America's overseas commerce, bringing in its train direct interests of the American people in foreign affairs. A corollary of this is a new realization of the importance of a merchant marine. History shows that a growing overseas, as opposed to overland, trade has usually been accompanied by an expansion of naval power, and that the more dependent a nation is on sea-borne commerce the greater is its interest in sea power. At the Geneva Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in the summer of 1927, special emphasis was laid by British spokesmen on Britain's need of a large number of cruisers to protect her world-wide commerce. As Admiral Mahan put it many years previously: "Maritime trade is the parent of shipping power; shipping power





EXPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES BY CONTINENTS,  
1820-1926.




IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES BY CONTINENTS,  
1820-1926.

is the parent of naval power; and these two together are the maritime constituents of sea power proper."

Europe's consciousness of America's rivalry, together with a latent resentment of America's wealth and strength, has earned for the United States the cordial ill-will of most Europeans in Asia as well as in Europe. Advocates of Anglo-American co-operation have tried to show that the English do not share this feeling and that there is no cause why America and Britain cannot work in harmony throughout the world—especially in the Far East. These good people, however, overlook the fact that Great Britain has at least three reasons for dreading the United States: the growing power of American finance which has threatened to displace London as the banking centre of the world; the ever-increasing participation of America in world trade, with the consequent competition with English commercial interests; and the size of the American navy which has threatened British supremacy on the seas.

It is only necessary to recall briefly a few incidents in England's history to understand the possible significance of these facts. In the days of Queen Elizabeth Spain commercially and navally threatened to rule the world and force Britain off the seas. The English navy, aided by an act of God in the form of a great storm, destroyed Spain's sea power and rose to maritime greatness in her place. A half-century later the Dutch traders began to displace the English in distant seas and the Dutch navy threatened to contest Britain's naval supremacy. The English grappled with the Dutch and defeated them, occupying Dutch colonies in America and elsewhere. In the eighteenth century and again early in the nineteenth, France sought to dispute Eng-

land's domination of the world's trade. The English navy defeated the French navies and occupied French colonial outposts. At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Germany threatened to undermine England's maritime supremacy and



SHIFT IN WORLD TRADE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC, 1913-1925.

The figures above the horizontal line show the percentage of increase, 1925 over 1913; the figures below the line show the decrease. Note that the increases are all in the Pacific area. The solid black represents exports, the gray, imports, from the countries first mentioned. (Compiled from material in the League of Nations' "Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1911-1925.")

to dispute the naval mastery of the seas. The English navy, aided by other forces, annihilated the German fleet and accepted a "mandate" over former German colonies.

In the relations of America and Britain there is one factor which did not exist when these other powers threatened to take a larger share than Britain's in world affairs—the special community of interest between the British Dominions and the United States. We are born of pioneers—Americans, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders. We have inherited a common tongue and common traditions. Our governmental systems are much alike. Our problems and our aims are similar. In the Pacific we share the policy of wishing to preserve our lands for our own people. We cherish no hostile designs against any nation, no secret hopes of territorial aggrandizement.

To these spiritual bonds must be added a community of material interests. America takes the major share of Canada's exports and furnishes most of her imports. Her share of the trade with Australia and New Zealand has been steadily increasing while Britain's has been declining. There is a big market in those countries for American products. In the United States the demand for Australian and New Zealand raw materials is increasing. As the bonds of Empire weaken, the ties that bind the Dominions to the United States will be strengthened. We four are of the new world, blessed with the material foundations of cultural greatness and fortunate in having vigorous, healthy populations.

These special ties with the Dominions do not imply any lack of sympathy for Japan. On the question of race migration, of course, the United States—like the Dominions—will remain adamant. But there is no insoluble cause for hostility between the peoples in the Pacific. The markets of China are big enough for Japan, America, and the Dominions. America's traditional

friendship for China does not, in itself, imply antagonism toward Japan. It is true that Americans would view with disapproval any new attempts of Japan to carve up China, or to extend her maritime empire southward. But so long as Japan does not try to upset the status quo Americans and Japanese will not quarrel in the Pacific. The common sense of the two peoples would never permit such an eventuality.

Toward China America's policy promises to continue benevolent but quiescent. Interference in the internal political situation in China either by diplomatic pressure or by armed force is not to be expected. The Chinese people cannot count on America to help them organize a stable government. Only by their own efforts can they build to meet their own needs. All that can be hoped from the United States is that when a *de facto* government has been created, ruling the major portion of Chinese territory, the American government will recognize it as *de jure*. Until that distant day American efforts in China will have to be confined to protecting the legitimate interests of Americans in that country and to upholding the traditional policy of respect for the political and territorial integrity of China.

When a competent government is formed in China, and Russia regains her national power, we may see in eastern Asia a new political equilibrium of three powers, China, Russia, and Japan, which may well prove a valuable factor in the preservation of peace in the Pacific. Should such a balance be established it would be clearly to the interest of the American people to see that no other nations sought to upset it.

As a Pacific power the United States wants, above all, peace, so long as this can be obtained with honor and



righteousness. In pursuit of this ideal the American Government must ever be ready to use such force as may be necessary. Needless to say, if America beats her battleships into tractors she will find it more difficult to enforce peace should a powerful fighting nation seek to bring about war. By the same token, if she abandons the Philippines she will find it hard to make her wishes respected in the East.

Although America is destined by her wealth and strength to have a preponderant share in the affairs of the Pacific, her influence will be continually subjected to the counterplays of European policies and ambitions. The present alignment of Japan, the United States, and Great Britain leaves the other powers, for the moment, at least, in a secondary position. Japan, owing to her geographical location and the might of her navy, is the foremost power in eastern Asia. It may be postulated that the closer the co-operation between the United States and Japan the greater the opposition of Great Britain and the European nations to America's ambitions. Part of the penalty of being a great world-power is to incur the jealousy of other nations. The history of England's relations with the continent of Europe during the last two centuries is replete with illustrations of this truth.

The United States is to the world to-day as England was to Europe during the last two centuries—vitaly interested commercially, but politically detached. She is opposed, as was England, to any change in the political status quo. Her interests demand that no nation or group of nations becomes sufficiently strong and aggressive to disturb the balance of world politics. As insular England used her detachment to prevent any continen-

tal power from dominating Europe, so midoceanic America must be prepared to throw her weight against any nation which threatens to disrupt world peace. She is not, nor ever has been, "isolated." But it is to her advantage to preserve complete freedom of action, so that she may the better carry out the policy of co-operation without commitments, of independence without isolation, which has been hers since the founding of the Republic.





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












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
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
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